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This doctoral thesis examines the rise of Big Data as a complex sociotechnical phenomenon. 
How is it that the notion of Big Data could gain so much traction, becoming the subject of 
considerable hype and hope? Adopting a broadly interdisciplinary perspective, the article 
dissertation investigates the historical roots as well as contemporary causes of the recent 
push for data and numerical evidence. Furthermore, it critically analyses the epistemic 
promises of industry vendors, considers the implications of Big Data as a tool for policy and 
decision making, and explores fictional accounts of algorithmic regulation that may trigger a 
more reflexive engagement with the potential pitfalls of Big Data-based technologies. The 
thesis objective is to contribute to a better understanding of the politics of people's trust in 
numbers, but also to point towards a more responsible and democracy-preserving 
governance of Big Data-driven innovation. What is ultimately argued is that Big Data should 
not be seen as a fad destined to fade, but as the current tagline for a process of 
computerization and datafication that will continue to shape and transform every aspect of 





Denne Ph.d.-afhandling undersøger fremkomsten af Big Data som et komplekst socioteknisk 
fænomen. Hvordan er det gået til, at Big Data har vundet så stor opmærksomhed og er 
omgærdet af så betydelig håb og hype? Ud fra et bredt tværfagligt perspektiv undersøger 
artikel-afhandlingen de historiske rødder og de nutidige årsager til de seneste års 
efterspørgsel efter data og numerisk evidens. Endvidere foretages en kritisk analyse af 
brancheleverandørers epistemiske løfter, implikationerne af Big Data som politisk og 
beslutningsmæssigt værktøj tages i betragtning, ligesom fiktive fremstillinger af algoritmisk 
regulering udforskes, som muligvis kan understøtte en mere refleksiv håndtering af de 
potentielle faldgruber ved Big Data-baserede teknologier. Tesens formål er at bidrage til en 
bedre forståelse af den politiske betydning af vores tillid til tal, men også at udpege nogle 
retninger for en mere ansvarlig og demokrati-bevarende governance af Big Data-drevet 
innovation. Ultimativt argumenteres der for det synspunkt, at Big Data ikke bør opfattes som 
et modefænomen, der med tiden vil falme, men som det aktuelle udtryk for en digitalisering 


















This thesis represents the culmination of three years working and studying as a doctoral 
candidate at the IT University of Copenhagen, Denmark, a remarkable interdisciplinary 
institution that has proven an ideal environment for this dissertation project. Throughout the 
past years, I have benefited greatly from the support and opportunities provided by ITU, for 
which I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation. 
My foremost thanks go to my supervisor, Prof. Judith Simon, who has provided me 
with continual support, critical feedback, and valuable insight into a fast-moving research 
area. It was through her guidance and mentorship that this thesis was written in a spirit of 
curiosity and free thinking, while still balanced against the need for tangible results. For the 
chance to sometimes wander off, grow, and explore I am tremendously grateful. 
 My next thanks go to my friends and colleagues at the ITU Copenhagen, especially to 
the brilliant members of the Technologies in Practice (TiP) research group, who have 
graciously commented on parts of this dissertation on various occasions. In hindsight, I could 
not have wished for a more generous and inspiring research community. A special shout-out 
goes to the artists of wing 4E whose creative tinkering with animate and inanimate objects 
allowed my mind to rejoice whenever the written word became too difficult to process. There 
is true delight in having wonderful, thought-provoking exhibitions right outside your office 
door. For this and for the many coffee conversations, thank you.  
I am also much indebted to Prof. Geoffrey C. Bowker, Prof. Judith Gregory, and Assoc. 
Prof. Christina Neumayer for their thoughtful comments and suggestions during my mid-way 
evaluation. They have greatly contributed to the refinement of my arguments.  
Material from this dissertation has been presented at various conferences and 
meetings. I would like to thank all audiences for their questions, interest, and feedback. I 
would also like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers who took the time to read and 
comment on the articles that form the core of this thesis. Their constructive suggestions have 
helped in fine-tuning the manuscripts and pushing each paper into a better shape. A special 
thanks goes to the editors who have supported the articles' publication process, especially to 
Ass. Prof. Andrew Iliadis and Ass. Prof. Federica Russo, who guest edited the Big Data & 
Society special theme on Critical Data Studies, and to Prof. Ann Rudinow Sætnan, Prof. Ingrid 
 vi 
Schneider, and Dr. Nicola Green, who invested great efforts in seeing the edited volume The 
Politics of Big Data: Big Data, Big Brother? successfully through the press.   
In terms of finance, I am grateful to the Austrian Science Fund (grant number P-23770) 
for supporting the first year of this research endeavor, and to the ITU committee that 
awarded me with a tuition free stipend and decided to employ me for the remaining duration 
of the project. 
Last but not least, I would like to extend my deepest thanks to family members and 
friends. To my brother, Bernhard, for reading through some of the material, but also for 
keeping conversations about the topic both lighthearted and fun. To Martin, Thomas, and 
Walther for their open ears and witty comments. To Dr. Thomas Völker for not only having 
me visit the European Commission's Joint Research Centre in beautiful Ispra, Italy, but also 
for co-authoring a paper on datafictions that I know was dear to both our hearts. To all of 













































































When I started my PhD studies in early 2015, there was a lot of confusion around the term 
and concept of "Big Data". Although various definitions had been proposed (see Press, 2014), 
at my university, not even the researchers from technical disciplines could agree on a 
common meaning; if one would add the social science and humanities scholars to the mix, 
the chaos was perfect and a Tower of Babel-like situation would prevail. A literature review 
did not provide much clarity. While some would hold that Big Data was best understood as 
society's ability to harness information in novel ways (see Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 
2013), others would argue that it had to do with the volume, velocity, and variety of data 
available (see Laney, 2012; 2001). While some would speak of a new problem-solving 
philosophy (see Hartzog and Selinger, 2013), others would point to the prominence and status 
acquired by data as a recognized output (see Leonelli, 2014). While some would call it a 
movement (see Sardana and Sardana, 2013), others would label it the "buzzword of the 
decade" (Barocas and Selbst, 2016 [2014]: 673). These contrasting views could in part be 
attributed to different scholarly or professional backgrounds, but they were also indicative of 
a broader truth: Big Data was more than just the mountains of data generated in an 
increasingly computerized world, and it was more than our improving ability to collect, store, 
and make sense of these data. Rather, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the rise and 
prevalence of Big Data, it would be necessary to treat it as a complex sociotechnical 
phenomenon, one that, as boyd and Crawford (2012) had observed early on, rests on an 
interplay of science, technology, and culture, an amalgamation of hardware power and 
analytical prowess combined with the "widespread belief that large data sets offer a higher 
form of intelligence […], with and aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy." (ibid.: 663) Given 
this messiness, no wonder there was a good deal of confusion and conceptual disagreement. 
 What soon became clear was that researching and mapping the debate around Big 
Data was a bit like aiming at a moving target, with new articles and feature stories published 
on a daily basis. Big Data was en vogue, and initially the coverage was mainly positive: "A new 
goldmine", proclaimed The Economist, celebrating the implementation of open data 
initiatives (Economist.com, 2013); a "revolution by numbers", promised The Guardian, listing 
sectors and fields that were bound to be changed by the oncoming data deluge (Naughton, 
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2012); and the German tabloid Bild ran a story on how the country's national football team 
was using Big Data to prepare for 2014 World Cup in Brazil (see Stein, 2014). A popular book 
at the time was Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier's (2013) Big Data: A Revolution that Will 
Transform How We Live, Work, and Think. The book mainly focused on possible gains, 
promoting the idea that Big Data would "shake up everything from businesses and the 
sciences to healthcare, government, education, economics, the humanities, and every other 
aspect of society" (ibid.: 11). Yet despite its focus on the expected benefits of modern data 
analytics,1 the latter part of the book already hinted at some of the problems that would soon 
overshadow the initial rush of excitement: the erosion of privacy under constant digital 
surveillance; the growing potential for systematic bias and discrimination; society's 
overreliance on numbers that are far more fallible than often assumed. Soon the media's tone 
shifted, and while there was still no shortage of Big Data success stories, they were balanced 
out by more critical reports: "Eight (no, nine!) problems with Big Data", found The New York 
Times (Marcus and Davis, 2014); "Big Data: are we making a big mistake?", wondered the 
Financial Times (Harford, 2014); and The Atlantic made sure to properly "welcome" its readers 
"to algorithmic prison" (Davidow, 2014). What seemed to evolve was a climate of clash 
between different stakeholders, but more generally, if one would peruse the comment 
sections, between people with different backgrounds, experiences, and beliefs. Vendors and 
programmers, regulators and NGOs, concerned citizens and affects publics – suddenly 
everyone appeared to have a different take on what Big Data meant and implied for society 
at large. What was striking was the polarization of the debate, which showed that at bottom 
this was not just a casual conversation, but rather a serious dispute over diverging values, 
interests, and priorities, and the kind of future society should aim for. 
 The controversial atmosphere was nourished by a nonstop series of global and 
regional events: from the Snowden revelations to the Cambridge Analytica scandal, from U.S. 
data breaches to the EU's right to be forgotten, from the British care.data initiative to China's 
social credit system, there seemed to be hardly a day without Big Data-related headlines 
making the news. Larger happenings were accompanied by smaller, often "creepy" (Shklovski 
et al., 2014) incidents: nosy smart TVs capturing living room chatter (see Harris, 2015), 
interactive Barbie dolls recording whatever a child was saying (see Halzack, 2015), social 
                                                        
1 For a critical review of the book, see Armstrong (2014). 
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media platforms experimenting with users' emotional states (see Meyer, 2014), seemingly 
innocuous smartphone apps sharing sensitive user information (see Goodin, 2015), Twitter 
chatbots turning racist overnight (see Vincent, 2016), the list could be continued almost 
indefinitely. But none of this was apparently enough to diminish what Kallinikos (2013) has 
called "the allure of Big Data", that is, the promise that Big Data would allow to "assemble the 
big picture of many phenomena" and "contribut[e] to lifting, as it were, the veil of reality" 
(ibid.: 42). As I write these lines in the spring of 2018, Big Data, despite massive criticism on 
epistemic and ethical grounds, continues to be a popular buzz term, even if part of the debate 
has "started to shift to a focus on computation and analytics such as algorithms, machine 
learning, and artificial intelligence" (Ruppert et al., 2017: 2). Between January 1st and March 
31st, for instance, the New York Times has published 33 articles that use the term either in the 
heading or body of text, which is less than during the same months in 2014 (54 articles) and 
2015 (42), but more than in 2016 (20) and 2017 (27).2 Equally, a Google Trends search, which 
charts search term interest over time, shows a popularity score of 89 for "Big Data" in March 
2018, which is higher than in March 2014 (72) and about the same as in March 2015 (89) and 
2016 (91). Global search interest was highest in March 2017, with a "peak popularity" score 
of 100.3 The term has not disappeared from the political scene either. Searching the European 
Commission's official website, one can find an abundance of recent Big Data-related content 
and initiatives: from Big Data for migration management (see Rango and Vespe, 2017), official 
statistics (see ESSnet Big Data, 2018), and healthcare (see Andriukaitis, 2018) to briefings 
about existing regulatory challenges and possible ways forward (see EC-DTM, 2017). Thus, 
despite earlier predictions that Big Data would go out of fashion by 2014 (see KDnuggets, 
2012), the term has proven remarkably resilient, still serving as a go-to concept well after its 
presumed expiration date. 
 But how was it that the vision of Big Data proved so successful? How did it come to be 
that what mainly started as a marketing strategy gained so much traction and power, 
especially in the political domain? This cumulative dissertation is, in part, an attempt to dig 
deeper and search for possible answers to these questions, exploring the rise and 
                                                        
2 Number of articles was counted using the on-site search functions of nytimes.com. 
3 Of course, such indicators should be interpreted with caution. In this case, they are solely presented 
in support of the claim that global (search) interest in Big Data has not diminished but, as of yet, proven 
stable.  
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proliferation of Big Data in public policy. But it does not stop there. Making the case that Big 
Data should not be regarded as a fad destined to fade, the thesis considers ways to anticipate 
and prepare for the consequences of an increasingly datafied society, seeking to contribute 
to recent discussions about responsible research and innovation (see Stilgoe et al., 2013). 
Thus, rather than simply dismissing it as yet another overblown hype, the following treats the 
widespread Big Data excitement as a meaningful object of inquiry, examining its composition, 
the reasons for its persistence, and potential short- and longer-term repercussions. Because 
even if the term itself should eventually run out of steam, the powers and dynamics that 
contributed to its prominence probably will not, making it that much more important to gain 
a clearer sense of the promises and expectations but also the pressures and challenges that 
fueled its cultural impact, shaping the "dreamscapes of modernity" (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009) 
for at least the better part of a decade. Ultimately, though offering a number of concluding 
remarks, the thesis should not be read as final statement on the matter, but rather as a 
modest contribution to a crucial issue and debate that is set to become even more relevant 























The main part of the thesis consists of the thesis framework (Chapters 1 to 4) and five peer-
reviewed papers (four published, one currently under review). Of the five papers, four are 
full-length research articles and one is a concise commentary. Four of the papers have been 
co-authored with other scholars: Three with my thesis supervisor, Dr. Judith Simon, Professor 
for Ethics in Information Technology at the University of Hamburg, Department of 
Informatics, and one with Dr. Thomas Völker, currently postdoctoral researcher at the 
European Commission's Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy. Both have kindly agreed for the 
papers to be incorporated and published as part of this thesis. 
 The papers approach Big Data from different directions and angles, seeking to treat it, 
as argued in the introduction, as a complex and messy phenomenon that is cultural as well as 
technoscientific. In order to capture the multifacetedness of the Big Data discourse, the 
papers make use of sensitizing concepts4 from multiple fields and disciplines, including 
Science and Technology Studies (STS), technology assessment (TA), ethics, social 
epistemology, and literature studies. This plurality of perspectives is at once a strength and a 
weakness. On the one hand, the use and combination of different conceptual and disciplinary 
lenses allows for a better appreciation of the phenomenon's intricate nature, a way to 
illuminate the nexus of science, technology, culture, and power that co-produces5 the hopeful 
monster6 that is Big Data. On the other hand, the breadth of perspectives bears the risk that 
each individual approach does not go quite deep enough, merely scratching the surface of 
what should be a much more detailed discussion. To be sure, the themes and questions 
explored in the papers are rich enough to warrant further analytical investigation, potentially 
                                                        
4 As Blumer (1954: 7) notes: "[A sensitizing concept] gives the user a general sense of reference and 
guidance in approaching empirical instances. Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of 
what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look." 
5 In essence, the idiom of co-production can be seen as "a critique of the realist ideology that 
persistently separates the domains of nature, facts, objectivity, reason and policy from those of 
culture, values, subjectivity, emotion and politics." (Jasanoff, 2004: 3) 
6 In the edited volume A Sociology of Monsters, Law (1991) employs the figure of the hopeful monster 
to refer to the heterogeneous networks, overlaps, and collages that make up modern sociotechnical 
order. His argument is dialectic, holding that while "entities make history", they are "made by history 
too" (ibid.: 18), thus opposing positions of both technological determinism and social reductionism.     
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even at the scale of a separate thesis project. But this would be a very different project, one 
that would not, and probably could not, attend to the Big Data phenomenon's multiplicity7 in 
a similar way. Ultimately, the thesis sought to find a balance between depth and breadth, 
with emphasis on the STS-guided examination of the emergence of Big Data in the political 
sphere (Papers I, III, and IV). 
 While using a number of sensitizing concepts, the empirical analysis was guided by the 
tenets and procedures of the grounded theory approach, a qualitative mode of inquiry where 
"theory is derived from data and then illustrated by characteristic examples of data" (Glaser 
and Strauss, 2006 [1967]: 5). The results of this research approach are best visible in Rieder 
(2018): Here, the notion of sociotechnical imaginaries was used as a conceptual framework 
for investigating the European Commission's vision of Big Data, while the analysis of the 
collected material was supported by the construction of analytic codes and categories that is 
central to grounded theory methodology (e.g., see Charmaz, 2006: 42ff.). In addition, the 
different visualization techniques of Clarke's (2005) situational analysis8 served as a valuable 
tool to make sense of the "universes of discourse" (Strauss, 1978: 120) that had formed 
around Big Data. Especially the creation of arena maps (see Clarke, 2005: 109ff.) proved useful 
in developing a bottom-up understanding of the various perspectives and motivations at play, 
and of the different "social worlds" (ibid.) that would sustain them. Eventually, engagement 
with the data would lead to the development of broader themes and theories, which 
subsequently were tested against additional chunks of data. The thesis' treatment of 
empirical material can thus can be regarded as the outcome of a shifting process between 
inductive theory generation and deductive hypothesis testing, an abductive form of reasoning 
that resonates with the exploratory spirit of the project. In the remainder of this chapter, the 
individual papers will be discussed in greater detail, thereby providing a clear overview of the 
thesis structure, the methods applied, and the intended outcomes and impacts. In addition 
to concise summaries of the main findings, the aim of these discussions is to offer some 
insight into how the papers came to be and what each of them sought to achieve. The papers 
                                                        
7 For a thorough treatment of ontological multiplicity in an STS fashion, see Mol (2002).  
8 Situational analysis can be seen as an extension of traditional grounded theory, with special attention 
to the analysis of discourses, the importance of nonhuman elements, and the impact of power 
relations (see Clarke et al., 2015).  
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are connected through interludes that are supposed to afford some additional continuity 
between the presented arguments and perspectives. 
  
2.1. Discussion of Paper I - Datatrust: Or, the Political Quest for Numerical Evidence 
and the Epistemologies of Big Data 
 
The Datatrust commentary (Rieder and Simon, 2016) was written for a Big Data & Society 
special theme on Critical Data Studies (CDS), co-edited by Andrew Iliadis and Federica Russo.9 
The special theme conceptualized data as a "form of power" (Iliadis and Russo, 2016: 1), 
inviting contributions that would "analyz[e] the ground upon which positivistic Big Data 
science stands" (ibid.: 2). Agreeing with the CDS aim to study the "technological, political, 
social and economic apparatuses" that "constitut[e] and fram[e] the generation, circulation 
and deployment of data" (Kitchin and Lauriault, 2014: 1), the commentary was an attempt to 
shed some light on the historical foundations of the Big Data phenomenon, situating the 
recent push for evidence-based policy making10 within a broader sociocultural context. More 
specifically, the paper sought to illuminate the roots of people's "trust in numbers" (Porter, 
1995), comparing it to other forms of trust – i.e., trust in human experts or institutions – and 
making the case that authorities' reliance on numbers and figures is often a sign of political 
weakness rather than strength, a strategy of democratically accountable administrations to 
maintain legitimacy and shield themselves from persistent scrutiny in times of crisis, public 
distrust, and uncertainty. By approaching the issue from a history of science perspective and 
drawing a line from early statistics in 17th-century England and 18th-century France (see 
Desrosières, 1998) to modern-day data analytics, the paper thus sought to highlight patterns 
of continuity, arguing that there is value in considering the long durée of processes of counting 
                                                        
9 The commentary has also been translated into German (Rieder and Simon, 2018) and published as 
part of the edited volume (Un)berechenbar? Algorithmen und Automatisierung in Staat und 
Gesellschaft (Mohabbat Kar et al., 2018). 
10 The notion of evidence-based policy is not new. Solesbury (2002), for instance, notes an 
"ascendancy of evidence" (90) in British public policy during the late 90's and early 2000's, finding a 
"new thirst for knowledge" marked by a more "instrumental view of research" (91) for social and 
economic development. Yet, as a Deloitte study for the European Commission indicates, the rise of 
Big Data "gave birth to a renaissance of evidence-based policy making practices", offering new 
techniques "to find insights […] and to answer questions that very previously considered beyond 
reach" (Barbero et al., 2016: 9). Thus, while the notion has been around for some time, it gained 
considerable momentum with the advent of Big Data analytics, as for example demonstrated by the 
recent proliferation of "data for policy" initiatives (see Poel et al., 2015). 
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and accounting rather than solely focusing on the proclaimed novelty of Big Data science. 
What such a perspective can allow is a greater appreciation of "quantification as a social 
technology" (Porter, 1995: 49) as well as of the origins of the strive for "mechanical 
objectivity" (Daston and Galison, 2010) as a preferred way of knowing. Such a reading may 
also provide some analytical distance, an opportunity to look beyond the marketing narrative 
and regard the ascent of Big Data as but the latest manifestation of the age-old Cartesian 
dream – the idea that "the emergent rational method and the deployment of science and 
science-based technology would deliver the truth (expressed in quantitative terms) and 
empower humanity to fulfil its destiny as masters and possessors of Nature" (Funtowicz and 
Pereira, 2015: 1). It is by thinking along these lines that the commentary aimed to encourage 
dialogue and critical reflection, urging for a historically grounded analysis of the quest for 
numerical evidence that presently culminates in the promotion and funding of Big Data 
monitoring and forecasting technologies (e.g., see European Commission (EC), 2017). The 
paper is not alone in this ambition: Ambrose (2015), for example, compares Big Data to the 
probabilistic revolution of the mid-1800s, arguing that this lens allows us to assess Big Data 
as an epistemic revolution, as opposed to simply a technological or economic one, offering 
insight into our attempts to govern it. In a similar vein, Aronova and co-authors (2017), in the 
introduction to a substantial Osiris issue on Data Histories, emphasize that Big Data can be 
seen as a chapter in a longer history of observation, quantification, and statistical methods, 
amplifying "features of data-driven science already present or latent in earlier data cultures", 
including "the automation of data collection, storage, and analysis; the mechanization of 
hypothesis testing; an increasing division of labor between data collectors and consumers; 
and the technological black-boxing of many data practices" (ibid.: 7). The Datatrust paper's 
call for a contextualization of Big Data practices within the broader history of social statistics 
has thus been echoed by others; what is fairly original, however, is its particular focus on 
questions of trust and data-driven forms of governance, adding a heightened sense of 
immediacy to the subject matter.  
 
Interlude: In 2016, at around the same time the Datatrust paper was released, David Beer 
published an article that asked, "How should we do the history of Big Data?" (Beer, 2016: 1) 
In it, Beer argues that while it is important to place Big Data within the genealogical lineage 
of the modern state and consider it as part of a much longer series of historical developments, 
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it is equally important to explore the actual concept of Big Data: "where it came from, how it 
is used, what it is used for, how it lends authority, validates, justifies, and makes promises" 
(ibid.: 2). What is needed, according to Beer, are close examinations of the discursive framings 
around Big Data, providing rich contextual accounts of how the notion becomes embedded 
in organizational, political, and cultural life. While the Datatrust paper mainly sought to 
contribute to the former part of the project – that is, to historically situate Big Data within the 
expansion of numbers and metrics over the past few centuries – the next two articles 
published in the course of this thesis were geared towards the latter part, aiming to provide 
a clearer picture of the Big Data-related claims and promises of both vendors (see Rieder and 
Simon, 2017a) and policymakers (see Rieder, 2018). The underlying assumption was that a 
better understanding of the discursive framings would reveal something about the nature of 
the phenomenon itself, and the dynamics that sustained it. As Beer aptly notes: "The power 
of Big Data is not just in the data themselves, it is in how those data and their potential is 
imagined and envisioned" (2016: 9). As Papers II and III show, these imaginaries and visions 
became a central concern of the thesis project. 
 
2.2. Discussion of Paper II - Big Data: A New Empiricism and Its Epistemic and     
Socio-Political Consequences 
 
The second paper (Rieder and Simon, 2017a) was a research article published in an edited 
volume, a Festschrift in honor of the retirement of Prof. Klaus Mainzer, the then Chair of 
Philosophy and Philosophy of Science at the Technical University of Munich (see Pietsch et 
al., 2017). In the main, the paper followed two lines of inquiry: First, drawing on Kitchin's 
(2014a; b) influential work on the subject, it sought to examine some of the most prominent 
epistemic claims made by Big Data proponents, focusing on how the concept is marketed by 
stakeholders from business and industry. Reading through a plethora of news items, product 
sites, tech reports, but also field-related books and publications, it was possible to discern the 
composition of a very specific epistemic imaginary, based on four key assumptions: that Big 
Data is exhaustive in scope, capable of capturing entire populations or domains (N=all); that 
high volume data can speak for themselves, eliminating the need for a priori theory; that data 
are neutral and objective, offering a disinterested picture of the world that counteracts 
human biases; and that modern data analytics can provide certainty in an uncertain world, 
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accurately predicting ever more aspects of human life. The main point here was not that these 
assumptions are necessarily wrong – even though researchers from various disciplines have 
refuted them on both conceptual and empirical grounds (see Kitchin, 2014a; Leonelli, 2014) 
– but to emphasize that this imaginary feeds into a culture where numbers and figures are 
seen as infallible, unchallengeable harbingers of truth, allegedly looking at the world from an 
all-seeing god's-eye perspective. Consequently, the second part of the paper was devoted to 
examining the sociopolitical consequences of blind data trust, drawing on Pasquale's (2015) 
notion of the "black box society", indicating a system "whose workings are mysterious" (ibid.: 
3) and where people are increasingly submitted to the "rule of scores and bets" (ibid.: 191). 
More precisely, the text offered a concise discussion of three interrelated issues and 
concerns: issues of opacity, caused by either corporate or state secrecy, high algorithmic 
complexity, or code volatility; problems of accountability, that is, the unwillingness of public 
and private entities to render themselves accountable as well as the inadequacy of current 
laws to enforce greater accountability; and questions of responsibility, meaning the 
considerable difficulty to determine a single culprit or 'smoking gun' in complex digital 
environments made up of a growing number of learning systems and autonomous AI agents.11 
The concluding section then shifted from a descriptive to a more normative stance, calling for 
a culture marked by new forms of digital "epistemic vigilance" (Sperber et al., 2010) rather 
than blind data trust, replacing 'trustful by default' with a model where trustees must 
establish their trustworthiness upfront, and trustors have the necessary means and 
competence to assess these assurances (see Simon, 2016; 2013). Ultimately, a combination 
of hard law (e.g., the primary rules of the European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)), soft law (e.g., nonbinding codes of conduct and attempts at public-private co-
regulation),12 ethically-informed software design (e.g., Apple's recent push for differential 
privacy),13 and educational efforts (e.g., raising critical awareness among students but also 
                                                        
11 For a recent perspective on regulators' struggle to implement better transparency and 
accountability mechanisms in face of ever more widespread automated decision-making processes, 
see Wachter et al. (2017). 
12 For more on the dynamics between hard and soft law, see Hagemann et al. (2018); for a discussion 
of the legal challenges of Big Data with focus on the "secondary rules of the law" at work within the 
GDPR, see Pagallo (2017).  
13 For a brief overview of Apple's use of differential privacy, see Greenberg (2016); for a more critical 
discussion, see Greenberg (2017); for wider philosophical reflections on the concept, see Nissenbaum 
(2016). 
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the public at large) would be required to meet the challenges posed by Big Data analytics. 
Instead of a magic silver bullet, the paper thus envisioned a combination of remedies that 
work on multiple fronts, treating Big Data as a vexing technopolitical problem with no easy 
solution. As Pasquale (2015: 218) concludes:  
 
"Black box services are often wondrous to behold, but our black box society has become dangerously 
unstable, unfair, and unproductive. Neither New York quants nor California engineers can deliver a 
sound economy or a secure society. Those are the tasks of a citizenry, which can perform its job only 
as well as it understands the stakes." 
 
Interlude: In the area of science and technology, promissory claims are often employed 
strategically to attract interest and investment. As is the case with Big Data, these claims tend 
to be overblown and sensationalized, lacking in nuance and detail. This, however, does not 
make them any less effective. Quite on the contrary, as scholars engaged in the sociology of 
expectations have pointed out, such "expectations can be seen to be fundamentally 
'generative'" (Borup et al., 2006: 285). They "drive technical and scientific activity", "provide 
structure and legitimation", and "attract[t] the interest of necessary allies" (ibid.: 286; 289). 
If the promissory rhetoric is successful, the visions become inscribed into actions, texts, 
bodies, and machines. They "take on substance, becoming materially embedded in structures, 
routines, systems, matters" (ibid.: 292). They are both performative and normative, enacting 
specific desired futures that trigger specific real-world actions. In the case of Big Data, the 
epistemic promises of industry stakeholders (outlined in detail in Paper II) have successfully 
found their way into the political discourse, spurring the imagination of policymakers around 
the globe. Paper III takes a closer look at these imaginaries, and the specific political ambitions 
and agendas they engender.    
 
2.3. Discussion of Paper III - Tracing Big Data Imaginaries through Public Policy:     
The Case of the European Commission 
 
The third paper (Rieder, 2018) presented in this dissertation was a full-length research article 
published in the Routledge edited volume The Politics and Policies of Big Data: Big Data, Big 
Brother? (Sætnan et al., 2018) Its main aim was to develop a better understanding of the rise 
of Big Data in public policy, examining official EU publications to investigate the values and 
visions that guide European policymakers' Big Data rhetoric. More specifically, based on a 
 14 
grounded theory analysis of roughly 120 documents scraped from the European 
Commission's website,14 the text outlined and critically discussed three interrelated 
narratives that figured prominently in the policy discourse. These were: (I) Big Data as the 
cornerstone of a thriving data-driven economy, with data analytics expected to increase 
productivity and boost economic growth; (II) Big Data as a way to transform and improve 
public services, with data technologies seen as a way to enhance government efficiency and 
reduce costs; and (III) Big Data as a tool for evidence-informed policy and decision making, 
with Big Data expected to provide timely, actionable insights that enable authorities to tackle 
societal challenges with high precision and accuracy. What thus emerged from the empirical 
analysis was a sweepingly optimistic vision of Big Data and its presumed impacts, the 
Commission essentially promoting Big Data's widespread application as a major opportunity 
not to be missed. While this focus on commercial growth and organizational efficiency should 
not come as a surprise given the institution's historic roots as an "economic community […] 
among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts" (Treaty of Paris, 1951: 3), the paper sought 
to dig deeper, citing the recent financial crisis, the pressing need for public legitimation, and 
a certain longing for certainty in uncertain times as additional factors that may have 
contributed to the Commission's determined push for Big Data solutions. The Commission's 
vision, however, entailed a number of problems, and the remainder of the paper listed and 
discussed some of them: from blind trust in numerical data to the strive for trusted rather 
than trustworthy technologies (compare Paper II), from the idea(l) of an entrepreneurial, self-
managing data citizenry to the adoption of an open-by-default principle for all public sector 
data. The conclusion was drawn that these concepts and convictions, underpinned by a strong 
free-market agenda, threaten to undermine the fundamental rights of EU citizens as well as 
the Commission's own call for responsible research and innovation (RRI).  
Readers who have followed the EU's difficult struggle for new data protection laws 
may be somewhat surprised by these findings. Mager (2017), for instance, contends that in 
the context of the EU privacy reform, the "economic rationale of the digital single market was 
                                                        
14 Google's Advanced Search feature, available at https://www.google.com/advanced_search, was 
used to scrape the European Commission's official website, http://ec.europa.eu/, for documents 
referring to Big Data. The collected material included communications, speeches, news, and blog 
entries published between 2012 and early 2017. The qualitative data analysis software NVivo (Version 
10 and 11) was used to support the coding, management, and analysis of the data (see Bazeley and 
Jackson, 2013).      
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increasingly overshadowed by the fundamental rights discourse staging citizens' rights and 
freedoms as core European values" (ibid.: 9). As the Commission's 2012 proposal for a new 
data protection framework clearly states:  
 
"Data protection is a fundamental right in Europe, enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, as well as in Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), and needs to be protected accordingly." (EC, 2012: 2) 
 
Given this commitment, how can it be that the Commission has nurtured a Big Data imaginary 
that lauds potential benefits but ignores well-documented harms and risks, that focuses on 
economic growth but fails to address any of the associated ethical and legal concerns? The 
paper offered a possible answer to this conundrum, arguing that on EU level, the Big Data 
discourse appears to run separate from ongoing discussions about data regulation, a certain 
state of detachment that has allowed for the continued use of Big Data as a generic marketing 
term, structurally divorced from the task of creating fair and sustainable data policies. 
Importantly, this detachment may be another reason why the term has not yet gone out of 
fashion, at least not in the political domain. Instead, it remains a key rhetorical resource in 
what Bos and co-authors (2014) have called the practice of "steering with big words", 
injecting a hint of tech-euphoria into almost any area of public policy. 
 
Interlude: Much of this dissertation project was dedicated to examining the promises made 
by Big Data advocates, and the (political) hopes and expectations these promises would 
generate. More often than not, this would involve dealing with overblown marketing claims, 
and to consider possible reasons for how these claims could prove so effective, creating a 
buzz that would spread well beyond IT and business circles. But Big Data is more than just a 
hype without substance. It is also the umbrella term for a number of technologies and 
analytical practices that are already in use, applied to ever more contexts, with real 
consequences for people's individual lives as well as for society at large (e.g., see Ezrachi and 
Stucke, 2016; O'Neil, 2016; Lyon, 2014). Consequently, Paper IV was a call to arms, aimed at 
a particular research community that over time has garnered much experience in studying 
the potential impacts, but also the societal desirability, of new and emerging technologies, 
from bioengineering to nanotechnology. I am referring, of course, to the field of technology 
assessment (TA), which has not been especially fast at addressing the challenges posed by Big 
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Data technologies, but has recently recognized the need for deeper engagement, the theme 
of the 2018 S.NET conference being "Anticipatory Technologies: Data and Disorientation" 
(S.NET Organizing Committee, 2018). 
 
2.4. Discussion of Paper IV - Big Data and Technology Assessment: Research Topic or 
Competitor? 
 
The fourth paper (Rieder and Simon, 2017b) was published in the Journal of Responsible 
Innovation as part of the special issue Into the Wild: Futures and Responsibilities in Technology 
Assessment, introduced by Erik Fisher (Fisher, 2017) and guest-edited by Ulrike Bechtold, 
Daniela Fuchs, and Niklas Gudowsky (Bechtold et al., 2017). Its main idea was to emphasize 
the importance of the Big Data phenomenon for the technology assessment (TA) community, 
arguing that the relationship between Big Data and TA is both special and peculiar in the sense 
that Big Data may be the first research topic TA has dealt with that is not only an object of 
inquiry, but that also rivals TA in some its core functions. Regarding the former, the paper 
stressed that TA's experience in multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinary research, together with 
its expertise in deliberation and consultation at the science-society-policy interface, can help 
in addressing and successfully dealing with the manifold challenges posed by Big Data. 
Concerning the latter, the argument was made that Big Data is bound to compete with TA on 
multiple fronts, including the assessment of public views and visions, means and methods for 
exploring the future, and the provision of actionable knowledge and advice. Thereby, it was 
important to highlight that while Big Data and TA may increasingly compete for the same 
public funds, epistemologically, they tread very different paths, offering contrasting views of 
what the exploration of public sentiments or the engagement in future-oriented analysis 
actually entails. While outlining such differences and emphasizing the allure of modern data 
analytics for public administrations, the paper also sought to sketch a way toward more 
responsible data-based research and innovation, pondering how to move Big Data under the 
RRI umbrella. Importantly, while arguing for critical engagement beyond ELSIfication15 and 
the option to stop socially undesired innovations through, for example, temporary or 
                                                        
15 In short, the acronym ELSI (used in the United States) or ELSA (used in Europe) refers to a range of 
efforts and formats that examine the ethical, legal, and social implications/aspects of new and 
emerging technologies. For a concise review of the "rise of ELS programs", see Hilgartner et al. (2017).   
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permanent moratoria, the paper pleaded for a coalition of mutual learning rather than 
dogmatic opposition, with TA acknowledging the value of data science as a powerful 
epistemic practice and actively engaging in the development of digital tools and methods that 
can serve as best practice examples. The paper was thus a call to arms not only in the sense 
that it asked for TA projects to consider the potential impacts and consequences of Big Data, 
but also in pointing to the field's need to methodologically expand and add computational 
capabilities to its own research efforts. 
 While the methodological expansion may be a longer process with gradual 
implementation in future research designs, the Germany-based project ABIDA16 has already 
demonstrated what a large-scale, multi-year TA study can achieve. Tackling Big Data from 
different disciplinary perspectives – including ethics, law, sociology, economics, and political 
science – the project teams have employed a number of research- and dialogue-oriented 
instruments to foster not only academic but also public discussions about public issues, 
synthesizing eventual findings into the development of options for political action.17 Projects 
such as this underscore the value of technology assessment as a field and practice that in 
many countries has formed and maintained close relationships with the political domain, 
potentially playing a key role in the democratic governance and resolution of technoscientific 
controversies. The paper sought to emphasize this role, but also to highlight that the very 
same technological phenomenon that now requires TA's attention may also start to rival TA 
in several of its core competencies, a challenge academics and practitioners in the field would 
do well to earnestly consider and address. As the paper concluded: 
 
"If done right, modern data analytics could become an ally rather than a competitor to the field of 
technology assessment, potentially extending the scope, speed, and quality of discourse, dispute, and 
trend analysis. If disregarded and left to the proprietary discretion of commercial products, however, 
Big Data may not only grow to challenge the TA community, but could also pose a considerable threat 
to the core principles of RRI." (Rieder and Simon, 2017b: 11)    
 
                                                        
16 The project acronym ABIDA stands for "Assessing Big Data". The project consortium includes teams 
from six German universities and research centers, with each working group approaching the subject 
matter from a different disciplinary background. 
17 For a brief outline of the ABIDA project structure, see the official website at 
http://www.abida.de/en/content/abida-das-projekt [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
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Interlude: Over the past decades, TA scholars have put much thought into how to improve 
society's capacity to anticipate and reflexively assess the dynamics and implications of 
sociotechnical change (e.g., see Guston, 2014). Thereby, the use of science fiction and science 
fiction-inspired approaches has been discussed as a promising way to grapple with the longer-
term implications of technoscientific innovation. According to Miller and Bennett (2008), such 
approaches can help to "meaningfully evaluate new and emerging technologies and to 
democratically govern the design and construction of future technological worlds" (ibid.: 
598). What makes (science) fiction-based books and films such a valuable resource for 
broader societal conversation and debate is their considerable public appeal. While academic 
publications and outreach activities tend to reach only a small number of people, popular 
fictions may reach millions. The question then is whether disciplines that seek to foster 
reflexive capacities – from technology assessment (TA) to Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) to computer and information ethics – can take advantage of this popularity and use 
science fiction to engage publics more broadly in deliberations about technoscientific futures 
(see ibid.: 599). Paper V aimed to contribute to this cause, providing an overview of selected 
datafictions that may be used in a variety of contexts to reflect upon the textures and politics 
of our increasingly digital lives.  
 
2.5. Discussion of Paper V - Datafictions: Or How Measurements and Predictive 
Analytics Rule Imagined Future Worlds 
 
The fifth paper of this dissertation (Rieder and Völker, 2018, forthcoming) has been submitted 
to the SAGE journal Futures and is, at the time of writing, still under peer review. The initial 
idea for the article came from the observation that while media and academic publications 
would frequently refer to George Orwell's (1949) novel Nineteen Eighty-Four when discussing 
the prospect of far-reaching digital surveillance (e.g., see Condliffe, 2016), references to other 
works of fiction were woefully rare. Was the often-cited connection between Big Data and 
Big Brother really all that narrative fiction had to offer? Based on an extensive literature 
review, the paper sought to show otherwise, taking a closer look at fifteen datafictions – 
including novels, short stories, films, and TV shows – that may serve as worthwhile discussion 
pieces when contemplating both the immediate and long-term effects of increased 
datafication and computerization. Although different in style and story, they all focused on 
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questions of (algorithmic) power and control, pondering the state of humanity in ever more 
tech-regulated environments. The fictions were subdivided into five main categories: 
surveillance (I); social sorting (II); prediction (III); advertising and corporate power (IV); hubris, 
breakdown, and the end of Big Data (V). The categories were meant to be suggestive rather 
than definitive, an attempt to cluster works of fiction that are so rich and varied that they 
could be interpreted and grouped in many different ways. The number of reviewed titles, 
three per category, was chosen so as to strike a balance between breadth and depth, that is, 
between providing a basic overview while still being able to briefly outline and comment on 
each of the selected texts. Conceptually, the paper drew on the notion of speculative fiction 
as a label for a genre that generates "other worlds as a comment upon our own" (Miner, 
1991: 150), telling plausible stories that explore real-life issues by pushing them to extremes 
in strange but imaginable alternative realities. Given their often dystopian nature, such 
visions can serve as dire warnings, as "dark shadows cast by the present into the future" 
(Atwood, 2005: 94), stimulating reflection and critical thinking by providing "rich and complex 
avenues for reading and rereading the world" (Thomas, 2013: 4). The concept of speculative 
fiction guided our literature review in important ways, allowing us to discard fictions that 
would not bear a sufficient resemblance to the universe as we currently know it while still 
providing the flexibility to include fictions that are so close to home that they could hardly be 
considered sci-fi at all. The notion of datafictions was then introduced as an umbrella term 
for speculative stories that deal with the datafication of society in both imaginative and 
imaginable ways,18 thus adding a clear thematic focus to our analysis. As mentioned, the 
principal goal was to gather and present striking fictional examples of data power in action, 
so as to contribute to the cultivation of a critical imaginative gaze that can support a more 
proactive engagement with the potential consequences of Big Data applications. However, in 
addition to honing reflexive capacities in students, scholars, and practitioners, such fictions 
can also be used to investigate how specific technologies are culturally imagined and what 
kind of futures are considered plausible given current implementations and trajectories. They 
thus should be recognized as fruitful sites of analysis for professional technology assessment, 
conceptually no less credible and legitimate than, for example, mapping exercises, scenario 
                                                        
18 The only exemption from this requirement was the inclusion of Mary Shelley's (1818) novel 
Frankenstein, which mainly serves as a thoughtful reminder that technologies, once created, must 
continually be checked and cared for in order not to run into any nasty surprises along the way.      
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development, or Delphi surveys. As the provided overview of datafictions was neither meant 
to be comprehensive nor conclusive, the article ended with a call for shared collections and 
repositories, a public resource for anyone with interest in the subject matter.19 
 A final thought: When working through the speculative fictions, it became increasingly 
clear that on a technological level their imagination was outpaced by the actual speed of 
innovation we are witnessing today. For instance, Google's 2018 keynote presentation of an 
AI assistant calling and making table reservations at a restaurant, thereby successfully 
conversing with a strongly-accented employee, seemed technologically more radical and 
disruptive than almost any of the visions encountered in the sci-fi literature (see Welch, 
2018). As briefly alluded to in the paper, however, the strength of narrative fiction does not 
necessarily lie in the detailed depiction of cutting-edge technologies, but in creating 
believable worlds where the consequences of sociotechnical change are shown from a 
protagonist's personal perspective, thus immersing the reader in an alternative reality and 
allowing her to become emotionally invested in a given situation or event. As a consequence, 
ethical inquiries into the potential pitfalls of datafied societies may benefit from an approach 
where fictional stories are discussed alongside real-world tech developments, providing some 
insight into recent trends and developments while offering a creative toolbox for pondering 




As mentioned, the five articles outlined above and included in full length below form the core 
of this thesis. Whilst differing in terms of their specific focus and research design, they find 
common ground in seeking to address Big Data as a complex sociotechnical phenomenon that 
is more than the sheer combination of hardware and software power. Rather, the term's long-
lasting prominence connects to a culture of mechanical objectivity that has grown and 
expanded significantly over the past two centuries (Paper I), to a powerful industry's 
relentless efforts to market and sell their latest products (Paper II), and to the specific needs 
                                                        
19 An example for such a resource is the Internet Speculative Fiction Database at http://www.isfdb.org 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. This website provides an open bibliographic archive that allows anyone with 
an account to add and freely tag new literature entries. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, the 
search term "Big Data" returns only a few results, but the technology to improve upon this situation 
is already in place. 
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of a struggling political system in times of public distrust and crisis (Paper III). The vision that 
Big Data offers may begin to challenge established modes of prognosis and analysis (Paper IV) 
as well as lead to situations of algorithmic regulation and control that not long ago would 
have seemed like far-off fiction rather than a plausible near-future scenario (Paper V).  
While alluding to a range of Big Data-related problems and issues – from blind trust to 
issues of opacity and accountability – and stressing the need for greater awareness of the 
potential social, ethical, and legal implications of widespread data analytics, the articles spent 
comparatively little time discussing the detrimental effects that have already started to 
manifest in the wake of the Big Data era. These tangible effects, however, are exactly why the 
rise of modern data analytics requires society's collective attention. Consequently, before the 
articles themselves take center stage and in an effort to provide a better sense of what is 
actually at stake, the thesis continues with a brief overview of the substantial risks and harms 
that Big Data and its application can engender (Chapter 3). This is then followed by a forward-
looking conclusion that rounds off the argument for why Big Data can indeed be seen as the 
vision that would not fade (Chapter 4).
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3. What Is at Stake: A Brief Overview of Big Data Risks and Harms 
 
In recent years, much has been said about the perils and pitfalls of an ever more widespread 
application of Big Data analytics. From civil rights groups to data protection authorities, from 
investigative journalism to academia-based critical data studies, from the world of fiction to 
non-fiction books and documentaries, warnings of the detrimental consequences of 
increased datafication and algorithmic decision making have come from numerous sources 
and directions. Thereby, the critique has mainly focused on three problem areas: issues of 
privacy and surveillance; problems of bias and discrimination; and the perils and drawbacks 
of virtual competition. This chapter briefly outlines each of these problem areas, providing a 
concise overview of some of the key concerns associated with the rise of Big Data analytics. 
As such, the chapter does not present original research, but draws on a few selected sources 
that have had considerable impact on the debate. As indicated, the goal is not to provide a 
comprehensive review of issues and challenges, but to foster a sense of awareness that sets 
the scene for the ensuing articles, a testament to their timeliness and relevance in the present 
digital era.     
 
3.1. Big Data: Issues of Privacy and Surveillance 
 
In mid-2013, the documents20 leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden provided 
some insight into the extent to which U.S. intelligence agencies had collected personal 
information on both domestic and foreign citizens. While extensive state surveillance is by no 
means a new phenomenon and evidence of NSA practices had surfaced before (see Bamford, 
2008), the Snowden revelations went beyond what was deemed possible in a Western 
democracy. Instead of targeted surveillance of individual suspects, the NSA and its partner 
organizations engaged in mass surveillance of ordinary, law-abiding citizens, obtaining vast 
amounts of personal data from a range of different sources. These sources include, but are 
not limited to, the interception of data-in-transit by tapping the fiber optic cables that run 
between and across countries and continents, installing spyware on personal computers, 
                                                        
20 The leaked documents are archived and publicly available in the Snowden Digital Surveillance 
Archive at https://snowdenarchive.cjfe.org [Accessed 20 June 2018].  
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servers, and routers, and gleaning user data from the servers of major U.S. IT companies such 
as Apple, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft.21 The latter source is particularly important 
because it indicates that in the 21st century it is no longer sufficient to merely speak of a top-
down surveillance state or totalitarian surveillance society, but that one must take into 
account the development of a comprehensive surveillance culture (see Lyon, 2015). After all, 
by willingly sharing our personal information online and using the 'free' tools of private for-
profit companies to do so, "[s]urveillance is not just practiced on us, we participate in it" (ibid.: 
3). This is also why references to Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four are generally insufficient to 
grasp the very nature of Big Data surveillance.22 As Snowden himself once stated: "The types 
of collection in the book – microphones and video cameras, TVs that watch us – are nothing 
compared to what we have available today. We have sensors in our pockets that track us 
everywhere we go. Think about what this means for the privacy of the average person." (cited 
after Pittas, 2013) Snowden's point here is, of course, technical, a reference to the rapid pace 
of innovation over the past few decades; but it is also cultural in the sense that it alludes to 
people's practice of habitually taking their smartphones everywhere they go. What is more, 
by interacting with the system and using services such as social media, users – sometimes 
knowingly, sometimes not – actively volunteer their data to providers that will treat this 
information in more or less privacy-protecting ways.23 However, if the monetization of the 
data is part of a company's business model,24 the result is often what Zuboff (2015) has 
referred to as "surveillance capitalism", that is, a "logic of accumulation" where data are 
routinely captured, aggregated, analyzed, packaged, and sold to the highest bidder. Yet, as 
Zuboff highlights, the power structure of this new surveillance architecture does not 
correspond to that of Orwell's Big Brother, where force is exercised through centralized 
command and control, but rather to what she calls Big Other, a "ubiquitous networked 
institutional regime" that records and commodifies everyday life, yielding "radically 
distributed opportunities for observation, interpretation, communication, influence, 
prediction, and ultimately modification of the totality of action" (ibid.: 82). And further: "If 
                                                        
21 All these surveillance techniques are detailed in the third chapter of Glenn Greenwald's (2014) book 
No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the Surveillance State. 
22 Also see Paper V in this thesis. 
23 On the concept of volunteered data, see Kitchin (2014b: 93). 
24 This is for instance the case when data are used for targeted advertising or directly sold to data 
brokers. For a historically grounded introduction to the topic, see Turow (2011). 
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power was once identified with the ownership of the means of production, it is now identified 
with ownership of the means of behavioral modification" (ibid.). What Zuboff describes here 
in more abstract terms is tech companies' ever-increasing proficiency in tracking, anticipating, 
and steering human action, applying this knowledge so as to generate clicks, views, and other 
forms of profit-making engagements. But the proliferation of such monitoring regimes poses 
a number of societal challenges and threats: First, as Zuboff points out, surveillance capitalism 
does not simply lead to an erosion of privacy rights, but rather to their redistribution. While 
covert data capture25 deprives individuals of the privacy producing choice to either share or 
withhold information, companies such as Google or Facebook hide their operations behind a 
veil of secrecy, seeking exemption from both public oversight and regulation. Second, by 
imposing automated systems of reward and punishment,26 surveillance capitalism changes 
the very nature of contractual relationships, replacing trust in people's solidarity and the rule 
of law with new techniques of algorithmic judgment and control. In an effort to mitigate the 
uncertainty caused by human fallibility, freedoms achieved by the "consensual participation 
in the values from which legitimate authority is derived […] are traded in for the universal 
equivalent of the prisoner's electronic ankle bracelet" (ibid.: 81). Insurance prices, for 
instance, can be tied to the monitoring of one's lifestyle choices (health care) or the scoring 
of one's personality based on social media data (car insurance), in an effort to calculate risk 
and incentivize behavioral change (e.g., see Ralph, 2017). Which leads to a third consequence. 
As Zuboff highlights, the invasive power of surveillance capitalism engenders a kind of 
anticipatory conformity where a "vortex of stimuli" nudges people into compliance with the 
"financial and, or, ideological interests that imbue Big Other" (Zuboff, 2015: 82). In such a 
world, human autonomy and psychological self-determination is a cruel illusion. Instead, 
people are "reduced to a mere animal condition, bent to serve the new laws of capital 
imposed on all behavior through an implacable feed of ubiquitous fact-based real-time 
records of all things and creatures." (ibid.) Society becomes dazed and tranquillized, thrown 
into submission by the orders and ideals of a new invisible hand. Although Zuboff's article 
mainly focuses on the practices of private tech companies, the Snowden revelations as well 
                                                        
25 As the past years have shown, Big Data corporations' modus operandi is often to quietly advance 
and expand their activities until resistance is met. If there is public backlash, apologies are offered, 
but the take-without-asking mentality continues (e.g., see Fowler and Esteban, 2018).  
26 For a well-made fictional treatment of the potential ramifications of such an automated system, see 
the BlackMirror episode "Nosedive" outlined in Paper V.  
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as public-private collaborations such as Google's involvement in the Pentagon's Project 
Maven (see Conger and Cameron, 2018) indicate that there is a confluence between 
commercial and state interests. As Bruce Schneier (2015: 78) contends in his book Data and 
Goliath: "Corporate surveillance and government surveillance aren't separate. They are 
intertwined; the two support each other. It's a public-private surveillance partnership that 
spans the world." More recently, the abolishment of the "safe harbor" agreement between 
Europe and the U.S. through the European Court of Justice (see Gibbs, 2015) as well as the 
EU's new Data Protection Regulation have shown that this partnership has at least some legal 
limits,27 which, however, does not seem to impede law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies' push for Big Data-enabled mass monitoring solutions. Examining the "rapid and 
widespread adoption" of Big Data techniques by government agencies, Lyon (2014) identifies 
three key ways in which the commitment to Big Data changes the nature of surveillance 
practices: First, surveillance is becoming more automated in the sense that data are collected 
and analyzed routinely, creating detailed profiles of individuals that are being mined for 
statistical patterns and correlations. The combination of powerful new software and cheaper 
storage makes the constant digital surveillance of entire populations not only technologically 
possible but, in times of tight budgetary constraints, also economically attractive. Second, Big 
Data practices change the "tense" of surveillance by attempting to predict and preempt future 
developments. In the context of predictive policing, for instance, profiled individuals are not 
merely assessed in terms of who they 'are' and what they have previously done, but also with 
respect to who they might become and what they probably will do (see Rieke et al., 2014). If 
paired with automated forms of decision making, such computational forecasts may impair 
civil liberties and undermine due process rights, especially if citizens cannot push back and 
contest the charges and suspicions. Third and finally, since Big Data applications are used in 
an ever-increasing variety of areas, one can observe processes of adaption where tools that 
were developed for one purpose are 'borrowed' and used for another.28 However, the level 
of accuracy that for instance suffices in the context of online marketing may not be acceptable 
                                                        
27 Moreover, in the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures, the tech giants sought to shed their image 
as NSA collaborators, upgrading their devices with stronger security and pushing back against 
government requests to unlock encrypted data (see Hautala, 2013).  
28 The predictive policing software PredPol, for example, forecasts the likelihood of future crimes in a 
given area based on an algorithm that was originally designed to predict earthquake aftershocks. For 
a critical discussion, see Lum and Isaac (2016). 
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in the context of law enforcement or criminal justice as the harms of false positives may be 
even more severe in the latter case. What is more, the fact that proprietary analytical systems 
are often thoroughly black-boxed and their workings not even well understood by the 
responsible authorities themselves casts a worrying light on the legitimacy and democratic 
nature of the use of Big Data technologies for surveillance and security purposes (see 
Ferguson, 2017: 1166). As Lyon (2015: 136) concludes: "One kind of freedom is to pursue 
technically supported ways of seeking human security of all kinds. But when the product of 
such freedom curtails the enjoyment of everyday freedoms to speak or associate with others, 
or to dissent from government policy, or just to live without fear, something has gone badly 
wrong." 
  
3.2. Big Data: Problems of Bias and Discrimination 
 
In 2016, mathematician and former Wall Street quant Cathy O'Neil published her widely 
successful book Weapons of Math Destruction. Having witnessed the destructive power of 
financial algorithms first hand, the book offers a rich exploration of what O'Neil calls "the dark 
side of Big Data" (2016: 13). The book goes through a series of examples – from teacher 
evaluations and U.S. college rankings to online advertising and crime prediction to human 
resources, credit scoring, health care and insurance – outlining the potential harmful effects 
of computational models on a case-by-case basis. In a nutshell, the main points of O'Neil's 
argument can be summed up in the following way:  
 Though often perceived as fair and objective, algorithmic models are based on the 
choices of fallible human beings. Rather than providing a disinterested picture of reality, they 
function as "opinion[s] formalized in code" (see ibid.: 53), reflecting the assumptions and 
ambitions of their respective creators as well as, in the case of machine learning, the biases 
and prejudices of society at large. Consequently, computational models do not guarantee a 
more even-handed treatment, but can perpetuate social injustices camouflaged by a façade 
of scientific certitude and rigor. While discrimination against protected classes – for example, 
sex, race, or disability – is, in theory, punishable by law, entire industries have formed that 
reward the rich and punish the (unprotected) poor, creating toxic feedback loops. For 
instance, if a responsible, hard-working person loses her job, this may negatively affect her 
credit score, making it more difficult and costly (due to higher interest rates) to get a loan. In 
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further consequence, the belief that bad credit correlates with bad job performance makes it 
even less likely to find new employment. As O'Neil explains: "Joblessness pushes them toward 
poverty, which further worsens their scores, making it even harder for them to land a job. It's 
a downward spiral." (ibid.: 7) Similar mechanisms can be observed in the criminal justice 
system. If a person is scored "high risk" due to, e.g., unemployment, living in a poor, high-
crime neighborhood, or having friends and family that had run-ins with the law, this may 
affect the length of her sentence or whether she qualifies for probation. However, since the 
time spent in prison increases the chance that a person upon release cannot find work and 
requires social welfare, the likelihood that the person commits another crime and returns to 
prison increases as well, creating a destructive cycle that the algorithmic model helps to 
sustain. If we look more closely, it should become apparent that such a model does not only 
discriminate against low-income classes, but also, using the zip codes of highly segregated 
communities as proxy data, against ethnic minorities. As ProPublica investigations have 
shown (see Angwin et al., 2016), the result is a racially biased system that overestimates the 
recidivism rate of African Americans (generating comparatively more false positives) while 
underestimating it for Caucasians (generating comparatively more false negatives), 
systematically privileging one ethnic group while disadvantaging the other. If affecting the 
court's sentencing decision, such biased models can contribute to trapping specific 
demographic groups in a continuous downward spiral, according to O'Neil a "signature quality 
of a [Weapon of Math Destruction]" (2016: 27).   
 What exacerbates the situation is the fact that these technologies tend to be opaque, 
their algorithms protected from scrutiny by the expansive nature of trade secret law (see 
Moore, 2017). This secrecy, however, makes it much harder to question a result and contest 
a score. As O'Neil (2016: 146) emphasizes, part of the technology's fearsome power is that 
there is "little recourse to complain, much less correct the system's error." So even if unfair 
treatment is detected, which due to the veil of secrecy rarely happens, there is no chance to 
provide feedback and "set the system straight."29 (ibid.) This also applies to erroneous 
personal information collected and stored in the massive databases of the data broker 
                                                        
29 In this context, consider Article 17 ("right to erasure", also known as the "right to be forgotten") and 
Article 18 ("right to restriction of processing") of the new European General Data Protection 
Regulation (EC, 2016), which can be seen as an attempt to implement a feedback structure that 
bolsters Europeans' privacy rights.    
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industry.30 If such records are sold to other companies, they may affect whether someone 
qualifies for a job or a loan or even, as O'Neil details, admittance to a senior living center (see 
ibid.: 151). Given the sheer number of data brokers selling customer profiles, faulty data can 
be difficult if not almost impossible to correct. The ones who have a way out are, once again, 
the financially better off. As O'Neil stresses, "privacy, increasingly, will come at a cost", a 
"luxury that only the wealthy can afford." (ibid.: 170) Trackers, she argues, will likely become 
the norm, and if someone wishes to opt out of the data economy, they will have to pay a 
premium. Google's services, for instance, are mostly free to use, but financed through 
targeted advertising based on continuously gathered user data.31 In order to enjoy an ad-free 
YouTube experience without using ad-blocking technology that many Internet users are still 
unaware of,32 one can only opt to purchase a YouTube Premium subscription which, after a 
trial period, costs €11.99 per month.33 Something similar can be observed in the area of online 
news. After years of struggling with dwindling advertising revenue, the website of the 
Austrian newspaper Der Standard, for example, no longer displays any content if an activated 
ad blocker in the user's browser is detected, giving readers the choice to either deactivate the 
ad-blocking software on its site, thereby accepting both ad delivery and third-party tracking, 
or to pay a subscription fee of, at the time of writing, 6 Euros per month. This type of choice 
may serve as a reminder of the well-known adage: "If you are not paying for it, you're not the 
customer; you're the product being sold", and the financially better off may find it quite a bit 
easier to pay the fees and safeguard at least some of their privacy when browsing the Web.   
 Another issue that O'Neil only briefly touches upon is that an effective regulation of 
discriminatory data mining is difficult to achieve, at least under current law. In an often-cited 
paper, Barocas and Selbst (2016) have made the case that even though Big Data applications 
can "affect the fortunes of whole classes of people in consistently unfavorable ways" (ibid.: 
                                                        
30 For critical a review of the data broker industry, see Rieke et al. (2016) and Office of Oversight and 
Investigations (2013).  
31 For more on YouTube's targeting methods, see the "About targeting for video campaigns" help page 
at https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2454017?hl=en [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
32 According to 2016 survey by Midia Research, 41% of the 3,600 respondents from the U.S., the U.K., 
Brazil, Australia, France, and Sweden were aware of ad blocking technology. But among those who 
were aware, 80% use ad-blocking software on desktop devices and 46% do so on smartphones (see 
Moses, 2016).    
33 For more details on the YouTube Premium service, formerly known as YouTube Red, see 
https://www.youtube.com/premium [Accessed 20 June 2018].  
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673), the logic of the data mining process, which is "always a form of statistical (and therefore 
seemingly rational) discrimination" (ibid.: 677), creates several hurdles to finding disparate 
treatment and impact liability, leading the authors to conclude that "existing law largely fails 
to address the discrimination that can result from data mining" (ibid.: 675). Unfortunately, 
there is no simple remedy, as a "standard that holds companies liable for any amount of 
theoretically avoidable disparate impact is likely to ensnare all companies." (ibid.: 729) As 
Barocas and Selbst stress, such standards would counsel against using data mining altogether, 
creating a "perverse outcome, given how much even imperfect data mining can do to help 
reduce the very high rates of discrimination in [traditional, non-computerized decision 
making]." (ibid.: 730).34 From a regulatory perspective, the challenge, then, is to create a 
legislative framework capable of safeguarding civil rights and liberties without discouraging 
data-driven innovation as such. The EU's General Data Protection Regulation constitutes such 
an approach, but it remains to be seen whether the principles laid out in this new set of law 
are capable of "fully engag[ing] with the impeding Big Data tsunami" (Rubinstein, 2013: 74), 
affecting not only how data are collected and stored, but also how they are processed and 
used for automated decision making (see Goodman and Flaxman, 2017).  
 
3.3. Big Data: The Perils and Drawbacks of Virtual Competition 
 
In April 2015, the European Commission announced that it had sent a Statement of Objection 
to Google, alleging that "the company has abused its dominant position in the markets for 
general internet search services in the European Economic Area (EEA) by systematically 
favoring its own comparison shopping product in its general search results pages." (EC, 2015)  
Margarethe Vestager, the European Union's Commissioner for Competition, added that she 
had also launched a formal antitrust investigation of Google's conduct concerning mobile 
operating systems, apps, and services, declaring that she wants "to make sure the markets in 
this area can flourish without anticompetitive constrains imposed by any company." (ibid.) In 
                                                        
34 This thesis is mainly focused on the problems and challenges associated with the rise of Big Data 
analytics. This, however, does not mean that there are no advantages to be gained from its 
application. For a balanced review of Big Data's potential to increase access to credit for the financially 
underserved, uncover and possibly reduce employment discrimination, and create educational 
opportunities for the students who most need them, see the White House publication Big Data: A 
Report on Algorithmic Systems, Opportunity, and Civil Rights (White House, 2016).   
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June 2017, the Commission fined Google €2.42 billion for "abusing dominance as search 
engine" and "breaching EU antitrust rules", with Commissioner Vestager noting that the 
company had "denied other companies the chance to compete", depriving "European 
consumers [of] a genuine choice of services and the full benefits of innovation." (EC, 2017) At 
the time of writing, the outcome of the Commission's antitrust investigation of Google's 
mobile operating system, Android, is still pending, but reports suggest that the penalty could 
even be higher than the previous one (see Scott, 2018). Given that the European Commission 
is not the only regulatory body pursuing Google for anticompetitive conduct – with similar 
investigations having been carried out in Russia (see Scott, 2016), India (see Kalra and Shah, 
2018), Brazil (see Leahy, 2013), and, infamously leading to no formal charges, the U.S. (see 
Mullins et al., 2015) – what is the background of these actions against a company that only 
recently removed its unofficial "don't be evil" motto from its code of conduct (see Conger, 
2018)?     
 In their book Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven 
Economy, Ezrachi and Stucke (2016) contend that while digital markets have traditionally 
been thought to contribute to increased innovation and well-being by reducing search costs, 
lowering entry barriers, and improving information flows – thereby, in theory, creating a more 
dynamic and transparent marketplace in which the best product triumphs – at a closer look, 
one can identify the operations of „an increasingly well-oiled machine that can defy the free 
competitive forces we rely on." (ibid.: vii) Thus, rather than reducing market concentration 
and limiting the power of large corporations, the data-based, algorithm-driven economy has 
given rise to a relatively small number of new platforms and ecosystems that dominate vast 
parts of their respective field(s) of operation. For instance, while Google dominates the search 
engine market (with 86.3 percent of global desktop market share in April 2018)35 and, 
together with Facebook, accounts for over 60 percent of global online ad revenues in 2017,36 
Amazon's U.S. e-commerce market share is expected to rise from 37 percent in 2017 to 50 
                                                        
35 See Statista "Worldwide Desktop Market Share of Leading Search Engines from January 2010 to 
April 2018" at https://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwide-market-share-of-search-
engines/ [Accessed 20 June 2018].  
36 See Statista "25 Percent of Global Ad Spend Goes to Google or Facebook" at 
https://www.statista.com/chart/12179/google-and-facebook-share-of-ad-revenue/ [Accessed 20 
June 2016]. Excluding China, the digital duopoly's market share was expected to reach 84 percent in 
2017 (Garrahan, 2017). 
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percent by 2021.37 What these three companies – which, together with a few other tech 
giants, belong to the most valuable companies in the world38 – have in common, is that they 
are masters of Big Data, meaning that they not only own and receive a lot of data, but that 
they also have the ability to capitalize on these data through analytical means. Yet the fact 
that large parts of the digital domain are controlled by only a small number of corporate 
players endangers competition by (a) enabling new forms of algorithmic collusion that 
threaten to leave antitrust law behind,39 by (b) allowing for "almost perfect" price and 
behavioral discrimination that may not only negatively affect individual well-being (see 
previous section), but also thwart smaller rivals' competitiveness, and by (c) creating complex 
"Frenemy" dynamics where "super-platforms" such as Microsoft's Windows, Apple's iOS, or 
Google's Android operating system set the rules of the game, determining who can join the 
platform and which apps are featured in the respective app store (see ibid.: 35ff, 83ff, 145ff).   
Importantly, the market power of large Internet companies increases through a variety of 
network effects – in essence, more users create more data that can be used to improve 
products and services – which raises entry barriers and makes it less likely that any newcomer 
will be able to compete. As Ezrachi and Stucke (2016: 135) put it with reference to the search 
engine market:  
 
"[M]ore users generate more search queries, which generate more trial and error, which yields better 
search results, which attracts more users and advertisers to the search platform, which enables better 
profiling of users and greater likelihood of users clicking on the ads, which generates more advertising 
revenue to enable the search engine to offer even more free services […]."  
 
As a result, the "big web-aggregators become bigger, […] occupying a strategic position in the 
distribution channel" (ibid.), which increases their power to dictate prices and, through a 
                                                        
37 See Statista "Projected Retail E-Commerce GMV Share of Amazon in the United States from 2016 to 
2021" at https://www.statista.com/statistics/788109/amazon-retail-market-share-usa/ [Accessed 20 
June 2018]. 
38 See Statista "The 100 Largest Companies in the World by Market Value in 2018 (in Billion U.S. 
Dollars)" at https://www.statista.com/statistics/263264/top-companies-in-the-world-by-market-
value/ [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
39 Whereas Apple's conspiracy with major publishing houses to raise and fix e-book prices can be 
understood as a more traditional form of collusion that is punishable by law (see Kastrenakes, 2016; 
Robertson, 2013), legal prosecution becomes more difficult in the case of algorithm-driven online 
systems where evidence of clear intent – the proverbial "smoking gun" – often cannot be found. For 
a detailed discussion of this problem, see chapters 6 to 8 in Ezrachi and Stucke (2016).     
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broad range of strategies, distort competition.40 Thus, while superficially competition in 
digital markets may seem robust, it is in fact controlled by a few giants who cement their 
leadership by either "acquiring or blocking innovation or entry that might potentially 
undermine [their] dominance." (ibid.: 175) Consequently, the often-repeated dictum that the 
"competition is just one click away" (Schmidt, 2015) is, while technically correct, misleading. 
In increasingly algorithm-driven digital environments, the availability of high-quality training 
data has become a key resource for product development, which gives established companies 
with a large, active user base a significant advantage over newcomers, effectively raising 
market entry barriers (see Radinsky, 2015). If, however, a tech startup does find a way to grow 
and succeed, it is far more likely that the company will end up being bought rather than ever 
getting the chance of becoming a serious rival.41  
What makes the situation even more challenging is that the market power of large 
Internet companies is not limited to their initial core business. As recent years have shown, 
the giants of the Web are constantly seeking to expand their operations by diversifying into 
new markets. Alphabet Inc., for instance, not only operates the world's most popular search 
engine (Google Search), develops the most widespread mobile operating system (Android), 
and runs a suite of highly profitable online advertising services (AdWords, AdSense), the 
company also produces hardware (from Pixel smartphones over Chromebook laptops and 
Google Home speakers to Nest thermostats), builds mapping (Google Maps), storage (Google 
Drive, Google Cloud Platform), productivity (Gmail, Google Docs), streaming (YouTube), and 
payment services (Google Pay), and currently heavily invests in AI research (DeepMind) 
including smart assistants (Google Duplex) and self-driving cars (Waymo). At first glance, it 
may be surprising that the company that once developed the PageRank algorithm is now one 
of the leading forces behind the autonomous car movement. Are these not very different 
areas of research and expertise? Looking a bit more closely, however, it becomes clear that 
much of what is needed to build a great search engine also comes in handy when building a 
                                                        
40 Google's alleged favoring of its own services in search results alluded to in the beginning of this 
section is one example of such a competition-crushing strategy. The Amazon-Hachette dispute, in 
which the online retailer temporarily removed the pre-order buttons from forthcoming titles of the 
French publishing house, in turn illustrates the kind of negotiating power that 'gatekeeping' online 
platforms in two-sided markets can wield (see Doctorow, 2014). 
41 For a graphical overview of the largest acquisitions by one of the 'Big Five', that is, Alphabet (Google), 
Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, and Facebook, see Rowley (2018). 
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navigation system for self-driving cars. For instance, such cars "need up-to-the-minute maps 
of every conceivable roadway to move" (Bergen, 2018) and Alphabet, through Google Maps 
and related services, has already gained vast experience in the mapping business. As a 
company spokeswoman notes: "We've built a comprehensive map of the world for people 
and we are working to expand the utility to our maps to cars." (ibid.) If one takes into account 
other 'asset classes' such as algorithmic competence, tried-and-tested logistics, and various 
economies of scale, it becomes evident that Alphabet is not a surprising but rather a quite 
obvious contender in the evolving self-driving car market. As the computerization of ever 
more aspects of human life progresses, it seems likely that large tech firms will continue to 
move and expand into these new areas, using synergies between their established and their 
future business to further consolidate their market power. What can thus be observed is an 
emerging "digitized hand" that gives rise to a suite of newly possible anticompetitive 
behaviors that threaten to undermine free market forces and pose difficult questions for 
regulators around the globe (see Ezrachi and Stucke, 2016: viii). 

















4. Final Thoughts and Outlook 
 
What should have become clear by now is that Big Data, as understood here, is more than a 
short-lived fad. While the term itself may eventually fade away, the vision that has fueled its 
rise will not. To gather and analyze 'data' is not just the craze of the season, it is one of the 
defining features of modern civilization ever since the scientific revolution. As Hacking (1990: 
1) writes in The Taming of Chance, over the course of the 19th century, "[s]ociety became 
statistical." But statistics need data to work, and the recent "data explosion" (Holmes, 2017) 
has redefined the limits of what can be traced, tracked, and subjected to computational 
analysis. To put it in simple terms, over recent years, Big Data has been a crack-like infusion 
to a mathematical science that builds on the work of Carl Friedrich Gauss, Pierre-Simon 
Laplace, Adolphe Quetelet, and other contemporaries (e.g., see Ambrose, 2015), as well as to 
a machine-based industry that goes back to Herman Hollerith's electromechanical punched 
card tabulator, the bedrock technology of a company that, through a series of mergers, would 
later become IBM (e.g., see Driscoll, 2012). From this perspective, Big Data's story is one of 
continuity that begins in the late stages of the mechanical age and currently culminates in the 
early 21st century digital world. But this story is nowhere near over. In the upcoming years, 
Big Data-based applications will continue to change the face of many professions as well as 
people's lives in general. In purely scientific terms, the advances will probably be impressive, 
with data-crunching technologies able to exploit the information flood in ever more 
sophisticated ways. From a sociotechnical point of view, however, these innovations pose a 
number of problems and challenges, threatening privacy, social justice, and consumer welfare 
(see previous chapter). Unregulated, these problems are bound to increase. In the future, 
people will leave even more digital footprints that can be mined and analyzed, revealing 
minute details about our daily lives. Clearly, such data mining techniques can also be used to 
reveal patterns of injustice and unfairness, potentially helping to prevent discrimination in an 
already biased world (e.g., see White House, 2016). But this is often neither the goal nor the 
outcome of this kind of analysis. As historian Melvin Kranzberg (1986: 545) famously 
maintained: "Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral." While technologies have 
certain affordances – that is, specific possibilities for action – it is society that ultimately 
determines their application and impact. Unfortunately, in the case of Big Data analytics, one 
cannot only see the potential for harm, but actual harms already manifesting themselves 
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within and across society. From this perspective, Big Data's story is one of rupture and 
discontinuity because changes in the amount and nature of data being collected have 
engendered a "qualitative shift in how data can be analyzed, to what ends data and analytics 
can be employed, and who has the power to utilize and extract value from data." (Kitchin, 
2014b: 176) As a result, Big Data poses a series of threats to people's fundamental rights and 
freedoms42 and extends processes of algorithmic decision making to an ever-greater number 
of application areas. It alters the power relations between, first, government and industry, 
and, second, between citizens, on the one hand, and both public and private entities, on the 
other. From a societal and democratic perspective, the question then remains how best to 
respond to the many challenges posed by Big Data. This is what the remainder of this chapter 
aims to address.  
 First off, I believe there needs to be acknowledgment of the fact that when it comes 
to the problems and challenges of Big Data, no single solution is likely to suffice. Big Data is 
not simply a technological issue, but a phenomenon that is deeply entwined with human 
history and culture. As mentioned – and argued in greater detail in Papers I and III – the appeal 
of quantification and mechanical objectivity is not new, but has gradually grown with the 
needs, pressures, and complexities of modern civilization (see Daston and Galison, 2010; 
Desrosières, 1998; Porter, 1995). Thus, contemporary society's trust in and reliance on 
numbers and figures is tied to a continually increasing demand for efficiency, predictability, 
and control. But to aim for such goals is not a value-free aspiration. Quite on the contrary, in 
the context of Big Data, notions such as efficiency, predictability, and control are bound to 
clash with established rights and values such as privacy, autonomy, and non-discrimination. 
Which leads to an important point: at the most fundamental level, issues around Big Data are 
grounded in specific economic and political ideologies, their respective norms and values. But 
if a system is geared toward profit and efficiency rather than privacy and non-discrimination, 
                                                        
42 Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, for instance, holds that 
"everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her" and that such "data 
must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of consent of the person concerned" 
(European Union, 2012). Ever since the Safe Harbor hearings, when a European Commission lawyer 
told an EU judge to "consider closing [his] Facebook account" because Brussel executives were unable 
"to guarantee 'adequate' safeguards" (Nielsen, 2015), it should have become clear that the rights 
guaranteed in the Charter are very much in jeopardy. For a more detailed discussion of how Big Data 
threatens to undermine European law, see Rubinstein (2013).   
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no "technological fix"43 will make much of a difference. What is needed, instead, is serious 
public debate about ethical acceptability, social desirability, and the key values a community 
wishes to uphold (see von Schomberg, 2013; Habermas, 1964). This, however, must be paired 
with a governmental commitment to protect these values, put them into legislation, and 
enforce them. The recent European General Data Protection Regulation, for instance, is the 
outcome of a long and difficult negotiation process where political powers have agreed upon 
a legal framework that – by providing new rights to consumers and imposing additional 
obligations on data controllers – may disrupt and transform parts of the sprawling data 
market (e.g., see Manthorpe, 2018; Rose, 2017). Certain EU member states such as Austria, 
however, have already passed laws that could undermine the enforcement of the new 
Regulation (see Nielsen, 2018; Sokolov, 2018), which from an analytic point of view only adds 
to the insight that a responsible governance of Big Data is ultimately a question of sufficient 
political and institutional will. Academia can – and should – of course contribute to this 
conversation in multiple ways: 
 Raising Awareness. In a recent New York Times op-ed, Cathy O'Neil (2017) critically 
notes that "our main source of information on the downside of bad technology […] is the 
media" while the ivory towers of academia "keep ignoring tech". Having spent several years 
working with scholars from fields such as Science and Technology Studies (STS), computer 
and information ethics, media studies, and human-computer interaction (HCI), I do not share 
this impression. Quite the contrary, I would argue that recent times have seen a sharp 
increase in research on the social and cultural consequences of modern data analytics, as 
evidenced by dedicated new journals (e.g., SAGE's open access journal Big Data & Society) 
and conferences (e.g., the bi-yearly Data Power Conference). At the same time, and as a 
reaction to the growing importance of computer technology in everyday life, technical 
universities have started to incorporate courses that foster critical reflection on IT into their 
curricula, a wave of STS-based hirings at the TU Munich and the establishment of the Research 
Group for Ethics in Information Technology (EIT) at the Departments of Informatics at 
Universität Hamburg being two telling examples. Educational efforts beyond the traditional 
ambit of the social sciences and the humanities has thus become an important means of 
awareness creation among future generations of data scientists and software developers but 
                                                        
43 For more on the origins of the notion of "technological fix" as "social cure-all", see Johnston (2018). 
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also, as seen at the IT University of Copenhagen, among students of business informatics and 
digital innovation. In addition, researchers concerned with the potential pitfalls of Big Data 
analytics and algorithmic decision making often seek to communicate beyond the confines of 
the ivory tower, actively striving to engage with representatives from industry and 
government as well as with civil society at large. Last but not least, social media has arguably 
contributed to scholars' public visibility, with academics such as Frank Pasquale, Professor of 
Law at the University of Maryland and author of above-cited The Black Box Society (2015), 
maintaining prolific Twitter feeds with many thousand followers. 
 In-Depth Research. One reason why Cathy O'Neil is critical about the media's role in 
shaping the Big Data discourse is that "much of what should concern us is more nuanced and 
small scale – and much less understood – than what we see in the headlines." (O'Neil, 2017) 
While there are plenty of great examples of excellent data journalism (e.g., see Angwin et al., 
2016), and Diakopoulos' (2015) work on "algorithmic accountability reporting" makes a strong 
case for the importance of journalistic watchdogging, I would agree with O'Neil that much of 
the news coverage on algorithmic power has been sensationalistic and partisan, often lacking 
the kind of nuance and depth that the complex subject matter deserves. Deep and nuanced 
analysis, however, is something that academia is ideally able to provide, with articles such as 
Barocas and Selbst's (2016) Big Data's Disparate Impact, which examines whether 
discriminatory data mining is likely to generate liability under Title VII of the US Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, being a prime example of how measured, detailed, and refined a critical 
discussion of algorithmic bias can actually be. Yet in order for such rigorous research to be 
produced, academia needs sufficient resources and suitable institutional structures. In the 
context of Big Data analytics, cross-disciplinary work will arguably become increasingly 
important, not only between fields such as ethics, law, and sociology, but also between these 
fields and the computer sciences. As a result, interdisciplinary research centers exploring the 
interplay between technology and society have become more common – see for example the 
newly established Weizenbaum Institute for the Networked Society in Berlin44 – indicating that 
new forms of research and collaboration are required to fully engage with the challenges of 
                                                        
44 Emphasizing its interdisciplinary approach, the Weizenbaum Institute promises to "unite all relevant 
disciplines in a single research program and develop a holistic perspective on the process of 
digitalization of society", see https://vernetzung-und-gesellschaft.de/english/ [Accessed 20 June 
2018]. For an effort at "Mode 2" knowledge production in the Dutch humanities, see Wyatt (2016) 
and Wyatt and Millen (2014).  
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digital transformation. A final remark: In-depth studies that add to our understanding of the 
digital domain in general and platform politics in particular may crucially depend on the level 
of insight into the workings of usually proprietary, blacked-boxed algorithmic systems and 
their wider societal embeddedness (see Kitchin, 2017). Consequently, regulatory efforts to 
increase the transparency of such systems not only to ensure fair market competition (see 
Khan and Toplensky, 2018), but also to facilitate academic inquiry into how these systems 
shape and restructure everyday life, should be welcomed as a step in the right direction. 
 Providing Guidance. While the critique of Big Data practices is well developed within 
the SSH literature, attempts to provide guidance and chart possible ways forward are far less 
common. Emphasizing the need for responsible Big Data research, Zook and co-authors 
(2017), for instance, have presented "ten simple rules" for addressing ethical issues and 
minimizing potential harms. Though the authors' recommendations are fairly general – 
reaching from the acknowledgment that even seemingly innocuous data can possibly do harm 
to calls for codes of conduct and greater auditability – they specify a concise set of principles 
that may counter negligence and naïvety when it comes to ethics. And while manifestos such 
as these certainly do not yield a complete solution to the complex ethical challenges of 
modern data analytics, they nevertheless may contribute to sensitizing scholars and 
practitioners to the wider implications of their craft. In some cases, this might lead to a 
rethinking – or even an abandonment – of certain tools and products. As Muller (2018: 3) 
notes:  
 
"There are things that can be measured. There are things that are worth measuring. But what can be 
measured may have no relationship to what we really want to know. The costs of measuring may be 
greater than the benefits. The things that get measured may draw effort away from the things we 
really care about. And measurement may provide us with distorted knowledge – knowledge that 
seems solid but is actually deceptive."  
 
To my mind, this quote epitomizes the kind of guidance SSH research is probably best suited 
to provide: not only offering feedback as to how to do things, but also, and perhaps even 
more importantly, how and when not to do them. The ability to unpack technologies and 
contextualize them within their wider sociotechnical assemblage is, I would argue, one of the 
main ways how the social sciences and the humanities can support a proper and responsible 
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conduct of Big Data research and innovation.45 As indicated, however, there also needs to be 
a sincere willingness of public and private stakeholders to consider and act upon such input, 




From a cursory glance, it may appear that this thesis paints an overly pessimistic picture of 
Big Data. But that is neither the intention nor the case. The problem is not Big Data as such, 
it is how computerized measurements are perceived, used, and governed. Surrounded by an 
"aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy" (boyd and Crawford, 2012: 663) and embedded in a 
culture driven by "metric fixation" (Muller, 2018: 17), Big Data technologies are bound to do 
more harm than good. Behind the façade of mechanical precision, they may incorporate 
biases and perpetuate discrimination. Worse still, by black boxing the analytical process, 
algorithmic software may curtail people's ability to contest their verdict. The result could be 
a world ruled by automated law, regulated by "weapons of math destruction" (O'Neil: 2016) 
that offer no appeal. But this is not the only way forward. Data science is a craft and practice. 
It demands human judgement. It serves certain interests and objectives. It offers views from 
'somewhere' rather than 'nowhere'. Data science has great potential: it can be used to unveil 
patterns of prejudice and discrimination, it can be employed to find and support those who 
need it most, it can contribute to improving fairness in a world that is not very fair to begin 
with. As a practice, however, data science can be as fallible and flawed as the people behind 
the screen. This thesis is not about the evils of Big Data. Instead, it is about the need for an 
algorithmic culture that sees the potential, acknowledges the pitfalls, and uses the power of 




                                                        
45 To elucidate what is meant by "unpack" and "contextualize", consider the following quote by Kitchin 
(2017: 25): "[A]lgorithms are not formulated or do not work in isolation, but form part of a 
technological stack that includes infrastructure/hardware, code platforms, data and interfaces, and 
are framed and conditioned by forms of knowledge, legalities, governmentalities, institutions, 
marketplaces, finance and so on. A wider understanding of algorithms then requires their full socio-
technical assemblage to be examined, including an analysis of the reasons for subjecting the system 
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Recently, there has been renewed interest in so-called evidence-based policy making. Enticed 
by the grand promises of Big Data, public officials seem increasingly inclined to experiment 
with more data-driven forms of governance. But while the rise of Big Data and related 
consequences has been a major issue of concern across different disciplines, attempts to 
develop a better understanding of the phenomenon's historical foundations have been rare. 
This short commentary addresses this gap by situating the current push for numerical 
evidence within a broader socio-political context, demonstrating how the epistemological 
claims of Big Data science intersect with specific forms of trust, truth, and objectivity. We 
conclude by arguing that regulators' faith in numbers can be attributed to a distinct political 
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objectivity, epistemology 
 
Over the past few years, there has been growing interest in so-called "evidence-based policy 
making". While the concept is not new (see Solesbury, 2002), the latest push for more data-
driven modes of governance has been considerable (see Haskins, 2014). Against the backdrop 
of multiple crises, policymakers seem ever more inclined to legitimize specific ways of action 
by referring to 'hard' scientific evidence suggesting that a particular initiative will eventually 
yield the desired outcomes (see Urahn, 2015). Across many areas of public service – be it 
healthcare, education, or law enforcement – a steady influx of "data for policy" (EC 2015a) is 
meant to offer guidance in a moment marked by high levels of complexity and uncertainty 
(see Nowotny et al., 2001). 
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 Legislators' current emphasis on evidence and results correlates with a recent techno-
scientific development – the advent of Big Data (see Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013). 
While state bureaucracies have relied on statistics and numerical information for centuries 
(see Cohen, 2005), new analytical techniques promise to improve upon former methods in 
several ways: whereas data analysis has traditionally been costly and time-consuming, it is 
now fast and cheap; whereas previously one had to settle for samples, the ongoing 
computerization of society makes it possible to glean data from entire populations; whereas 
once there was need for theory, through sheer volume the data now speak for themselves; 
whereas in the past measurements were tainted by human bias, agnostic algorithms now 
guarantee an impartial view from nowhere. Together, the alleged qualities of Big Data 
technologies feed into what Rob Kitchin (2014a: 5) has described as the "articulation of a new 
empiricism", which operates as a "discursive rhetorical device" designed to promote the 
utility and value of new analytical services. 
 Policymakers on either side of the Atlantic have bought into the hype, usually without 
much regard for nuance or subtlety. In official documents and speeches, Big Data is referred 
to as the "new oil for the digital age" (Kroes, 2012), the next "industrial revolution" (Kroes, 
2014), "gold" (ibid.), a game-changing "key asset" (EC, 2015b) for creating value, increasing 
productivity, and boosting growth. The technology is not only expected to improve public 
administration by "advanc[ing] government efficiency" (White House, 2014: 67) and enabling 
"better services" (EC, 2013: 2), but also to support "evidence-informed decision making" (EC, 
2015a) by providing real-time feedback, generating solutions, and predicting outcomes, 
always ensuring that "regulation is empirically justified in advance" (Sunstein, 2012: 2). 
Although this focus on technology-driven benefits has in some cases expanded to include 
consideration of potential risks and pitfalls, political leaders remain firmly committed to 
"harness[ing] the power of Big Data" (Kalil and Zhao, 2013). 
 Much effort has already gone into challenging the buzz-laden assumptions of modern-
day "data-ism" (Brooks, 2013). Investigating both the politics and power of contemporary 
data practices, scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds have identified a range of 
social, ethical, and legal issues – from privacy and security (see Ohm, 2009) to transparency 
and accountability (see Pasquale, 2015), bias and discrimination (see Barocas and Selbst, 2016 
[2014]) – emphasizing that Big Data's presumed benefits may come at a cost. But while there 
has been a steady stream of critical reactions across academia and the media, attempts to 
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gain a better understanding of the socio-historical foundations of policymakers' push for 
numerical evidence have been rare. Put differently, even though the rise of Big Data and 
related consequences has been a major issue of concern, its significance for and 
embeddedness in a long-standing culture of measurement and quantification has not. As 
Barnes (2013) poignantly states: "Big Data, little history." 
One reason for this lack of historical contextualization can be attributed to the 
dynamics of Big Data discourse: Presented as a rupture and revolution with no ties to the 
past, discussions about Big Data have focused on the modalities of change rather than forms 
of continuity. The 'now' is said to be fundamentally different from what came before, the 
'new' supersedes the 'old'. This narrative of novelty and disruption, exemplified in notions 
such as Anderson's (2008) "Petabyte Age", is both powerful and convenient, but discourages 
appreciation of Big Data as a specific amalgamation, a "conjuncture of different elements, 
each with their own history, coming together at this present our moment" (Barnes 2013: 298). 
Yet it is precisely the recognition of Big Data's diverse roots, its connection to prior epistemic 
practices, that may provide greater insight into the current excitement's underlying norms 
and values. 
Such exploratory analysis requires some conceptual rethinking: Instead of narrowly 
defining Big Data in mere technical terms – e.g., Laney's (2001) popular 'three Vs', which 
reductively characterize Big Data as an increase in (data) volume, velocity, and variety – it 
seems more productive to think of it as the terminologically contingent manifestation of a 
complex socio-technical phenomenon that rests on an interplay of technological, scientific, 
and cultural factors (cf. boyd and Crawford, 2012). While the technological dimension alludes 
to advances in hardware, software, but also infrastructure and the scientific dimension 
comprises both mining techniques and analytical skills, the cultural dimension refers to (a) the 
pervasive use of ICTs in contemporary society and (b) the growing significance and authority 
of quantified information in many areas of everyday life, including public administration and 
decision making. Ultimately, this broader interpretative approach may assist in 
"deconstructing the black boxes of Big Data" (Pasquale, 2015: 6) by paying attention not only 
to the mechanical, but also the mental workings of an otherwise opaque phenomenon. 
Investigations into the roots and antecedents of Big Data may take different paths: 
Barnes and Wilson (2014), for instance, examine the origins of the social physics movement, 
whose monistic urge – that is, the assumption that the laws of physics apply to both natural 
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and social worlds – was later incorporated into spatial analysis, shaping the use of Big Data in 
present-day geography. Morozov (2014), drawing on Medina's (2011) Cybernetic 
Revolutionaries, details the Allende administration's Project Cybersyn to highlight the 
intellectual affinities between socialism, cybernetics, and Big Data, while Grandin (2014), 
citing Dinges (2005), reports on the Pinochet regime's Condor data bank to locate the "anti-
socialist origins of Big Data", a juxtaposition of historical events illustrating that the idea of 
data-facilitated control may in fact appeal to different ends of the political spectrum. Last but 
not least, Mackenzie (2013) provides an empirical account of how recent shifts in 
programming practice relate to what Adams and co-authors (2009) have labeled "regimes of 
anticipation", demonstrating how the current emphasis on machine learning and predictive 
modelling is entangled with a concerted cultural effort to reduce uncertainty by fostering the 
continuous assessment of the 'not yet'.  
While these examples offer unique perspectives, each focusing on particular cases and 
ideas, they are also similar in that they seek to situate Big Data discourse within a larger 
historical context, attributing meaning to what all too often takes the form of pure marketing. 
We suggest that such attempts to historicize and contextualize are crucial as they may (a) 
provide better insight into the epistemological foundations of contemporary data science, (b) 
deepen our understanding of the norms, values, and expectations driving the current climate 
of hope and hype, and (c) indicate potential social and ethical ramifications, serving as a 
guiding compass at a time when technical innovation continues to outpace government 
regulation (see Rubinstein, 2013). We would like to contribute to this research agenda by 
suggesting what may prove another fruitful avenue of investigation: The data hype's reliance 
on specific forms of trust, truth, and objectivity.  
 
As boyd and Crawford (2012: 663) have argued, Big Data is not just about technological 
progress, but about a "widespread belief that large data sets offer a higher form of 
intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights that were previously impossible". 
Leonelli (2014: 1) makes a similar argument, stressing that the novelty of Big Data science 
does not lie in the sheer quantity of data involved, but in the "prominence and status acquired 
by data as commodity and recognized output." But where does this prominence and status 
come from and what exactly are the roots of the belief that more data equals better insight? 
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 An initial answer would be that data are often perceived as raw, objective, and neutral 
– the "stuff of truth itself" (Gitelman, 2013: 2). But, as historians of science and technology 
have repeatedly shown, conceptions of objectivity, truth and truthfulness, trust and 
trustworthiness may vary, they are "situated and historically specific" (ibid.: 4). Therefore, it 
is important to clarify which particular version of these concepts manifests within Big Data 
discourse. One way to identify such differences is through comparison, which may involve 
tracing conceptual shifts and changes over time. 
 
In his book The Social History of Truth, Shapin (1994) emphasizes the central role of trust in 
building and maintaining social order. Societies are made through acts of trust – without trust, 
they may falter and collapse. The allocation of trust and trustworthiness can thus be 
understood as the "great civility" (ibid.: 3), granting the conditions in which people can 
colonize each others' mind. Although often rendered invisible, trust as the "cement of 
society" (ibid.: 10; also see 35f.) is also essential to the construction and establishment of 
epistemic systems. The production of scientific knowledge, for instance, rests on myriads of 
social and material interactions, which take for granted the reliability of numerous stabilized 
norms and relationships. As a result, scientific distrust and skepticism only takes place "on the 
margins of trusting systems." (ibid.: 19)  
 But such systems of trust are not fixed – conceptions of whom to trust, what to trust, 
and in what circumstances, are subject to change: While in premodern society it was the 
politically and economically independent gentleman who was generally conceived as a 
credible truth-teller, modern society accorded trust to the "abstract capacities" (Giddens 
1990: 26) of "faceless institutions" (Shapin, 1994: xxxi). The veracity of testimony was no 
longer underwritten by personal virtue, but by an elaborate system of institutionalized norms 
and standards, rigorously policed in a great "panopticon of truth" (ibid.: 413). A different form 
of trust first accompanied and then superseded the premoderns' faith in the integrity of the 
solitary knower and the moderns' confidence in the rigor of institutionalized expertise, a type 
of trust that has gained considerable traction with the arrival of Big Data: People's trust in 
numbers. 
 While the general history of quantification can be traced back much further, 
Desrosières (1998: 23) identifies 17th-century English political arithmetic as the "basic act of 
all statistical work (in the modern sense of the term), implying definite, identified, and stable 
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unities." Whereas early records of baptisms, marriages, and burials were meant to attest to 
the existence of individuals and their family relations, later statistical surveys such as the one 
underlying the 18th-century French "adunation" were intended to support the unification of 
national territory in order to establish a "politico-cognitive construction of a space of common 
measurement" (ibid.: 33). Examples such as these highlight the close relationship between 
statistics and state-making: Numbers allowed for coherence and generality, enabling central 
governments to exercise administrative control over matters of taxation and economic 
development at a time when the familiarity of face-to-face interactions gradually gave way to 
the anonymity and complexity of expanding trade and business networks.  
 But behind those numbers still stood individual experts and prestigious institutions – 
numbers did not speak for themselves. Quite to the contrary, it was the cultivated judgment 
of an administrative elite that guaranteed the trustworthiness of numerical information; 
deployed by outsiders, statistics counted for little. As Porter (1995: 138) explains, numbers 
could only "provide a modest supplement to institutional power." Their credibility rested on 
the authority and integrity of a bureaucracy whose members believed that measurements 
only became useful when subject to expert interpretation. For them, nothing could be 
reduced to inflexible laws, abstract formulas, or technical routines. Agreements were reached 
through informal discussion rather than formal procedures. In general, decisions were rarely 
entrusted to the numbers. 
 The demand for quantitative rigor increased during the first half of the 20th century: 
Instead of expert judgment, the pursuit of technical discipline required an "ideal of self-
sacrifice" (ibid.: 89); instead of professional autonomy, the desire for precision-imposed 
adherence to a strict "regime of calculation" (102); instead of elite discretion, it became 
necessary to "manage by the numbers" (92). The result was what Porter refers to as the "cult 
of impersonality" (90), a specific culture of quantification that seeks to reduce the human 
element as much as possible, preferring formalized principles to subjective interpretation, 
uniform standards to methodological tinkering, the rule of law to the rule of men. The goal 
was to attain "mechanical objectivity" (Daston and Galison, 1992), a disinterested science that 
"eradicates all that is personal, idiosyncratic, perspectival." (ibid.: 123) In this brave new 
world, trust no longer resides in the integrity of individual truth-tellers or the veracity of 
prestigious institutions, but is placed in highly formalized procedures enacted through 
disciplined self-restraint. Numbers cease to be supplements. They are couched in a rhetoric 
 65 
of factuality, imbued with an ethos of neutrality, and presented with an aura of certainty. 
They step out of the shadows of their human creators, enter center stage, and, in the 
arguments and claims of countless profiteers, start to speak for themselves. 
  What are the reasons for this shift toward mechanical objectivity? On the one hand, 
technological progress played a significant role. The growing availability of ever more capable 
machinery changed the face of the accounting profession. The idea was powerful: The more 
mechanized a process, the more automated a procedure, the less the need for – and danger 
of – subjective human intervention (see Venturini et al., 2014). In the words of Daston and 
Galison (2010: 123), "instead of freedom of will, machines offered freedom from will". The 
virtuous machine was conceived as the "ultimate outsider", and it was not long until "it 
became the greatest in the kingdom of quantification" (Porter, 1995: 85). Consequently, the 
"honest instrument" (Daston and Galison, 1992: 120) with its "glow of veracity" (ibid.: 111) 
both served as a means to and symbol of mechanical objectivity. 
 On the other hand, there was a social dimension: The pursuit of quantitative rigor was 
seen as a strategy to adapt to new external pressures in a rapidly changing political 
environment. War and economic crisis had left their marks, and the dynamics of democracy 
increased the need for hard evidence and professional accountability. Confronted with public 
distrust, invasive auditing, and competing political demands, bureaucratic agencies and 
scientific communities sought to withstand scrutiny and minimize responsibility by adhering 
to rigid protocols and explicit decision criteria. This willingness for personal restraint is a sign 
of professional weakness rather than strength: The more permeable the boundaries of a 
discipline, the higher its vulnerability to outside criticism, the more tempting the language of 
mechanical objectivity becomes. Consequently, the appeal of standardized methods is 
especially great in cultures where the faith in other forms of trust has been shattered. As 
Porter (1995) notes, methodological strictness and objective rules may serve as an alternative 
to trust and shared beliefs. Where trust is missing and suspicion prevails, numbers are meant 
to fill the gap: Regarded as carefully measured matters of fact, they are expected to offer a 
sense of fairness and justice, a way of making decisions without having to decide, a chance to 
de-politicize legislation. This push for impersonal numerical evidence is however not so much 
rooted in the inner workings of quantitative professions, but in the needs and demands of a 
specific socio-political culture, a democratic system undermined by pervasive distrust and 
uncertainty. It is on these grounds that the Big Data phenomenon continues to blossom. 
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The epistemic promises of Big Data connect to the ideal of mechanical objectivity in several 
ways, not only fortifying but also expanding the appeal of the doctrine:  
First, a child of new analytical techniques and the progressing computerization of 
society, Big Data pledges to extend the reach of automation, from data collection to matters 
of storage, curation, and analysis. The virtuous machine emerges as ever more powerful as it 
covers increasingly large parts of the analytical and decision-making process. 
Second, by capturing massive amounts of data and focusing on correlations rather 
than causes, Big Data claims to reduce the need for theory, models, and, in extension, human 
expertise. In addition, modern data analysis software is often thoroughly opaque, with a 
phenomenology that emphasizes both uniformity and impersonality. 
Third, Big Data promises to expand the realm of what can be measured. Trackers, 
social media, and the Internet of Things allow to trace and gauge movements, actions, and 
behaviors in ways that were previously unfeasible. Fully quantified and free from bias, Big 
Data pushes the tenets of mechanical objectivity into ever more areas of application. 
Fourth and finally, settling for neither the present nor the past, Big Data aspires to 
calculate what is yet to come. Smart, fast, and cheap predictive techniques are meant to 
support decision making and optimize resource allocation across many government sectors, 
applying a mechanical mindset to the colonization of the future. 
  
The limitations of these "sociotechnical imaginaries" (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009) have been 
discussed elsewhere (e.g., see Kitchin, 2014b), but the point here is to develop a better 
understanding of how the current language of Big Data-related hope and hype intersects with 
and relies on particular forms of trust and objectivity, which, in turn, can be conceived as 
products of a specific socio-political culture. In a climate of distrust, crisis, and uncertainty, 
officials' adherence to supposedly impartial numbers may be regarded as a strategy of 
defense, an attempt to shield themselves from increased public and judicial scrutiny. It is not 
by coincidence that the European Commission, whose authority continues to be challenged 
by citizens and national governments alike, has emerged as the one of the most zealous 
political quantifiers. 
Big Data has been repeatedly criticized for its positivist epistemology and its support 
of techno-capitalism, and while such criticism has its merits, it pays little attention to the 
circumstances and dynamics that contribute to the creation and internalization of 
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corresponding norms and values. Our proposition is simple: Instead of focusing exclusively on 
the potential consequences of the Big Data phenomenon, we can gain additional insight from 
examining its social and political, but also its technical and epistemic roots. Such an approach 
may foster more, not less, critical engagement as it shifts the perspective and situates Big 
Data discourse within a broader historical narrative. As Barnes and Wilson (2014: 11) argue: 
 
"By showing that Big Data is historical, we show the assumptions that were built into it, as well as the 
contestations around them. Big Data becomes no longer a black box, self-contained, sealed and 
impregnable, but is opened up, available for verbalist discussion and contestation."  
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The paper investigates the rise of Big Data in contemporary society. It examines the most 
prominent epistemological claims made by Big Data proponents, calls attention to the 
potential socio-political consequences of blind data trust, and proposes a possible way 
forward. The paper's main focus is on the interplay between an emerging new empiricism 
and an increasingly opaque algorithmic environment that challenges democratic demands for 
transparency and accountability. It concludes that a responsible culture of quantification 
requires epistemic vigilance as well as a greater awareness of the potential dangers and 




The "Age of Big Data" (Lohr, 2012) is firmly upon us, and it promises to change not only how 
"we live, work, and think" (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013), but also, and perhaps most 
fundamentally, how we know.  
People, sensors, and systems generate increasingly large amounts of data. The 
networking company Cisco (2015) estimates that global Internet traffic has increased fivefold 
over the past five years, and will have tripled again by 2019. In the same year, driven by new 
users, products, and the quickly expanding Internet of Things, the number of Internet-
connected devices is expected to reach 24 billion, compared to about 14 billion in 2015 
(Ericsson, 2015).1 Already there are "more data […] being generated every week than in the 
last millennia" (OECD, 2015: 1), and at a rate that is likely to accelerate.  
But Big Data as a complex techno-scientific phenomenon is not just about growth in 
data "volume, velocity, and variety" (Laney, 2001), it is also seen as the ability to mine and 
manipulate data in ways that allow to "extract meaning and insight" and "reveal [hidden] 
                                                        
1 Such forecasts should be regarded with caution. The numbers vary not only between research firms, 
but also between individual reports issued by the same company, and thus are quite volatile. 
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trends and patterns" (IBM, 2014: 11; 15). Consequently, and heavily lobbied by industry 
stakeholders, there have been considerable investments in analytical capabilities (i.e., 
hardware, software, and skills) across both public and private sectors. The European 
Commission, for instance, has only recently announced a €2.5 billion public-private 
partnership in an effort to put "Europe at the forefront of the global data race" and "master 
Big Data" (EC, 2014a). 
Enthusiasts and advocates from research and industry have argued that Big Data 
presents a new scientific paradigm (see Hey et al., 2009), a data-intensive exploratory science 
with the "dream of establishing a 'sensors everywhere' data infrastructure" (Bell, 2009: xv), 
enabling us to "measure more, faster, than ever before" (Wilbanks, 2009: 214). From such a 
perspective, the impact of advanced data analytics is nothing short of revolutionary: In 
addition to transforming a wide array of areas such as health care (see Science Europe, 2014), 
education (see Dede, 2015), or law enforcement (see Bachner, 2013), Big Data is said to 
produce a new kind of knowledge, one that is more comprehensive, more objective, and more 
predictive.   
Against this backdrop, scholars from the social sciences and humanities have warned 
of an emerging "new empiricism" (Kitchin, 2014a), a certain belief that "the volume of data, 
accompanied by techniques that can reveal their inherent truth, enables data to speak for 
themselves free of theory" (ibid.: 3). Taken to the extreme, such unbridled "trust in numbers" 
(Porter, 1995) is said to lead to "data-ism" (Brooks, 2013), a "deification of data" (Jenkins, 
2013) that promotes forms of "algorithmic governance" (Williamson, 2014) and "digital age 
[…] Taylorism" (Lohr, 2015) where a focus on performance and efficiency metrics replaces 
other norms and values.  
Following a brief discussion of the rise of Big Data in contemporary society (2), this 
paper examines some of the most prominent epistemological claims made by Big Data 
proponents (3), calls attention to the potential socio-political ramifications of unrestrained 
'datatrust' (4), and, in a concluding section, points to potential conceptual alternatives (5).  
 
2. Big Data: Genesis, Definitions, Trust 
 
While the exact origins of the term remain a matter of debate (see Lohr, 2013), bibliometric 
studies have documented a growing number of Big Data articles since the early 2000s, with a 
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sharp increase in publications since 2008 (see Halevi and Moed, 2012). At first, references to 
Big Data can mainly be found in the engineering and computer science literature; more 
recently, the use of the term has become widespread across a host of disciplines – from 
business and management to physics, biology, and medicine to the social sciences and the 
humanities. But the popularization of the notion has not been restricted to academia. A 
Google Trends search for "Big Data" indicates a strong surge in interest2 since 2011, the tool's 
forecast feature predicting a further increase from 2015 onwards. At present, there appears 
to be hardly any major news outlet that has not dealt with the phenomenon in one way or 
another, and its heavy use as an advertising and marketing term has solidified its reputation 
as the "buzzword of the decade" (Barocas and Selbst, 2016: 673).  
Many definitions of Big Data have been given, but no consensus has been reached. As 
Schroeder (2014: 5) notes, there are "no definitive, academic definitions of data and of Big 
Data". Probably best known, however, are the so-called "3Vs" suggested by former META 
Group (now Gartner) analyst Doug Laney (2012; 2001). According to this model, Big Data can 
be characterized as growth in data volume (i.e., a change in the depth and breadth of data 
available), velocity (i.e., an acceleration of data generation), and variety (i.e., a greater 
heterogeneity of data types and formats). But even when extended to four (see IBM, 2013), 
five (see Marr, 2014), or seven Vs (see van Rijmenam, 2013), frameworks of this kind mainly 
focus on measures of magnitude and related challenges, thus providing a very narrow view 
of what constitutes Big Data. Other approaches have shifted attention from data properties 
to new forms of analysis, conceptualizing Big Data as a "problem-solving philosophy" (Hartzog 
and Selinger, 2013) that "link[s] seemingly disparate disciplines" (Berman, 2013: xv), enabling 
researchers to "discover relationships" (Schaeffer and Olson, 2014: 44) and "harness 
information in novel ways to produce useful insights" (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 
2). While such a perspective offers a richer understanding of Big Data as a complex techno-
scientific phenomenon, it cannot account for the current climate of hype that surrounds 
modern data analytics. This is where a third type of definition provides further insight. As 
boyd and Crawford (2012: 663) have argued, Big Data is not only about technological progress 
and advances in analytical techniques, but also about a "widespread belief that large data 
                                                        
2 Google's "interest over time" graph shows "total searches for a term relative to the total number of 
searches done on Google", see: https://support.google.com/trends/answer/4355164?hl=en&rd=1 
[Accessed 20 June 2018].  
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sets offer a higher form of intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights that were 
previously impossible". Leonelli (2014: 1) makes a similar argument, stressing that the novelty 
of Big Data science does not lie in the sheer quantity of data involved, but in the "prominence 
and status acquired by data as commodity and recognized output." It is arguably this trust in 
the authority of data, this faith and belief in numerical evidence, that has greatly contributed 
to the buzz-laden narrative of Big Data discourse. 
The rhetoric of hope and hype is not limited to industry and business circles, it also 
features prominently in political realms. Policymakers have referred to Big Data as, e.g., the 
"new oil of the digital age" (Kroes, 2012), a game-changing "key asset" (EC, 2015a), or the 
next "industrial revolution" (Kroes, 2014). There appears to be agreement that "Big Data 
drives big benefits" (White House, 2014a: v), and that one must "seize the opportunities 
afforded by this new, data-driven revolution" (NSF, 2012). On the one hand, the conviction 
that data science can "change this […] world for the better" (Obama, 2015) is deeply rooted 
in the history of modern Western statecraft (see Rieder and Simon, 2016); on the other hand, 
it is sustained and nurtured by a very specific epistemic imaginary, a core set of knowledge 
claims that, although not entirely new, has (re)gained significant traction over the past few 
years. In the next section, we shall take a closer look at the composition of this imaginary, 
examining how it contributes to the current data hype.  
 
3. The Rise of a New Empiricism 
 
One of the most comprehensive critical overviews of Big Data epistemologies to date has 
been provided by Kitchin (2014a; b). In essence, Kitchin (2014a: 5) argues that in the context 
of Big Data one can observe the "articulation of a new empiricism", which "operates as a 
discursive rhetorical device designed to […] convince vendors [and other stakeholders] of the 
utility and value of Big Data analytics." But what exactly are the promises and claims 
associated with this emerging new paradigm? If Big Data serves as a potent rhetorical device, 
what are the ascribed powers? While an extensive discussion of the Big Data imaginary3 is 
beyond the scope of this paper, a brief outline of certain key assumptions may allow for a 
                                                        
3 For other mentions of such a distinct "Big Data imaginary", see Housley (2015) and Williamson 
(2015).  
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better understanding of the particular kind of knowledge Big Data practices are said to 
produce. It thus seems worthwhile to consider these assumptions in some more detail. 
First, there is the notion that Big Data is exhaustive in scope, capable of capturing 
entire populations or domains (N=all) rather than being limited to sample-based surveys, 
allowing researchers to "get the complete picture" (Oracle, 2012: 3) and "make sense […] 
without traditional reduction" (Strawn, 2012: 34). This belief in what Lagoze (2014: 2) critically 
refers to as the "allness" of Big Data is, on the one hand, driven by the proliferation of digital 
data in today's increasingly computerized society and, on the other hand, the result of 
improved capacities to retrieve, store, and analyze those data. The expectations are high: At 
its best, Big Data is supposed to "give a view of life in all its complexity" (Pentland, 2014: 11), 
combining "millions, if not billions, of individual data points" to get "the full resolution on 
worldwide affairs" (Steadman, 2013). In addition, this vision of completeness is assumed to 
be (a) more inclusive and representative than other forms of research, "encompass[ing] 
thousands of times more people than a Gallup or Pew study" (Rudder, 2014: 20); (b) 
analytically superior in the sense that "the more data available the better and more accurate 
the results" (EC-BIO, 2013a: 13); and (c) more direct and unmediated as it reveals "what 
people actually do rather than what they say they do" (Strong, 2015: 2). This last aspect points 
to another central claim. 
A second key imaginary holds that with enough volume the data speak for themselves, 
replacing "the narrative with the empirical" (Brooks, 2013) and eliminating any need for a 
priori theory. Instead, meaning is thought to emerge from the data "without human 
involvement" (Szal, 2015), rendering established forms of scientific inquiry – i.e., hypothesize, 
model, test – obsolete (see Anderson, 2008). Advanced algorithms are said to "find patterns 
where science cannot" (ibid.), shifting the focus from causal explanations to the discovery of 
statistical correlations that "inherently produce […] insightful knowledge about social, 
political and economic processes" (Kitchin, 2014b: 130). What follows is a reduction in the 
perceived relevance of context since "knowing what, not why, is good enough" (Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 52) to make "human systems […] run better and smarter" and 
"engineer a safer and healthier world" (Eagle & Greene, 2014: 153). Similarly, subject matter 
expertise and domain-specific knowledge is believed to "matter less" when "probability and 
correlation are paramount" (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013: 16), suggesting that the 
pioneers and innovators of the Big Data era will "often come from fields outside the domain 
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where they make their mark" (ibid.: 142). Consequently, computer and data scientists rather 
than, e.g., physicians, biologists, or sociologists are considered the main protagonists of this 
new research paradigm (see Davenport and Patil, 2012). 
The third imaginary overlaps with the second, but extends the argument even further: 
Not only are data seen as speaking for themselves, free of human intervention, they are also, 
by their very nature, expected to be fair and objective. More specifically, "agnostic statistics" 
(Anderson, 2008) are said to "eliminate human bias" (Richtel, 2013) from decision-making 
processes, offering an impartial "view from nowhere" that reveals new truths and provides a 
"disinterested picture of reality" (Jurgenson, 2014). Replacing "gut and intuition" with 
"numbers and metrics" (Gutierrez, 2015), fully automated software is supposed to deliver 
fact-based recommendations, acting as a neutral corrective to people's "subjective judgments 
and hunches" (Clinton, 2016). While confidence in the virtues of quantification is no new 
phenomenon (e.g., see Cohen, 2005; Porter, 1995; Hacking, 1990), the promise of 
"algorithmic objectivity" (Gillespie, 2014: 168) has raised hopes that modern data analytics 
may serve as a "powerful weapon in the fight for equality" (Castro, 2014), battling 
discrimination across a broad range of sectors – from employment and education to law 
enforcement and health care to housing and credit – "empower[ing] vulnerable groups" and 
"ensur[ing] equal opportunity for all" (FPF, 2014). The idea is both simple and compelling: The 
more mechanized the process, the higher the chance that the results won't be tainted by 
researchers' interpretive subjectivity (see Venturini et al., 2014) – after all, "it's humans, not 
algorithms, that have a bias problem" (New, 2015). 
Fourth and finally, the application of sophisticated Big Data techniques is meant to 
provide "certainty in an uncertain world" (AppDynamics, 2014), generating reliable 
knowledge for robust, evidence-informed decision making. As Hardy (2013) notes, the 
"promise of certainty has been a hallmark of the technology industry for decades", and the 
ability to reduce ambiguity, establish clarity, and determine risk is often touted as a major 
benefit of advanced data analytics. Thriving on rather than drowning in information overload, 
Big Data methods are expected to find the 'signal in the noise', the 'needle in the haystack', 
'connecting the dots' with high precision and accuracy. What is particularly noteworthy is the 
scope of the claim: Governing principles – much like physical laws – are believed to "undergird 
virtually every interaction in society" (Silver, 2012: 53), and the arrival of dense, continuous 
data together with modern computation makes it possible to detect "statistical regularities 
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that […] are true of almost everyone almost all of the time" (Pentland, 2014: 189), offering 
valuable "insights about human nature" (203). Once 'reality' has been mined4 and patterns 
are found, "more and more aspects of our lives […] become predictable" (EC-BIO, 2013b: 3), 
allowing us to tame uncertainty and "sens[e] the future before it occurs" (Fitzgerald, 2012). If 
to "know ahead [and] act before" (Quantacast, 2013) is the industry's trademarked mantra, 
the "end of chance" (Müller et al., 2013) is its ultimate goal.  
There are, of course, a number of other epistemological beliefs and assumptions that 
feed into the Big Data imaginary – such as the idea that "unless something can be measured, 
it cannot be improved" (Kelly, 2007) or that "the law of large numbers […] evens out the errors 
of any individual data point" (Phillips Mandaville, 2014) – but these are arguably an extension 
of, or at least closely related to, the four central propositions outlined above: Namely, that 
Big Data represents nothing less than a computational means to know everything (I), of 
anything (II), free from bias (III), with a high degree of certainty (IV). 
 
Scholars from various disciplines have challenged the bold claims of Big Data empiricism, 
arguing that modern analytical techniques neither provide a complete picture of entire 
populations (see McFarland and McFarland, 2015) nor eradicate the need for models and a 
priori theory (see Pigliucci, 2009), are neither neutral or free of bias (see Hardt, 2014) nor 
have the ability to predict with certainty (see Silver, 2012). Instead, Big Data collections can 
be "small" and "partial" (Leonelli, 2014); algorithms may "perpetuate the prejudices of their 
creators" (Centre for Internet and Human Rights, 2015: 5) or "learn bias from the data fed 
into them" (Kun, 2015); and forecasts are never certain, but deal in probabilities, possibilities, 
and uncertainties that may be "narrow in reach, scope, and perspective" (Ekbia et al., 2013: 
1539). Yet despite signs of growing awareness – e.g., the recent White House report Big Data: 
Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values (White House, 2014b: 64) emphasizes the need for a 
"national conversation on big data, discrimination, and civil liberties" – the ideal of 
"impersonal rationality achieved through technical methods" (Porter, 2011: 46) continues to 
act as an important techno-political leitmotif. As Hildebrandt (2013: 28f) observes, "we have 
trouble resisting the seemingly clean, objective knowledge [Big Data] produces", and turn it, 
                                                        
4 For more on the concept of reality mining, see Eagle and Pentland (2006) and Eagle and Greene 
(2014). 
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by making ourselves dependent upon its oracles, "into a new pantheon, filled with novel 
gods." But what are the dangers of being enthralled by the power and possibilities of modern 
computing, of placing our faith in the veracity of ever more widespread predictive analytics? 
If society were to follow the path toward digital serfdom, what are the costs of becoming 
"slaves to Big Data" (ibid.)? 
 
4. A Black Box Society 
 
Discussions about the social and political ramifications of Big Data have predominantly 
focused on two interrelated sets of issues: questions of privacy (e.g., regarding surveillance, 
profiling, or data protection/security) on the one hand and instances of discrimination (e.g., 
through differential access or treatment) on the other. Journalists and academics have 
examined a variety of analytical tools and techniques – from Target's pregnancy-prediction 
model (see Duhigg, 2012) and the City of Boston's StreetBump app (see Crawford, 2013) to 
Google's Flu Trend service (see Lazer et al., 2014) and Facebook's 'emotional contagion' study 
(see Meyer, 2014) – exposing both methodological biases and ethical transgressions.  
While reports of this kind have contributed to public awareness and dialogue, the 
focus on a limited number of high-profile cases may give the impression that there is only 
cause for concern if things have either gone 'wrong' or 'too far', that is, if the analytical 
process is flawed or there is clear indication of unethical or illegal conduct. But this is not the 
case. In fact, even if done 'right', data mining may reflect "widespread biases that persist in 
society at large" (Barocas and Selbst, 2016: 671), and can thus "affect the fortunes of whole 
classes of people in consistently unfavorable ways" (673). Similarly, the strong reactions to 
Facebook's emotional contagion study, in which researchers altered the News Feeds of 
almost 700,000 users (see Kramer et al., 2014), fail to take into account that "manipulating 
the News Feed is Facebook's entire business" (Patel, 2014). To be clear, the point here is not 
to defend any particular study or experiment; rather, it is to emphasize that the issues and 
concerns run much deeper, are systemic rather than case-specific, cultural rather than 
attributable to a few outliers. The main impact of the Big Data phenomenon is not that smart 
TVs may be listening to "everything you say" (Harris, 2015), that social media posts "may 
damage your credit score" (McLannahan, 2015), or that the police might pay you a visit 
because your name appeared on a software-generated "heat list" (Gorner, 2013); much 
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rather, it is that Big Data with its "aura of truth [and] objectivity" (see boyd & Crawford, 2012: 
663) contributes to a specific "algorithmic culture" (Striphas, 2015) that renders such 
practices not only "the new normal" (Andrejevic, 2013: 30), but also socially acceptable.5  
The consequences may be quite severe. Pasquale (2015), for instance, cautions of an 
emerging "black box society", i.e., a "system whose workings are mysterious" (3), where the 
"distinction between state and market is fading" (10), and where people submit to the 
"dictate of salient, measurable data" (10), the "rule of scores and bets" (191). Others have 
voiced similar concerns, arguing that unquestioned faith in the seemingly impartial workings 
of the machine may undermine civil liberties (see Al-Rodhan, 2014), threaten social and 
economic justice (see Newman, 2015), and prove "toxic to democratic governance and […] 
democracy itself" (Howard, 2014). But what exactly are the problems and challenges 
associated with this brave new data world? Though there are overlaps, it is possible to 
distinguish between three main issues and concerns: opacity, accountability, responsibility. 
Opacity – While the use of algorithmic decision-making tools by governments and 
private entities has grown progressively (see Zarsky, 2016), analytical processes are often 
opaque, operating according to rules that are hidden, using input data that remain unknown. 
This lack of transparency has several reasons. For one, as Burrell (2016) highlights, opacity 
can be the result of intentional corporate or state secrecy, e.g., in order to secure a 
competitive advantage, to shield an algorithm from being 'gamed', or to avoid regulation and 
control. Second, opacity may be a consequence of high algorithmic complexity, especially in 
the case of machine learning applications. While it might be possible to "untangle the logic of 
the code within a complicated software system" (ibid.: 5), being able to understand the 
algorithm in action as it operates on data may not be feasible as such machine optimizations 
"do not naturally accord with human semantic explanations" and hence "escape full 
understanding and interpretation" (10). As Gillespie (2014: 192) argues, there appears to be 
something "impenetrable about algorithms", even for well-trained programmers and 
computer scientists. Finally, there is the problem of volatility. As Facebook engineers explain, 
"code is not a fixed artifact but an evolving system, updated frequently and concurrently by 
                                                        
5 Such social acceptance is actually quite contradictory: While a study of the Pew Research Center 
(2014) finds that 91% of the surveyed adults "agree" or "strongly agree" that consumers have lost 
control over how personal information is collected and used by companies, Internet and technology 
giants such as Amazon, Google, or Apple regularly rank not only amongst the most valuable (Ember, 
2015), but also amongst the most reputable corporations (Adams, 2015). 
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many developers" (Calcagno et al., 2015). Google, for instance, is known to change its search 
algorithm around 500-600 times a year, including both minor and major updates (see Moz, 
2016). In that sense, code may not only be secret and opaque, it may also be quite elusive. 
Accountability – In a world where Big Data software takes command, "accountability 
is often murky" (Rosenblat et al., 2014: 1). Internet companies, in particular, seek to avoid 
scrutiny and deflect concerns regarding their services and products. Whenever there is public 
outcry – as in the case of Facebook's emotional contagion study – the giants of the Web are 
quick to apologize, acknowledging that they "did a bad job", "really messed up", or "missed 
the mark" (Isaac, 2014). But the tinkering and testing continues – without much oversight, 
meaningful public deliberation, or serious legal or financial consequences.6 New legislative 
instruments, such as the EU's proposed General Data Protection Regulation (EC, 2012), are 
supposed to clarify industry obligations by introducing "binding corporate rules" (ibid.). Legal 
scholars, however, have warned that current reform efforts do not go far enough as Big Data 
"defeats traditional privacy law by undermining core principles and regulatory assumptions" 
(Rubinstein, 2013: 75), including, for instance, the informed choice model, the distinction 
between personal and non-personal data, or requirements of data minimization. Thus, the 
overall picture is somewhat bleak: While current laws seem unable to enforce greater 
corporate accountability, data-mining firms show little interest in disclosing details about 
their business practices, a sentiment not unique to the private sector as the Snowden 
revelations have made abundantly clear (see Greenwald, 2014). 
Responsibility – Professional software systems are usually not created by a single 
person, but by groups of people with different skills and expertise working in institutional 
settings. If a system fails and causes harm, determining individual responsibility may prove 
difficult since "responsibility […] does not easily generalize to collective action" (Nissenbaum, 
1996: 29). The question of who is to blame becomes even more challenging now that 'smart' 
technologies take over a growing number of knowledge and decision-making processes. 
Especially in machine learning, where "computers [are given] the ability to learn without 
being explicitly programmed" (Samuel, 1959; cited after Simon, 2013: 89), the "influence of 
                                                        
6 The monetary fines imposed on large technology companies have often been insignificant compared 
to the revenues their services generate (Pasquale, 2015). More recently, however, EU regulators have 
increased pressure by filing antitrust charges against Google, which could lead to fines of more than 
€6 billion – about 10 percent of the company's 2014 revenue (Kanter and Scott, 2015).  
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the creator over the machine decreases [while] the influence of the operating environment 
increases" (Matthias, 2004: 182), giving rise to so-called autonomous agents whose actions 
can be difficult to predict. Companies have sometimes emphasized this autonomy to shirk 
responsibility. Google, for example, maintains that its autocomplete suggestions, which have 
repeatedly been criticized for discriminating against protected classes (see UN Women, 2013) 
and defaming individuals (see Niggemeier, 2012), are "generated by an algorithm without any 
human involvement" and merely "reflect what other people are searching for" (Google, 
2016). Courts around the globe have arrived at different verdicts – from imposing fines and 
ordering the removal of specific autocomplete suggestions (see Valinsky, 2013) to discharging 
the search company from liability (see Bellezza and De Santis, 2013) – demonstrating that in 
Big Data contexts, questions of responsibility are neither obvious nor easy.   
 
Government and corporate secrecy paired with technical inscrutability; obsolescent legal 
safeguards that are no match for new forms of "digital feudalism" (Clark, 2011); algorithmic 
scapegoating to avoid responsibility and curtail agency – these are the main ingredients of a 
thoroughly black-boxed data economy, in which "opaque technologies are spreading, 
unmonitored and unregulated" (Pasquale, 2015: 14). Such technologies do not just describe, 
but actively create social realities: They rank and recommend, classify and score, predict and 
prescribe, exercising social control through numerical judgment. What they offer are 
seemingly innocuous automated results; what they produce are specific systems of order. 
Algorithmic regulation is often described as fair and objective, and the epistemic claims of Big 
Data empiricism reinforce this image: By claiming to capture everything in great detail, Big 
Data diverts attention from what remains unseen; by claiming general applicability, it 
discourages critical debate about where data analytics should or should not be applied; by 
claiming unbiased neutrality, it discursively impedes public scrutiny; by claiming empirical 
certainty, it fends off doubts about analytical veracity. The epistemological promises of Big 
Data empiricism are both powerful and seductive, and if not challenged will contribute to an 








As outlined, the bold claims of Big Data empiricism can be contested both on epistemological 
grounds and for their socio-political consequences. Given the amount of criticism these claims 
have received not only from SSH scholars but also from computer and natural scientists (e.g., 
see O'Neil, 2016; Hardt, 2014), their continued prominence in business and policy contexts 
may come as a surprise. But while the proliferation of Big Data excitement within the business 
sector may be attributed to vested commercial interests (see IDC, 2015), the uncritical 
reception in certain political domains can be understood as but the latest manifestation of a 
more generic "trust in numbers" (Porter, 1995). Numbers provide authority and justify 
decision making, especially in times of crisis and uncertainty. The European Commission's 
recent push for "evidence-informed policy making" (EC, 2014b) is a telling example. 
While we acknowledge the potential benefits of "data for policy" (EC, 2015b), we hold 
that a responsible culture of quantification requires greater awareness of the possible 
dangers and pitfalls of an increasingly data-driven society. As "governance by algorithms" 
(Musiani, 2013) is becoming ever more commonplace, a public conversation about the politics 
of algorithmic regulation and what it means to be a "citizen of a software society" (Manovich, 
2013) is crucial.  
What is needed is "epistemic vigilance" (Sperber et al., 2010) instead of blind data 
trust. Such vigilance requires, on the one hand, access to both the data used and the 
algorithms applied and, on the other hand, competencies to understand the analytical 
process as an embedded socio-technical practice, a specific way of producing knowledge that 
is neither inherently objective nor unquestionably fair. Thus, while legally guaranteed access 
to data and algorithmic code is important, it is not sufficient; what must also be cultivated are 
capabilities to interpret and possibly contest algorithmic data practices. The more such 
automated processes shape our society, the greater the need to invest in the education of 
researchers and policymakers, but also of journalists and ordinary citizens, to facilitate a 
better understanding of the epistemic foundations and socio-political ramifications of 
pervasive data analytics. Without doubt, this will be a difficult task that may require not only 
educational measures, but also technological intervention. On the one hand, we are talking 
about tools and services that can support epistemic vigilance by making visible what is often 
thoroughly black-boxed and concealed. On the other hand, technology design can also be 
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used as a means to implement ethically sound software solutions as a form of governance by 
design. 
The importance of epistemic vigilance cannot be overstated: Any political, ethical, or 
legal assessment of Big Data practices hinges upon a proper understanding of the 
epistemological foundations – and limitations – of algorithmic knowledge production. 
While transparency and education are aimed at tackling the problem of opacity, there 
is also a need to address issues of distributed agency and the challenges they pose for 
accountability and responsibility attribution. As noted, algorithmic systems are complex 
assemblages of human and non-human actors and identifying a single culprit – be it man or 
machine – can be difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, if disparate impact is not the result of 
intentional discrimination, but of widespread biases that exist in society at large (see Barocas 
and Selbst, 2016), who can ultimately be held responsible for the potentially severe real-life 
consequences of Big Data analytics? To deal with these distributed forms of agency, new 
concepts to understand and enforce socio-technically distributed responsibility must be 
developed (see Simon, 2015; Floridi, 2013). 
In conclusion, if we wish to tackle the epistemological and socio-political challenges of 
a new empiricism, we must act on several fronts: Hard law, soft law, education and ethically-
informed software design all need to be employed for a "good enough governance" (Pagallo, 
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Across the globe, the notion of Big Data has received much attention, not only in technology 
and business circles but also among political authorities. Public officials in Europe, the U.S., 
and beyond have formulated Big Data strategies that will steer I(C)T development towards 
certain goals and aspirations. Drawing on official European Commission documents and using 
the notion of sociotechnical imaginaries as a sensitising concept, this chapter investigates the 
values, beliefs, and interests that guide European policymakers' Big Data rhetoric, making the 
argument that while the Commission's embrace of a strong free-market position can be partly 
explained in terms of vexing economic, institutional, and epistemic challenges, its push for 
Big Data solutions threatens to undermine democratic rights and principles as well as efforts 
towards responsible research and innovation. The article concludes with recommendations 




In recent years, the term Big Data has emerged as a major buzzword, widely used by both 
public and private actors. A precise definition, however, remains elusive, as various 
stakeholders have offered different views – pointing, for instance, to the volume, velocity, 
and variety of data produced (see Laney, 2012), new and improved ways to collect, store, 
process, and analyse those data (see Ward and Barker, 2013), or profound changes in how 
people think, work, and live (see Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013).  
Others have been more reluctant to buy into the hype, arguing that the current 
excitement is driven by inflated expectations rather than actual shifts in operational reality.1 
But while claims that the "Big Data bubble" is bound to burst sooner rather than later have 
been around for years (see Franks, 2012), reports indicate that investments in Big Data 
                                                        
1 This is perhaps best visualized in Gartner's (2013) Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies, which 
shows Big Data right at the "Peak of Inflated Expectations", gradually making its way toward the 
"Trough of Disillusionment".   
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solutions have only been increasing, with decision makers considering the ability to extract 
value from data as critical to future success (see Columbus, 2015). Media and public interest, 
too, remains high, with the New York Times publishing 118 articles mentioning Big Data over 
the course of 20162 and a Google Trends analysis attesting to the continued popularity of the 
term in global search queries.3 The reasons for the persistence of what has repeatedly been 
described as a "fad" destined to fade (see Woody, 2012) are arguably twofold: On the one 
hand, the ongoing computerisation of ever more areas of human life – from social interaction 
and commerce to health care, law enforcement, and education – has provided ample 
opportunity for Big Data small talk. The notion has therefore become a convenient umbrella 
term, broad enough to be applicable to almost anything technology-related, while imparting 
a sense of urgency and importance. Big Data's conceptual vagueness is thus very much part 
of the term's appeal, serving as a common point of reference in today's fast-changing digital 
environments. On the other hand, what may have started as a technical discussion4 has since 
developed into a much more complex cultural phenomenon. Big Data is not just a fashionable 
catchphrase; it is a modern myth that has inspired an almost religious following (see boyd and 
Crawford, 2012). This mythology, as will be shown below, is structured around a logic of 
promise and obligation that deals in metaphors and visions, hopes, dreams, and ambitions. 
As a result, Big Data no longer functions as a mere shorthand for a set of computational 
problems and methods, but acts as a powerful rhetorical device designed to boost support 
and ensure public consent. 
Many of these narratives originated in the marketing departments of hard- and 
software vendors (e.g., see IBM, 2012), only to be echoed in the reports of research and 
consultancy firms (e.g., see IDC et al., 2013). It was not long, however, until they found their 
way into political discourse: For several years now, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic 
have stressed the great potential of Big Data, framing it as a potent antidote to a wide range 
of societal issues. The excitement and confidence expressed in numerous political speeches 
                                                        
2 Articles have been identified and counted using the New York Times' on-site search service. 
3 Google's Trends graph measures interest over time by showing the number of searches for a 
particular term relative to the total number of searches performed on Google.  
4 One of Big Data's origin stories leads to a series of presentations in the middle and late 1990s by John 
R. Mashey, a former chief scientist at Silicon Graphics who pointed to the challenge of increasing data 
traffic for IT infrastructures, for instance in his talk "Big Data and the Next Wave of InfraStress" 
(Mashey, 1999). 
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and communications is considerable, rivalling even the grand claims of industry stakeholders. 
Officials' widespread endorsement of Big Data has translated into concrete funding actions: 
In 2012, the Obama Administration announced a $200 million Big Data Research and 
Development Initiative to "help solve some [of] the Nation's most pressing challenges" (OSTP, 
2012: 1); in 2014, the European Commission (EC) launched a €2.5 billion public-private 
partnership in an effort to "master Big Data" and put the Union at the "forefront of the global 
data race" (EC, 2014b: 1). In view of such large-scale commitments, the (dis)qualification of 
Big Data as a short-lived buzz or fad seems both analytically wanting and conceptually 
inadequate, unable to account for the actual scale and longevity of the phenomenon.  
Against this background, the chapter at hand aims to develop a better understanding 
of the rise of Big Data in public policy. It will do so in two important ways: First, it will examine 
key sociotechnical imaginaries as they manifest in official policy documents, with recent 
publications of the European Commission serving as the main empirical material. Second, the 
chapter seeks to contextualise these narratives and visions by adopting a broader analytical 
perspective, pointing to a number of economic, institutional, and epistemic challenges that 
contribute to the production and perpetuation of the Big Data imaginary. Based on these 
observations, the chapter develops a pointed critique of the Commission's Big Data rhetoric, 
arguing that it incorporates a set of values and beliefs that threaten to undermine key 
democratic principles as well as efforts towards responsible and sustainable ICT development. 
 
2. Interlude: Sociotechnical Imaginaries 
 
The concept of sociotechnical imaginaries, introduced in Jasanoff and Kim (2009) and further 
elaborated in Jasanoff and Kim (2015), has been influential within the field of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS). Loosely tied to earlier work on social imaginaries by Anderson 
(1983), Appadurai (1996), and Taylor (2004), but with particular emphasis on science and 
technology as key sites of modern imagination, it has inspired a growing number of case 
studies to look for and investigate "collectively held, institutionally stabilised, and publicly 
performed visions of desirable futures" (Jasanoff, 2015: 4). Crucially, such visions are 
considered to be both situated, meaning that they are culturally and temporally particular, 
embedded within specific socio-political environments, and materially grounded in the sense 
that they are co-produced within heterogeneous networks of both human and non-human 
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actors. The concept's focus, however, is not only on the formation of sociotechnical 
imaginaries but also on their performative power: Once imaginaries become widely accepted 
and used, they may shape trajectories of research and innovation, steering technological 
progress as well as public/private expenditure. Thus, while imaginative work can be 
understood as an important cultural practice that creates common narratives and enables 
shared interpretations of social reality, it can have serious normative implications: What starts 
as a description of potentially attainable futures may soon turn into a prescription of futures 
that ought to be attained (see Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). Rather than mere fantasy, 
sociotechnical imaginaries thus constitute a "crucial reservoir of power and action [that] 
lodges in the hearts and minds of human agents and institutions" (Jasanoff, 2015: 17). 
How then can the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries contribute to the kind of 
qualitative policy analysis proposed in this chapter? There are a couple of points to be made 
here. First and foremost, the very invocation of the imagination as an object of study "rejects 
the idea of politics as consisting simply of purposive, rational action" (ibid.: 7). Instead, it 
emphasises that political agendas are driven by culturally-specific belief and value systems 
that produce different forms of techno-political order. The governance of nanotechnologies, 
for instance, has been shaped by contrasting visions and ideals in Germany and the United 
States (see Burri, 2015), and narratives of national nuclear identity differ greatly between 
atom-free Austria (see Felt, 2015) and radiating France (see Hecht, 2009 [1998]). In this sense, 
the notion of sociotechnical imaginaries invites a close reading of the various expectations 
and concerns, the diverse norms, mores, and ideologies that guide and inform the articulation 
of national policies. Second, and equally important, the concept encourages a critical 
examination of dominant imaginaries in the sense that it takes into consideration the 
topographies of power that help these imaginaries to form, stabilise, proliferate, and endure. 
Again, this is a hybrid process that involves not only humans and their respective aspirations, 
but also technical artefacts, institutions, industrial practices, and regulatory frameworks, to 
list but a few. Thus, in addition to its focus on values and beliefs, the concept calls for a 
broader assessment of techno-political regimes, their actors, structures, and embodiments, 
and how these participate in the cultivation and maintenance of specific collective 
imaginations. Third, and on a more methodological note, the concept explicitly refers to 
official documents – e.g. policy texts, political speeches, press releases – as materials 
providing "some of the most accessible and ubiquitous resources for analysing sociotechnical 
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imaginaries" (STS-RPSI, 2017). Studied carefully, such documents may reveal "recurrent 
themes or tropes in references to national and cultural practices", including "articulations of 
the public good, risk, and responsibility" (ibid.). This emphasis on language as a "crucially 
important medium for the construction of imaginaries" (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009: 122) makes 
the concept a suitable tool when seeking to identify and discuss prominent visions of techno-
scientific futures in official policy discourse. Last but not least, the concept advocates 
comparative investigations as well as research on changes over time, suggesting that 
imaginations of particular sociotechnical innovations can vary between different nations or 
stakeholders, and that shared visions may change with shifting circumstances. Diverging 
opinions, contrasting ideas, and signs of controversy should therefore be regarded as pointers 
that may help to illuminate imaginaries together with their inscribed values, goals, and 
politics. Ultimately, it is through such comparisons that the distinctive features of prevalent 
imaginaries become apparent, while simultaneously providing a clearer sense of possible 
alternatives.  
Drawing on these insights, this chapter uses the notion of sociotechnical imaginaries 
as a sensitising concept to study visions of Big Data as they manifest in the official policy 
discourse of the European Commission. The aim is to gain a better understanding of the hopes 
and fears that drive these narratives, the ways in which they are related to particular 
constructions of the public good, and the broader historical and cultural contexts in which 
they are embedded. The European Commission presents a particularly interesting case as the 
institution has become an important regulator of digital services, its policies and directives 
not only affecting the national legislations of EU member states, but also impacting data-
related laws, rights, and markets around the globe (see Buttarelli, 2016). Tracing the 
Commission's Big Data imaginary through respective policy documents5 thus provides insight 
into the values and aspirations of a key political actor whose normative power can be 
expected to play a formative role in the creation and design of our digital future. 
     
                                                        
5 For this chapter's analysis, Google's Advanced Search feature was used to scrape the European 
Commission's official website, https://ec.europa.eu, for documents referring to Big Data. Using this 
term alone and in combination with other search queries (e.g. names of commissioners, specific 
topics), roughly 120 publications (incl. communications, speeches, individual web pages) were 
collected and subjected to qualitative analysis, providing a decidedly partial but nevertheless rich 
picture of the Commission's Big Data imaginary. 
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 3. Tracing Big Data Imaginaries: The Case of the European Commission  
 
In early 2014, the then Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital 
Agenda, Neelie Kroes, declared at the European Data Forum in Athens that about 200 years 
after railways started to connect people and energise the economy, society now faces a new 
industrial revolution: a digital one, with Big Data as its fuel. Her dream, Kroes continued, was 
that Europe would take full part in this revolution, with "European industry able to supply, 
European citizens and businesses able to benefit, [and] European governments able and 
willing to support" (Kroes, 2014b: 1). A year later, in a speech at Hannover Messe, Kroes' 
successor in office, Guenther Oettinger, presented a similar vision. Europe's future is digital, 
he stated, with the availability and use of Big Data crucial for maintaining the Union's 
competitiveness. In order to not fall behind and realise the potential of digital technologies, 
Europe would need to act fast, becoming the avant-garde of digital manufacturing (see 
Oettinger, 2015c). 
Framings such as these, which emphasise Big Data's great economic potential and the 
necessity to exploit it, have for years dominated the Commission's Big Data narrative. At its 
core, this narrative is characterised by a twofold dynamic: On the one hand, the frequent use 
of buzz-laden metaphors imparts a sense of novelty and excitement. Going through official 
EC publications, one can, for instance, find Big Data referred to as the "new oil" (Kroes, 2013c: 
2), the "motor and foundation of the future economy" (EC, 2014b: 1), a "key asset" (EC, 
2017a), a "game-changer" (Šefčovič, 2016), some "magic material" (Kroes, 2013a: 2), a 
"goldmine" (EC, 2015b: 1), the "lifeblood of digital markets" (Oettinger, 2015a). In such cases, 
the language of the Commission and its representatives resembles that of a marketing 
campaign, mystifying the product while stressing its value and functional benefits. On the 
other hand, there is also a sense of urgency to capitalise on what is seen as a great chance 
and opportunity. In order not to miss out, and to secure Europe's digital future, quick and 
decisive action is said to be required. Failing to act is considered a major concern (see Kroes, 
2013a), threatening to stifle innovation and the development of a flourishing EU data market 
(see EC, 2014d). Accordingly, the main task would be to tackle any obstacles, create the right 
environment, and "turn this asset into gold" (Kroes, 2014b: 3). 
What emerges most clearly from the documents is the conceptualisation of Big Data 
as an economic imperative, the key to unlocking a bright and prosperous future. Big Data's 
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status is that of a raw material to be mined and exploited, a digital lubricant of growth and 
progress. While this master narrative already provides a rough account of the Commission's 
general position, a closer look reveals a somewhat more fine-grained pattern of claims and 
promises. More precisely, the EC's vision of Big Data appears to hinge upon three interrelated 
storylines: Big Data as the cornerstone of a thriving data-driven economy, Big Data as a way 
to transform and improve public services, and Big Data as a tool for evidence-informed policy 
and decision making. We shall briefly examine each of these in more detail. 
Big Data as the cornerstone of a thriving data-driven economy: This vision holds that 
Big Data is bound to play an integral role in the development of a strong European data 
industry, with Big Data technology and services expected to grow at a compound annual 
growth rate of 40% (see EC, 2014d), saving manufacturers billions and boosting EU economic 
growth by an additional 1.9% by 2020 (see EC, 2016g). What is more, by increasing 
productivity and accelerating innovation, Big Data is expected to stimulate an opportunity-
rich market environment, creating "hundreds of thousands of new jobs in the coming years" 
(EC, 2014b: 2), gradually replacing lower-skilled work with new and higher-quality 
occupations (see Oettinger, 2015c). From a global perspective, the availability and use of Big 
Data is said to be crucial for maintaining the EU's competitiveness (see ibid.); failure to 
harness this potential would mean becoming dependent on solutions from abroad (see Kroes, 
2013a). The creation of a thriving data market is thus presented as a simple binary choice: 
"We can either be at the table – or on the menu" (Kroes, 2013b: 3). And since the Commission 
is adamant to position the European Union (EU) as a "digital world player" (Oettinger, 2015d) 
that takes "the global lead in data" (Kroes, 2013c: 3), its strong support of Big Data as one of 
"Europe's key economic assets" (EC, 2014c: 1) appears a foregone conclusion. 
Big Data as a way to transform and improve public services: On the public sector side, 
the use of Big Data technologies is seen as way to increase both government efficiency and 
effectiveness, improving the quality of public services while reducing costs and administrative 
burden through new and optimised solutions (see EC, 2017c). Example applications include 
the development of interoperable healthcare platforms, better management of traffic flows 
and energy consumption, or the design and implementation of automated translation 
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systems (see EC, 2017d).6 In this narrative, public sector information is framed as a goldmine 
that must be unlocked (see Kroes, 2013a), enabling a "smarter use of public money" (Kroes, 
2014b: 1) together with more "personalized, user-friendly and innovative services" (EC, 
2017c). In order to realise this vision, public data silos would have to be opened up, facilitating 
information sharing not only inside and between government agencies (improving efficiency) 
or between these agencies and ordinary citizens (improving transparency), but also between 
the public and the private sector. In the eyes of the Commission, the ability to reap Big Data 
benefits is thus tied to strong public-private partnerships (see EC, 2014b) and the re-use of 
public sector information (see EC, 2014a). 
Big Data as a tool for evidence-informed policy and decision making: With regard to 
public policy, there is the expectation that Big Data will enable "policymakers to make 
informed and evidence-based decisions" (EC, 2017d), tackling societal challenges such as 
climate change (Vestager, 2016), unemployment (Thyssen, 2016), or migration (EC, 2016c) 
with high precision and accuracy. In essence, Big Data technologies are supposed to provide 
timely, actionable insights, allowing administrations to make the 'right' choices more quickly. 
Techniques such as performance monitoring, opinion mining, or policy modelling are 
considered promising avenues to more targeted, data-driven policy designs (see EC, 2015d). 
Rather than merely offering advice, however, Big Data technologies are meant to generate 
solutions (see EC, 2014d), testing strategies and simulating outcomes at a systemic level (see 
EC, 2016a). The need to predict and prevent figures prominently in this imaginary, marking a 
shift from reactive to more proactive modes of governance. From nowcasting7 income 
distribution to forecasting crop yields, from "predicting the traffic to predicting the economy" 
(Kroes, 2013a: 2), there is hardly an area of public policy that is expected to remain untouched 
by advances in Big Data analytics.    
Although clearly desired, according to the Commission, none of these outcomes are 
guaranteed. Instead, their realisation is said to depend upon certain prerequisites, including 
(I) a coherent data ecosystem that counters the paralysing fragmentation of the European 
market (see Kroes, 2013a), (II) a firm commitment to open data, facilitating the re-use of 
                                                        
6 For a more comprehensive overview of potential application areas, see "Part III: Usage and 
Exploitation of Big Data" in Cavanillas et al. (2016). 
7 In essence, the practice of nowcasting involves computational methods to "predict the present" 
(Khan, 2012) and provide near-term forecasts, for example regarding weather conditions, market 
movements, or influenza activity. 
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public sector information (see EC, 2016d), (III) significant investment in education and training 
to ensure Europe's workforce adapts to the new digital environment (see Oettinger, 2015b), 
and (IV) the establishment of public-private partnerships that unite all relevant players and 
strengthen every part of the Big Data value chain (see EC, 2017b). To "get it right" would imply 
safeguarding a better economic future; to "get it wrong" would mean losing out and risking 
European competitiveness on the international market (see Kroes, 2013b: 2). With data 
governance believed to be at a crossroads, there is thus strong emphasis that the Union "can't 
miss out on that kind of growth opportunity" (Kroes, 2013c: 2). To turn away and 'not do' Big 
Data would constitute both a failure and a mistake since technology development is 
considered "the only sustainable long term response to secure our digital future" (Oettinger, 
2015d). In the Commission's narrative, Big Data is thus viewed as a destiny without viable 
alternatives, a programmatic answer to the assumed truism that "tomorrow's world will be 
digital" (Kroes, 2013b: 3).  
As might be expected, data-related worries and concerns only play a minor role in this 
imaginary. Rather, there appears to be agreement that one should not "[stop] the wonderful 
things, simply to prevent the not-so-wonderful" (ibid.: 2). If, however, potential risks and 
pitfalls are being addressed, these are, on the one hand, mostly thought to be limited to issues 
of privacy and security and, on the other hand, assumed to be amenable to technological fixes 
– that is, solutions that do not challenge the deployment of a technology or service as such, 
but only the particularities of its design, leaving little room for serious intervention. Legal 
regulation is also considered an option, but only to the extent that safeguards "[do] not come 
at the expense of innovation" (ibid.: 4). From the Commission's perspective, laws should be 
pragmatic and proportionate, with rules set up to "maximize the value and minimise the cost 
of data" (Kroes, 2013d: 2). Tools and laws together could then "empower people" (Kroes, 
2014b: 2), giving users both control and responsibility over their data and making consent a 
"cornerstone of data protection" (Kroes, 2013b: 3). Ultimately, measures such as these are 
expected to boost public trust and confidence in digital services whose benefits are believed 
to outweigh any potential harms, with detrimental effects deemed the exception, not the rule 
(see Kroes, 2012).  
To sum up, while public debate about the impacts of Big Data is polarized and critical 
(see Cukier, 2014), the European Commission upholds a decidedly positive vision, promoting 
the widespread use of modern data analytics as an opportunity not to be missed. In a digital 
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future, Europe is seen as having the choice between leading or following, and the Commission 
is clear about its ambition to "master Big Data" and put the Union "at the forefront of the 
global data race" (EC, 2014b: 1). Consequently, primary concerns include ways to strengthen 
the sector, accelerate innovation, and profit from an unleashed data-driven economy where 
"data protection cannot mean data protectionism" (Kroes, 2013b: 4). What emerges is an 
imaginary of Big Data for industrial growth and public sector transformation, spurred by 
aspirations of increased efficiency, reduced costs, and digitally aggregated value generation 
(see EC, 2015c). With the continued fragmentation of the European market considered a 
threat to this vision, the Commission keenly stresses the need for an open and coherent data 
ecosystem, and "every lawmaker, every public body, every vested interest who wants to push 
back [needs to be convinced] there's a better way of doing things" (Kroes, 2014a: 3). What is 
initially presented as a choice thus quickly turns into a normative imperative and obligation. 
As former Commissioner Kroes maintained: "'Data' isn't a four-letter word. […] It's something 
Europe needs to embrace" (ibid.: 3).   
 
4. Discussion: Data Governance in Times of Crisis 
 
The Commission's predominant focus on economic growth and organisational efficiency 
should not come as a surprise. Formally established in 1951 as the High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – and later joined by (in 1957) and merged (in 
1965) with the executives of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) – the European Commission, throughout its institutional 
history, has sought to retain its legitimacy through policies aimed at contributing towards 
prosperity, competitiveness, and effective EU leadership (see Nugent and Rhinard, 2015; Cini, 
1996). In times of social and economic unrest, pressures to strengthen the market and battle 
unemployment while cutting costs can be particularly pronounced, and there is no doubt that 
the Union has recently seen its fair share of turbulence, both financial (see EC, 2009) and 
otherwise (see EC, 2016e). Against such a troubled background, the promises of Big Data may 
seem particularly alluring: With average growth rates said to outpace not only the general 
economy but also the already healthy numbers of the traditional ICT market (see EC, 2014d), 
the data sector presents itself as an opportunity "Europe cannot afford to miss" (ibid.: 2). 
Moreover, by promising to disrupt other industries and change "the way we do business" 
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(Oettinger, 2015c: 2) – with expected cost savings of as much as €426 billion and an additional 
GDP increase of €206 billion until 2020 (see EC, 2016g) – the proclaimed data revolution may 
well appear as a panacea to an ailing European economy. It thus stands to reason that the 
Union's fragile economic situation has provided fertile ground for the promises of Big Data 
advocates, the current climate of excitement arguably a combined product of significant 
budgetary pressures and vested corporate interests.  
However, it is not just about financials. As outlined in the previous section, there is 
considerable interest in data technologies for evidence-informed policy and decision making,8 
stretching from policy modelling and simulation to monitoring and analysis to enforcement 
and compliance, with the intention of improving "the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality 
[of] decisions in the public sector" (see EC, 2015d). But while the traditional view of the 
Commission as a technocratic body in constant need of expertise and information certainly 
holds some explanatory power (see Metz, 2015), the recent rise of 'datatrust' (Rieder and 
Simon, 2016) appears to be of a somewhat different nature. As Porter (1995: 146) argues, 
whereas technocracy presupposes relatively secure elites who would insist that "cultivated 
judgment is required to solve social problems", attempts to mechanise decision making 
usually occur under conditions of intense scrutiny, when pressured authorities seek to shield 
themselves against outside challenges by exchanging expert judgement for seemingly 
impersonal technical routines. Rather than the high point of technocratic ambition, the 
Commission's push for Big Data solutions is thus better understood as a contested political 
and administrative body's effort to maintain authority and legitimacy amidst strong 
opposition by both national political forces and a substantial proportion of the Union's 
population. With people's trust remaining low,9 trusted analytical services are seen as a 
potential remedy, offering actionable insights surrounded by what boyd and Crawford (2012: 
663) have referred to as an "aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy". The "promise of 
mechanical neutrality" (Gillespie, 2014: 181) with its "glow of veracity" (Daston and Galison, 
                                                        
8 For some background on the "ascendancy of evidence", see Solesbury (2002); for a recent state-of-
the art account of "data for policy", see Poel et al. (2015).  
9 According to the Standard Eurobarometer 86 survey of autumn 2016 (EC ,2016f), only 36 percent of 
Europeans "tend to trust" the European Union, with 54 percent saying that they "tend not to trust". 
Compared to pre-crisis levels, this is a low value. In spring 2007, for instance, trust in the Union was 
at 57 percent (ibid.: 14). 
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1992: 111) thus serves as a valuable tool and means to establish credibility and justify political 
action.  
Finally, and on a related note, while the availability of ever more data and the ability 
to collect and analyse them contribute to governmental efforts to "make society legible" 
(Scott, 1998: 2), Big Data's focus on machine learning and prediction caters to – but also fuels 
– policymakers' "craving for certainty" (Nowotny, 2016: 1) and "ex ante assurances" (ibid.: 7). 
In light of the expressed need "for organizing and managing […] increased complexity" 
(Šefčovič, 2016), data-driven insights are seen as a way to battle volatility and regain control, 
supporting the governance of the present by turning unmeasurable uncertainty into 
measurable risk (see Knight, 1921). Whereas the former threatens to grind the wheels of the 
political machinery to a halt, the latter provides a mandate for action based on probabilistic 
forecasts. Public officials' interest in Big Data is thus driven by a high demand for "anticipatory 
intelligence" (EC, 2015a: 18), which is thought to "augment decision makers" (EC, 2016b: 68) 
and "reconfigur[e] the policy system in a way that makes it more apt to address long-term 
challenges" (EC, 2015a: 19). In addition, the promise of universal applicability, most famously 
voiced by Anderson (2008), positions Big Data as a practical chance to expand the statistical 
colonisation of the future to an increasing number of governmental tasks and areas. To a 
bureaucratic institution that faces uncertainty but chases forward-looking policies, the 
prospect of 'knowing the odds' with unprecedented speed and accuracy may just constitute 
an offer too good to refuse. As a result, to date, the Commission's hopes are firmly pinned on 
Big Data.  
In sum, the roots of the European Commission's Big Data imaginary can arguably be 
traced back to a specific amalgamation of economic, institutional, and epistemic factors and 
challenges: a Union in search of growth and prosperity amidst a severe financial crisis; a 
supranational authority experiencing a loss of trust and legitimacy; an agenda-setting political 
machinery in need of data and tools for probabilistic risk assessment. While a series of 
technological and methodological advancements have made Big Data possible, it is these 
contextual specificities that have elevated the term into a widespread sociotechnical 
phenomenon. The Commission's narrative, however, is not without its problems. In fact, it 
incorporates a number of claims and assumptions that warrant further critical examination. 
Even though a detailed discussion of the entrenched fallacies is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, a few key points should briefly be addressed. 
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Datatrust: As Bowker (2005) points out, data are never raw, but always already 
cooked, a process that needs to be recognised and considered with care. In a similar vein, 
Rieder (2017: 103) argues that the employment of algorithmic techniques may best be 
thought of as a situated epistemic practice that generates "interested readings of empirical, 
'datafied' reality". The insight that even highly formalised analytical methods produce 
interpretations from specific 'somewheres' rather than a "view from nowhere" (Nagel, 1986) 
gains significance in a world where numbers and their mathematical treatment are 
increasingly considered the unquestioned – and unquestionable – backbone of decision 
making. Such blind trust, however, bears dangers of subverting the very foundations of 
deliberative democracy as well as key principles of the rule of law: With respect to the former, 
exaggerated faith in the neutrality and fairness of Big Data processes may undermine 
democratic deliberation by (a) deflecting from the goal-driven interests that shape and inform 
the design and implementation of analytical systems, (b) discouraging investigations into how 
Big Data practices can cause harm and unfair discrimination, and (c) rendering debates about 
alternative forms of business and governance both misguided and absurd. Regarding the 
latter, the sheer complexity of algorithmic operations can make the connection between 
input data and output decision-making murky (see Burrell, 2016), yielding an inscrutable 
evidence base that jeopardises existing due process norms, and disrespecting individuals' 
rights to transparent and accountable adjudication (see Citron, 2014; 2008). Given that Big 
Data's ultimate promise is not only to predict but to pre-empt, marking a fundamental shift 
from reactive to more "aggressive", proactive measures (see Kerr and Earle, 2013), blind trust 
in the veracity and social equity of mechanical reasoning appears a negative and irresponsible 
direction. 
 
Trusted Technologies: Also related to the issue of trust, but approaching the topic from 
a different angle, are the Commission's attempts to strengthen individuals' trust and 
confidence in digital solutions, because "[w]ithout people's trust, a functioning [Digital Single 
Market] based on data will not work" (Ansip, 2015b). In light of a perceived "lack of trust in 
online services" (Ansip, 2015a), the Commission thus aims to reduce fears, mitigate concerns, 
and create "trusted" environments, encouraging citizens to "embrace the digital revolution" 
(Bieńkowska, 2016). What is problematic here is the rhetorical emphasis on trust rather than 
trustworthiness, on trusted rather than trustworthy computational systems. As Simon (2013) 
 114 
stresses, "given the dangers of misplaced trust, […] we should not simply trust, but trust those 
who are worthy of our trust." From a governance perspective, attempts to "build", "boost", 
"secure", "restore", or "maintain" trust should always be accompanied – and ultimately 
surpassed – by efforts to create trustworthy frameworks and environments that contribute 
to citizens' social, economic, and legal protection. Put differently, if the political goal is to 
create an atmosphere of trust that "translate[s] into economic growth" and turns the Union 
into an "economic powerhouse" (Jourová, 2015: 5; see also Fukuyama, 1995), the 
democratically preferable and presumably more sustainable way would not be to directly 
target people's confidence level – e.g., through PR campaigns, shiny certificates, or repeated 
statements of intent – but to support and invest in systems that genuinely deserve such 
confidence. By strengthening citizens' digital rights, introducing new compliance obligations, 
and increasing monetary fines for violations, the EU's upcoming General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), which will take effect in May 2018, arguably presents an important step 
in this direction. Yet it will be the actual implementation and enforcement of the Regulation 
by EU member states that will decide whether the longing for trust will eventually lead to the 
development and deployment of truly trustworthy digital solutions (see Davies, 2016). 
 
Citizen Empowerment: One crucial way the Commission hopes to safeguard privacy 
and build trust in the digital economy is by giving people control over their data, 
conceptualising individuals as self-managing, entrepreneurial subjects who take charge and 
become makers of their own digital destiny. As Commissioner Kroes declared at the European 
Data Forum, "[w]hat you need is to empower people, give them control, give them a fair share 
of that value. Give them rights over their data – and responsibilities too, and the tools to 
exercise them" (Kroes, 2014b: 2). While such calls for the autonomous, self-reliant homo 
datanomicus may appeal to the ears of free-market liberals – and there are certainly good 
arguments for having users take part and profit from the monetisation of their personal data 
(e.g., see Rubinstein, 2013) – the idea that individuals should act as tech-savvy guardians of 
their own privacy has several caveats: First, as critique of the informed consent model has 
highlighted time and again, users tend not to read terms of services and privacy policies, thus 
calling into question the image of the attentive, dutifully engaged data citizen authorities seek 
to project (see Monteleone, 2015). Second, even if users were to devote time and effort into 
data privacy self-management, chances are that long and rhetorically cloudy customer 
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policies together with secretive corporate practices and opaque machine operations would 
render such attempts an almost impossible task, even for the digitally skilled (see Obar, 2015). 
Considering that many EU citizens still have no or very low digital competences (see Eurostat, 
2013), the Commission's call for data privacy self-governance seems both unrealistic and, to 
a degree, insincere. Last but not least, the attribution of responsibility to the data subject 
involves a democratically dubious shifting of the burden to the individual who is (over)tasked 
with oversight in a context of high complexity and weak regulation. While the lengthy GDPR 
negotiations have shown how difficult it can be to strike a balance between industry and 
privacy interests,10 a general redistribution of work and responsibility under the banner of 
citizen empowerment may prove incompatible with EU law, where the protection of personal 
data is recognised as a fundamental right (see European Communities, 2000).      
 
Open Data: A final concern pertains to the Commission's strong support of open data, 
that is, "data made freely available for re-use to everyone for both commercial and non-
commercial purposes" (EC, 2014d: 5). While for the Commission, the free flow of data "across 
sectors, languages, and borders" (ibid.: 6) constitutes a critical component in the 
establishment of a thriving, innovative digital economy, researchers have pointed to the 
dangers and limitations of this sharing imperative, arguing that the open distribution of public 
sector information may conflict with individuals' right to data privacy, underestimating the 
increasingly blurry lines between personal and non-personal data in the age of Big Data 
analytics (Kulk and van Loenen, 2012). As studies and real-world examples have shown, 
powerful computational models can now be used infer highly sensitive personal information 
from seemingly innocuous data (see Kosinski et al., 2013; Duhigg, 2012), and even when data 
have been anonymised, re-identification techniques may allow to link these data to specific 
individuals, undermining prior protection efforts (see Narayanan et al., 2008; Sweeney, 2000). 
Given this, but also in light of concerns regarding increased data marketisation (see Bates, 
2012) and the establishment of open access research repositories (see Mauthner and Parry, 
2013), the Commission's push for liberal data-sharing policies in the name of transparency, 
efficiency, and growth should be viewed critically and with caution. Instead of an "open by 
                                                        
10 For a politically charged glimpse into the parliamentary negotiations around the EU data protection 
reform, see David Bernet's documentary Democracy (2015).  
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default" principle, as set out in the G8's Open Data Charter (see Group of Eight, 2013) and 
repeatedly referred to in Commission documents (e.g., see EC, 2014d), questions as to which 
data should be shared with whom, under what circumstances, and to what ends, ought to the 
be properly discussed and addressed. In the UK, public resistance against the government's 
care.data program has recently demonstrated that the distribution of personal-level 
information – even if anonymised – remains a highly controversial and divisive social issue 
(see Presser et al., 2015).  
 
Though by no means comprehensive, the list above should provide a sense that the 
Commission's Big Data imaginary builds on a number of (epistemic) assumptions and 
(ideological) framings that, from an academic but also a purely democratic point of view, 
warrant critical scrutiny, if not outright rejection. To be sure, the problem is not so much that 
the Commission aims to create a strong and innovative digital market – after all, the fostering 
of trade and commerce has always been one of the institution's main responsibilities. Rather, 
it is that in this process, economic imperatives clearly outweigh wider social, ethical, and legal 
considerations, at times even to the detriment of fundamental rights and values. If the 
Commission truly wishes to (re)build trust as the basis of not only a thriving but a fair and 
sustainable digital economy, it should reconsider key elements of its Big Data narrative, 




This article has sought to outline the European Commission's Big Data imaginary in some 
detail, reporting on the general thrust of the narrative, the claims and promises made, but 
also pointing to some of the major political challenges that have undoubtedly shaped the 
vision and its underlying values. What emerged from the assessed material was a strong free-
market agenda in which trade barriers ought to be removed, regulatory burden ought to be 
reduced, and legislation ought to be tuned to industry requirements. In this normative 
framework, economic needs take precedence over questions of social desirability, and Big 
Data is mainly celebrated as the key to global competitiveness and a prosperous digital future.  
But the strong economic imperative comes from a position of political weakness: 
Multiple crises and a deep sense of uncertainty have shaken the Union to its core, and the 
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Commission has operated under conditions of high pressure and distrust in what has been 
appropriately labelled "a challenging decade" (see EU, 2017). Against this background, the 
hype around Big Data technologies, which are expected to reduce costs, increase efficiency, 
generate value, and improve decision making, seems almost understandable. At the same 
time, however, the Commission's push for Big Data solutions involves certain concepts and 
convictions – from blind trust to open by default – that threaten to undermine basic 
democratic rights and principles. As an EU institution bound to uphold the Union's values and 
contribute to the protection of its citizens (see EU, 2007), the Commission should re-evaluate 
both the quality and societal plausibility of its Big Data discourse, pondering, for instance, 
whether the current narrative lives up to the standards of responsible research and 
innovation (RRI) laid out in the Horizon 2020 Framework Program.   
In order to situate the findings of this study, it is important to note that the 
Commission's vision of and for Big Data is only one part of European-level data and ICT 
governance. The EU's new General Data Protection Regulation, for example, does not 
explicitly refer to Big Data (see Schneider, 2018; EU, 2016b), and neither does the equally new 
Directive, which lays down principles for the processing of personal data in the criminal justice 
system (see EU, 2016a). What does this imply? In essence, it indicates that in current EU 
policy-making, the Big Data discourse runs separate from parallel discussions about data 
regulation, a peculiar state of detachment that allows for the continued use of Big Data as a 
generic marketing term, unburdened by the challenges of creating fair and sustainable data 
policies. On a positive note, this means that there is in fact political awareness of the problems 
and issues associated with rapidly progressing computerization, even if such concerns are 
treated outside the Big Data rhetoric. In turn and somewhat less encouraging, however, this 
also entails that Big Data as an influential, value-laden catchphrase may remain politically 
unchallenged, fully co-opted by vendor interests and monetisation imperatives. Thus, while 
the Commission's Big Data narrative is heavily biased and skewed, its structural divorce from 
wider debates about the potential ramifications of large-scale datafication may allow this 
imbalance to persist. 
From an academic and research perspective, the task is manifold: A first step would 
be to develop a better understanding of the Big Data imaginary itself, its origins, values, and 
inscribed politics. The present article has sought to contribute to this effort. A second step 
should then consider ways of improving the quality of the political discourse so that visions 
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of an EU-wide Digital Single Market do not merely reflect industry and administrative needs, 
but also remain open to questions of social and cultural desirability, including the option to 
halt or reject particular technological applications. The call here is for critical participation 
rather than distant antagonism, for constructive reform rather than dogmatic opposition. Last 
but not least, there is a rising need for cross-disciplinary efforts: scholarship at the 
intersection of IT, on the one hand, and ethics/STS/law, on the other, should be fostered to 
harness knowledge and expertise for sustainable development. European academia will have 
to rise to this challenge as high-quality interdisciplinary programs remain rare. Yet with 
policymakers positively enthralled by the promises of Big Data advocates, further research on 
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With its promise to transform how we live, work, and think, Big Data has captured the 
imaginations of governments, businesses, and academia. However, the grand claims of Big 
Data advocates have been accompanied with concerns about potential detrimental 
implications for civil rights and liberties, leading to a climate of clash and mutual distrust 
between different stakeholders. Throughout the years, the interdisciplinary field of 
technology assessment (TA) has gained considerable experience in studying socio-technical 
controversies and as such is exceptionally well equipped to assess the premises and 
implications of Big Data practices. However, the relationship between Big Data as a socio-
technical phenomenon and TA as a discipline assessing such phenomena is a peculiar one: Big 
Data may be the first topic TA deals with that is not only an object of inquiry, but also a major 
competitor, rivaling TA in several of its core functions, including the assessment of public 
views and visions, means and methods for exploring the future, and the provision of 
actionable knowledge and advice for political decision making. Our paper explores this dual 
relationship between Big Data and TA before concluding with some considerations on how 








Around the globe, the notion of Big Data1 has captured the imaginations of governments, 
businesses, and academics. Heralded as a key enabler of public sector innovation (see 
                                                        
1 Although many definitions have been proposed (see Press, 2014), there is "a pronounced lack of 
consensus about the definition, scope, and character of what falls within the purview of Big Data" 
(Ekbia et al., 2015: 3). One of the most popular characterizations is Laney's (2012, 2001) notion of the 
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European Commission (EC), 2015b), a catalyst for economic growth and well-being (see 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015), and the emblem of a new 
"data-intensive" scientific paradigm (see Hey et al., 2009), there is hardly a segment of 
modern society that is not expected to be touched and transformed by the ongoing "Big Data 
revolution" (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013). While wrapped in a rhetoric of hype and 
hope, applications of Big Data are no longer science fiction: From crime and disaster 
prediction to online advertising, from precision medicine and disease tracking to industry 4.0, 
from smart cities and climate research to credit and insurance scoring, the use of 
computational means to uncover patterns and trends in ever larger haystacks of data has 
found widespread appeal. Significant investments are being made, underpinned by 
promissory narratives of efficiency and security, progress and prosperity. To "unlock the 
value" and "reap [the] benefits" (EC, 2016a) of Big Data appears to have emerged as a primary 
concern of both public and private entities, the incorporation of advanced analytics into 
virtually all areas of human life already considered a foregone conclusion.  
 But the rise and spread of Big Data solutionism (see Morozov, 2013b) has not 
remained unchallenged. Observers in the media and academia, but also from watchdog 
organizations and public interest groups, have called for open debate and critical reflection, 
pointing to unresolved issues related to privacy and surveillance, bias and discrimination. Put 
poignantly: What may have started as an advertising campaign for the new "testosterone of 
business computing" (Vance, 2010) soon turned into a heated argument about civil rights and 
liberties (see Upturn, 2014). Though large-scale outcry has been the exception rather than 
the rule,2 public reactions to the Snowden revelations (see Lyon, 2014), NHS England's 
                                                        
"3Vs", which focuses on measures of magnitude and conceptualizes Big Data as growth in data 
volume, velocity, and variety. Other approaches have shifted the focus from data properties to new 
analytical possibilities, describing Big Data science as a "God's-eye view" (Pentland, 2012) that "lets us 
examine society in fine-grained detail" (Pentland, 2014: 177). In contrast to such technology-oriented 
perspectives, scholars from the social sciences and humanities have pointed to the cultural dimension 
of Big Data, arguing that the real novelty of Big Data lies in the growing significance and authority of 
quantified information in ever more areas of everyday life (see Leonelli, 2014). From this perspective, 
Big Data constitutes a complex socio-technical phenomenon that rests on an interplay of science, 
technology, ideology, and mythology (see Jurgenson, 2014; boyd and Crawford, 2012). It is this latter 
perspective that will guide our analysis. 
2 Citizens' passivity may have multiple causes. A survey by Turow, Hennessy, and Draper (2015) on 
consumer data collection in both digital and physical commerce, for instance, finds that people's 
provision of personal information is not the result of either consent, ignorance, or indifference, but 
 133 
care.data initiative (see Presser et al., 2015), or Facebook's emotional contagion experiment 
(see boyd, 2016) illustrate a growing discomfort with current data practices. The result is a 
climate of clash, an atmosphere of intense distrust between different parties and 
stakeholders with conflicting interests, values, and diverging visions of the future. 
 The situation is unlikely to resolve itself quickly: As rapid growth in both data 
generation (see IDC, 2014) and the analytics market (see Statista, 2016) suggests, at least 
from a techno-economic perspective, the age of Big Data has only just begun. Processes of 
datafication and computerization are sure to continue, and it is safe to assume that the 
combination of declining hardware costs, rising processing power, and ever more 
sophisticated software solutions will increase the allure of Big Data's 'capture all' imperative. 
With even more organizations planning to jump on the data train (see Gartner, 2015), and 
many people experiencing a loss of control over their personal information (see EC, 2015c; 
PEW, 2014), further conflict seems inevitable. 
 Throughout the years, the interdisciplinary field of technology assessment (TA) has 
gained considerable experience in studying socio-technical controversies. Extensive research 
on issues ranging from nuclear power and waste management to genetically modified 
organisms, geo engineering, stem cell research, and nanotechnology has left the discipline 
with a broad set of methods and techniques to assess and evaluate the ethical, legal, and 
social implications of new and emerging technologies. Thereby, the identification of current 
and future challenges, the facilitation of multi-actor involvement, and the search for both 
desirable and sustainable solutions has often been of central concern to the field and its 
scholars.3 In addition, TA as a concept and practice aims to contribute to the governance of 
science and technology by (a) adopting an intermediary role and fostering dialogue between 
policy makers, industry, and the public sphere (see Joss and Bellucci, 2002) and (b) providing 
actionable knowledge and advice for democratic decision making in cases where the stakes 
are high, facts are uncertain, and values are in dispute (see Klüver et al., 2015; Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1993). Big Data has only recently appeared on the TA agenda,4 but if the "march of 
                                                        
rather a sense of resignation and powerlessness, a feeling that it is futile to even try to manage and 
control what companies can learn about them. 
3 For an overview of the TA landscape and its various strands, see van Est and Brom (2012) and 
Grunwald (2009).  
4 While explicit references to Big Data were rare in the program of the 1st European TA Conference in 
Prague in 2013 (see PACITA, 2013; Michalek et al., 2014), two years later, at the 2nd European TA 
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quantification" (Gary King, quoted in Lohr, 2012) continues, it will probably stay there for a 
while.   
In this article, we seek to explore the relationship between Big Data and TA from two 
distinct perspectives:  
First, we set out to discuss whether and in what ways TA can contribute to the current 
debate around Big Data. In essence, it is argued that the field's experience in bridging 
disciplinary boundaries, its proficiency in facilitating (upstream) public engagement, and its 
expertise in developing deliberative methods for thinking about possible future scenarios may 
indeed prove a valuable addition to Big Data discourse, providing not only insight into but 
potentially also a way out of the current climate of clash. 
Second, instead of merely conceiving Big Data as a new research topic for TA, we shall 
consider their relationship as one marked by rivalry and competition. Despite significant 
epistemic and methodological differences, Big Data's key promise bears striking similarities 
to that of TA, namely the provision of actionable, future-oriented knowledge. Consequently, 
the nascent field of Big Data analytics – home to a growing number of software solutions 
marketed by major IT companies – may soon challenge TA in one of the discipline's core roles 
and functions: as a scientific advisor to political and bureaucratic decision making. Ultimately, 
this rivalry could lead to gradual displacement, especially if the computational approach 
appears to outperform its competitor both practically (e.g., cheaper, faster) and 
epistemologically (i.e., recommendations believed to be objective and based on numerical 
facts). The potential consequences of such a shift will be discussed at length. 
In a concluding section, we wish to go beyond this scenario of competition and 
replacement and instead envision possibilities for cooperation and mutual learning between 
TA and Big Data analytics. Embedding our considerations within the context of RRI, we will 
inquire how responsibility in data-based research and innovation may be achieved and 
ponder how more reflexive, inclusive, and participatory modes of computational knowledge 
generation could actually be put into practice. In particular, we will stress the need for a 
multidisciplinary research approach, call attention to the politics of participation and the 
                                                        
Conference in Berlin, the term had become more common and a dedicated session sought to 
investigate the "Governance of Big Data and the Role of TA" (PACITA, 2015). 
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performativity of temporalities, and comment on the chances and pitfalls of collaborative 
knowledge production. 
 
2. Big Data as a Research Topic for Technology Assessment 
 
Though still relatively new as a topic of investigation, with significant growth in scholarly 
publications from 2012 onwards (see Singh et al., 2015; Youtie et al., 2017), several TA-related 
research initiatives examining the rise and impact of Big Data analytics have already been 
launched. European examples include the Germany-based ABIDA (Assessing Big Data) 
project,5 the Norwegian Board of Technology's study on data-driven analysis and predictive 
policing (Teknologirådet, 2015), the UK Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology's 
exploration of Big Data uses across various policy areas,6 or background documents by the 
European Commission's Unit for eHealth and Health Technology Assessment on Big Data in 
the medical sector (see EC, 2014). In the United States, the White House report Big Data: 
Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values (White House, 2014) and the complementary report 
Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective (President's Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology, 2014) are examples of high-profile technology assessments meant to inform 
and steer federal S&T policy.7 
While the initiatives listed above differ in scale and scope, they share the common 
goal of examining the potential impacts of Big Data from a decidedly multidisciplinary 
perspective. The German ABIDA project, for instance, includes five specialized working groups 
who are tasked with assessing the opportunities and challenges of Big Data from either an 
ethical, legal, sociological, economical, or political science point of view.8 Such 
multidisciplinary, which has been an integral part of TA programs for decades,9 can contribute 
                                                        
5 See the ABIDA website: http://www.abida.de/en [Accessed 20 June. 2018]. 
6 See POST's Big Data program website: http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-
offices/offices/bicameral/post/work-programme/big-data/ [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
7 Another example is the recent report Big Data: A Report on Algorithmic Systems, Opportunity, and 
Civil Rights (White House, 2016).  
8 For a concise overview of the ABIDA project, see: http://www.abida.de/en/content/abida-das-
projekt [Accessed 20 June. 2018]. 
9 To give but one example, when reporting on the status of the now abolished US Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) back in the early 1980s, Project Director and Senior Analyst Fred B. 
Wood writes that "OTA's multidisciplinary staff [...] of 80-90 professionals spans the spectrum of 
physical, life, and social sciences, engineering, law, and medicine." (Wood, 1982: 214) 
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to Big Data discourse in two important ways: On the one hand, by bringing together expertise 
and insights from different fields, TA may provide a synoptic overview of what is often 
scattered across various disciplinary boundaries. Presented in a concise manner, this 
collected information may then allow TA scholars to act as "knowledge brokers" (Meyer, 
2010) between the scientific and the political realm, thus strengthening what to date remains 
a notoriously difficult relationship (see Wilsdon et al., 2015). On the other hand, the influx of 
knowledge and know-how from different disciplines may provide a better understanding of 
the actual significance of Big Data as a complex socio-technical phenomenon. In fact, as 
review articles such as Ekbia et al. (2015) demonstrate, ethical and legal reflections alone are 
insufficient to cover the range of conceptual and practical dilemmas surrounding Big Data. 
And if it is true that modern data analytics will not only "transform how we live, work, and 
think" (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013), but also how we know (see Kitchin, 2014), 
judge (see Christin et al., 2015), and govern (see Rieder and Simon, 2016), a concerted 
scholarly effort seems, indeed, indispensable. 
  Multidisciplinarity, however, is usually only the first step; the establishment of 
interdisciplinary dialogue and collaboration being the next. Perceived as a chance to 
transcend research silos and facilitate "more radical interactions between different styles of 
knowledge" (Stirling, 2014), interdisciplinary assessments are expected to provide responses 
to problems that "are not solvable by an individual scientific discipline alone" (Decker, 2001). 
Such '"wicked" (Rittel and Weber, 1973) or "post-normal" (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993) 
problem situations have become more frequent in the current "age of uncertainty" (Nowotny 
et al., 2001), and Big Data is no exception: Tamed by neither existing law (see Barocas and 
Selbst, 2016) nor new regulatory approaches (see Rubinstein, 2013), the search for hidden 
patterns and trends in ever larger – and increasingly diverse – datasets poses a host of 
intricate ethical and epistemic, social and political, legal, technical, and commercial 
challenges that evade traditional problem-solving strategies. Though not a panacea, issue-
focused interdisciplinary research, as included in many TA programs (e.g., see Decker and 
Grunwald, 2001), can help in finding options for political action, providing practical guidance 
for problems that do not fit into the functional differentiation of academic disciplines.10 Yet 
successful collaboration can be difficult to achieve, requiring significant effort, competence, 
                                                        
10 For more on TA's "problem-oriented" version of interdisciplinarity, see Schmidt (2008). 
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a certain openness, and time. Especially in Europe, where higher education and research 
continue to be dominated by scholarly compartmentalization,11 TA might play a crucial role 
in facilitating such interactions, nourishing a culture of interdisciplinarity ready to support the 
governance of new and emerging technologies, including Big Data. 
 While multi- and interdisciplinarity are key constituents, TA projects, including several 
of the Big Data-oriented initiatives mentioned above, often seek to take an additional step: 
the implementation of transdisciplinary engagement, meaning the active involvement of 
actors (e.g., laypeople, specialists, interest groups) from diverse social and professional 
backgrounds, in an effort to broaden the scope, gain new perspectives, and make the borders 
between science, technology, and society more permeable.12 Depending on the stage of a 
techno-scientific development, such participatory approaches may serve two main 
purposes.13 On the one hand, in the early stages of development, when a technology is new 
and societal consequences are difficult to foresee, public engagement – for example, through 
scenario exercises (see Selin, 2011), group discussions (see Felt et al., 2014), or online 
deliberation tools (see Rommetveit et al., 2013) – can assist in generating anticipatory 
knowledge about possible future trajectories and their implications, determining both the 
plausibility and desirability of an emerging socio-technical arrangement. The focus here is on 
preparation rather than prediction, on cultivating a capacity to identify viable options and 
alternatives in times of growing complexity and uncertainty (see Barben et al., 2008). On the 
other hand, however, when a controversial technology has already become entrenched and 
ex ante preparation is no longer possible, the involvement of heterogeneous groups of actors 
can provide a better understanding of the nature of the conflict, that is, the main concerns, 
the values at stake, the positions taken, the interests involved. Moreover, the inclusion of 
                                                        
11 Regarding such compartmentalization in higher education, see Newell (2010); regarding research, 
see Pan, Boucherie, and Hanafi (2015). 
12 For a deeper, historically grounded discussion of such participatory technology assessment (pTA), 
see Joss and Bellucci (2002).  
13 In fact, reasons for public participation are manifold (see Wesselink et al., 2011). The argument 
proposed in this paragraph refers to David Collingridge's well-known "dilemma of control". 
Collingridge (1980: 11) states: "The social consequences of a technology cannot be predicted early in 
the life of the technology. By the time undesirable consequences are discovered, however, the 
technology is often so much part of the whole economics and social fabric that its control is extremely 
difficult." Like Collingridge, TA searches for ways and means to deal with and, both in theory and 
practice, overcome this quandary. For an insightful analytical discussion of the dilemma, its 
assumptions and relationship to TA, see Liebert and Schmidt (2010). 
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affected publics can reveal information about problems and issues that may otherwise be 
overlooked (see Cotton, 2014), offering a clearer picture not only of possible, but of actual 
harms and risks. In sum, participatory engagement can be considered a vital element for a 
more "anticipatory" (Guston, 2014) and "reflexive" (Braun et al., 2010) governance of science 
and technology, opening both existing conditions and future prospects to broader scrutiny 
and critical debate. In the case of Big Data, where impacts are already tangible (see O'Neil, 
2016) but even bigger changes are on the way (see Davenport, 2015), such expanded modes 
of inquiry and reflection could prove essential for more sustainable, socially robust 
development. 
All in all, we believe that TA's experience in multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinary 
research, its practical expertise in consultation, deliberation, and advice at the science-
society-policy interface, can help to address and successfully deal with the manifold 
challenges posed by Big Data. In turn, the ongoing controversy about Big Data provides an 
opportunity for TA to prove itself as a theory and practice, demonstrating its value and 
relevance for the democratic governance of techno-scientific innovation and change. 
Modern data analytics, however, are not only destined to become an important 
research topic for TA, they may also emerge as a serious competitor to TA, rivaling the field 
in several of its core competencies, including the assessment of public views and visions (i), 
means and methods for exploring the future (ii), and the provision of actionable knowledge 
and advice for political decision making (iii). Following, we shall elaborate on both the 
programmatic and epistemological similarities and differences between Big Data and TA, 
highlighting conceptual incommensurabilities as well as the potential for methodological 
complementarity and research synergy. 
 
3. Big Data as a Competition for Technology Assessment 
 
3.1. The assessment of public views and visions  
 
While TA was initially conceived as a "rational-scientific tool" (Thompson Klein, 2001: 37) that 
would provide policy makers with "competent, unbiased information" concerning "probable 
 139 
impacts of technology",14 the field's focus has since shifted from mere risk-based assessments 
to greater consideration of public acceptance (see Assefa and Frostell, 2007) and social 
desirability (see Bennett and Sarewitz, 2006). Supported by a broad variety of survey and 
engagement methods,15 numerous research projects have sought to investigate people's 
values and beliefs, but also their hopes and concerns regarding specific techno-scientific 
developments. However, there are certain problems: Quantitative survey research, for 
instance, has been criticized for relying on narrow 'tick-box' questionnaires that fail to 
account for the plurality and complexity of laypeople's thinking (see Macnaghten et al., 2010) 
and for the particular 'versions of reality' such surveys enact (see Law, 2009). Qualitative 
engagement exercises, in comparison, have come under fire for being slow and time-
consuming,16 for granting too much authority to the new "experts of community" (Rose, 
1999) and their "technologies of participation" (Chilvers and Kearnes, 2016), and for issues of 
legitimacy and representativeness (see Lafont, 2015).  
In view of such criticism, the growing interest in digital methods for controversy 
mapping, opinion mining, and sentiment analysis should not come as a surprise.17 Paired with 
the epistemic promises of Big Data (see Rieder and Simon, 2017; Kitchin, 2014) such 
computational techniques may indeed seem like an offer too good to refuse: Advertised as 
fast and cheap, Big Data tools promise real-time analysis, claiming to provide guidance and 
orientation at a bargain price. Furthermore, by gleaning data from online sources – for 
example, from social networking sites such as Facebook or Twitter – computational methods 
are said to bridge the qualitative-quantitative divide, capturing an entire conflict or debate in 
                                                        
14 Quoted from the U.S. Congress Technology Assessment Act of 1972, Public Law 92-484, § 2(d) and 
§ 3(c), which created the now defunct Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), see: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-86/pdf/STATUTE-86-Pg797.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
15 For a selective overview of public engagement methods, see Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology (2001); for a review and critical discussion of large-scale survey research – and its 
paradigms – see Bauer (2008). 
16 For a list of participatory methods, including time and cost estimates, see Involve (2005) and the 
Participation Compass: http://participationcompass.org/article/index/method [Accessed 20 June 
2018). 
17 As an indication of this interest in a European policy context, consider studies such as the 
commissioned report Big Data Analytics for Policy Making (EC, 2016b), events such as the EurActiv 
stakeholder workshop Big Data & Policy Making, see 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/video/big-data-and-policy-making/, or research initiatives 
such as the Framework Programme 7 projects SENSEI, see http://www.sensei-conversation.eu/, and 
EuroSentiment, see https://web.archive.org/web/20160629170848/http://eurosentiment.eu 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
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full detail. Finally, presented as a disinterested reading of reality, the Big Data marketing 
narrative feeds into the ideal of "mechanical objectivity" (Daston and Galison, 2010), thus 
seemingly solving the problem of individual or institutional research bias by purely technical 
means. While scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds have pointed out the practical 
limitations and conceptual flaws of this heralded methodological revolution (e.g., see 
Crawford, 2013; Mustafaraj et al., 2011), the ability to measure public attitudes directly and 
without delay presents a compelling prospect for a political system facing issues of trust and 
uncertainty. And even though TA's role in facilitating public participation in science and 
technology governance goes well beyond the collection of views and opinions, the systematic 
monitoring of user-generated online data for feedback gathering and trend analysis may soon 
give traditional engagement methods a run for their money. In a society where more and 
more of people's interactions have migrated to the Web, the opportunities for such research 
proliferate – and policy makers are taking note (see Grubmüller et al., 2013). The question of 
how TA should respond to this challenge will thus be crucial to the field's future development.  
 
3.2. Means and methods for exploring the future  
 
Technology assessment's relationship to the future is the next potential site of competition. 
As mentioned above, the orientation towards the future is a central element of TA and has 
been a guiding issue from its very beginning. Yet, following some disillusionment with 
positivistic and deterministic "prognosticism" (Grunwald, 2009), there has been a shift from 
notions of early warning and control to those of shaping and designing (see Grunwald, 2014). 
The future orientation of TA becomes obvious both in methodology and conceptual work: On 
the one hand, empirical studies on the societal impacts of technology make use of an 
abundance of foresight methods such as Delphi surveys, roadmapping exercises, or scenario 
development (see Porter, 2010). On the other hand, conceptual work on technology futures 
has blossomed in recent years, and there have been numerous attempts – both from within 
and beyond TA – to conceptually grasp the dynamic and performative relationships between 
past, present, and future (see Esposito, 2007; Brown and Michael, 2003). Two prominent non-
deterministic approaches at the core of the TA movement are the concept of "anticipatory 
governance" (Guston, 2014) and the notion of "technology futures" (Grunwald, 2012). While 
the former advocates broad-based capacity building to manage emerging technologies as 
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long as such management is still possible (see Guston, 2008), the latter stresses the value of 
technology futures as a common point of reference between developers, political actors, and 
the wider public, thus emphasizing their contribution to a sustainable co-evolution of 
technology and society by stimulating critical reflection and debate (see Grunwald, 2012). 
What unites the two approaches – and TA foresight practices in general – is an understanding 
of the future as open and malleable, as something that can be steered and shaped, not 
"determined by natural necessities, but contingent and influenced by human action" (Voß et 
al., 2006: 166). Avoiding any 'crystal ball ambitions', contemporary TA conceptualizes 
foresight and anticipation as a fundamentally democratic practice, an inclusive societal 
learning process that is meant to reduce the costs of learning by trial and error. 
The reduction of costs through future-oriented analysis is also one of the main selling 
points of Big Data. The methods employed, however, differ considerably: Instead of 
deliberative foresight, Big Data specializes in predictive forecasting; instead of negotiating 
plausible future scenarios, Big Data technologies estimate probable future trajectories. In 
essence, historical and near-time data are used to identify patterns and trends, marking an 
epistemological shift from futures as socially created (see Adam, 2005) to the future as an 
object of machine calculation. The spirit of positivism thus returns (see Jurgenson, 2014), and 
it appears more powerful than ever, fueled by a massive increase in data availability and 
advanced tools and techniques to process and leverage them. The real challenge for TA, 
however, is arguably not so much the upcoming field of data science,18 but, once again, the 
Big Data imaginary, which promises almost universal applicability (see Anderson 2008) and 
the restoration of certainty in uncertain times (see Hardy, 2013). By rendering the future 
knowable and its outcome optimizable,19 Big Data "revitalize[s] the promise of prediction 
across social, political, and economic worlds" (Aradau and Blanke, 2016: 2), becoming both 
product and enabler of a new "regime of futurity" (Ekbia et al., 2015: 1539), in which slower 
and less accurate methodologies are considered obsolete. In a society that increasingly thinks 
and lives towards the future, that is marked by a constant need to conquer and colonize the 
'not yet' (see Adams et al., 2009), technology assessment's deliberative modes of future 
                                                        
18 Data scientists are usually well aware of the various limitations of their craft. For a balanced 
account of prediction in the era of Big Data, see Silver (2012).  
19 Consider, for instance, IBM's advertising slogan for their predictive analytics products, which 
prompts customers to "optimize the future with better decisions today". See 
http://www.ibm.com/analytics/us/en/technology/predictive-analytics/ [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
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engagement may soon find themselves outgunned and outpaced by the grand claims of the 
algorithmic forecasting industry. Once again, an open discussion of how TA as a future-
oriented discipline should and could respond to this challenge seems paramount. 
 
3.3. The provision of actionable knowledge and advice  
 
While "anticipating future developments and their impacts" is a key objective of TA, the field 
also seeks to "accommodate such insights in decision making and its implementation" (Rip, 
2012: 31). The focus on providing actionable knowledge for political decision making has been 
a major concern of TA since its formal inception in the 1970s. Back then, the now defunct 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was commissioned to advise the US Congress in 
matters of science and technology. While the executive branch of the US government could 
rely on an extensive apparatus of departments and agencies, Congress as the legislative 
branch was lacking such resources. Thus, a crucial function of OTA was to re-establish the 
knowledge/power balance between the government's legislative and executive branches (see 
Sadowski, 2015; Bimber, 1996). The focus on actionable knowledge, however, becomes 
apparent not only in the specific case of parliamentary TA, which aims to "strengthen 
representative democracy by timely informing MPs about the potential social impacts of 
technological change" (van Est and Brom, 2012: 306), but also when participatory TA is used 
as a means to mediate between the interests of different stakeholders, for instance in the 
context of selecting sites for nuclear waste disposal (see Hocke and Renn, 2009). The 
distinction between consultation, on the one hand, and decision making, on the other, is 
crucial for the disciplinary self-understanding of TA. In order to remain trustworthy in its 
advisory function, TA aims at providing independent, high-quality knowledge about techno-
scientific developments and their potential social, ethical, and legal implications. It does not, 
however, actively participate in the decision-making process.20 Moreover, TA as a discipline 
is well aware that the impact of its advice varies greatly and is hard to predict. While some 
reports may directly influence parliamentary decisions, others may get tucked away in filling 
cabinets, never to be read again. This relative openness and uncertainty should not be seen 
                                                        
20 For an overview of the different practices and institutions of parliamentary TA in Europe, see 
Nentwich (2016). 
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as a failure of the discipline, but as a testimony to its facilitative and supportive rather than 
deciding societal function. 
 In the case of Big Data, the distinction between consultation and decision making is 
far less obvious: While Big Data technologies are said to provide insight and guidance for 
human decision making, they are increasingly used to generate decision recommendations or 
even take action on their own (see Citron and Pasquale, 2014). What can thus be observed is 
a gradual shift from description (i.e., data reporting) and prediction (i.e., identifying trends) 
to prescription and automation (see Davenport, 2015). Whereas prescriptive analytics are 
meant to suggest actions and "tell you what to do" (Davenport, 2013), the move towards 
automation shifts the power – and burden – of decision making from the human actor to ever 
smarter programs and machines. In the latter case, algorithmic systems do not merely 
participate in decision processes, but perform certain actions with no or minimal human 
intervention. And even though a fully automated state may still be a distant utopian or 
dystopian vision (see Forster, 1909), there is clear indication that the demand for such 
solutions in the public sector is growing (see Hartzog et al., 2015). In such a context, a major 
task for TA will be to critically assess and question the "prominence and status acquired by 
data as a commodity and recognized output" (Leonelli, 2014: 1) as well as to challenge the 
"widespread belief that large data sets offer a higher form of intelligence […], with an aura of 
truth, objectivity, and accuracy" (boyd and Crawford, 2012: 663). In addition, however, the 
field will also have to develop strategies to maintain its relevance in a crisis-ridden political 
environment that longs for seemingly clean, unambiguous knowledge and advice. To be blunt, 
the recent push for "data for policy" (EC, 2016c) and "evidence-informed decision making" 
(EC, 2015a) does not aim to raise the budget for traditional public engagement exercises, but 
encourages the development of computational solutions that may make such methodologies 
appear increasingly redundant. Going forward, fast-paced innovation and the ongoing 
datafication of society will make this an even more pressing matter of concern.  
 
4. Discussion: Towards Responsible Data-Based Research and Innovation 
 
The relationship between Big Data as a complex socio-technical phenomenon and TA as a 
discipline assessing such phenomena is a peculiar one: Big Data may be the first topic TA deals 
with that is not only an object of inquiry, but also a major competitor, rivaling TA in several 
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of its core functions. Having outlined a narrative of competition in the previous section, we 
now want to conclude by sketching an alternative way forward, one that considers the 
relationship between Big Data and TA with respect to the concept of RRI. In essence, we 
believe that TA's focus on multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinary research, its reflexive 
orientation towards the future, and its practical expertise in providing policy advice, can help 
to address and successfully deal with the manifold challenges posed by Big Data. In doing so, 
TA-based analysis may provide valuable insight and support for the alignment of Big Data 
governance with the aims and goals of RRI, a widespread policy agenda the European 
Commission broadly defines as "an approach that anticipates and assesses potential 
implications and societal expectations […], with the aim to foster the design of inclusive and 
sustainable research and innovation" (EC, n.d. b). While we do not wish to engage in a detailed 
discussion of RRI as a concept and funding strategy (see, however, Simon, 2017; 2015), we do 
seek to highlight a number of central issues and concerns that may require special attention 
when moving Big Data under the RRI umbrella.  
 
4.1. Multidisciplinarity beyond ELSIfication  
 
As the range of topics and issues covered in journals such as Big Data & Society indicates, the 
scope and complexity of the Big Data phenomenon extends well beyond the purview of any 
single academic discipline. Meaningful assessments of societal impacts will thus require the 
collaboration of researchers from different fields, not only contributing their domain-specific 
knowledge, but also engaging in cross-disciplinary investigations, considering complex socio-
technical entanglements from various angles and perspectives. As argued, TA as an analytic 
practice is well equipped for such a task, but the selection of the relevant scientific disciplines 
is both crucial and tricky and should be made with care (see Decker, 2004). While the choice 
ultimately depends on the question to be answered and the problem to be solved, in the case 
of Big Data, the scope of traditional ELSI research often will not suffice. In particular political 
(see Morozov, 2013a), economic (see Newman, 2015), and epistemic (see Rieder and Simon, 
2017) premises and implications should be taken into account, and some technical expertise 
may prove necessary when dealing with matters related to advanced computational methods 
such as data mining or machine learning (e.g., see Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Burrell, 2016). 
Thus, in order to truly grasp the impacts and consequences of Big Data and path the way for 
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more responsible data-based research and innovation, finding the 'right' research partners 
and establishing a high-quality exchange relationship will be key. 
 
4.2. Public Engagement and the Politics of Participation  
 
The idea(l) of RRI emphasizes the need for "deepening the relationship between science and 
society" (European Parliament and Council, 2013) by "includ[ing] multi-actor and public 
engagement in research and innovation" (EC, n.d. b), fostering "dialogues between 
researchers, policy makers, industry and civil society organizations, NGOs, and citizens" (EC, 
n.d. a). While the general aim of "bringing on board the widest possible diversity of actors" 
(EC, n.d. a) may be democratically laudable, and TA certainly has a lot to offer in this regard 
(see Section 2 above), the specific modes and modalities of engagement remain a major issue 
of concern. Despite a rhetoric of openness and inclusion, consultation exercises are 
frequently designed as one-way, top-down public education approaches where participants 
are taught about scientific facts, expert knowledge is given primacy over lay expertise, and a 
strong commitment to consensus stifles deliberative disagreement. Given Big Data's now 
well-documented potential for causing harm (see O'Neil, 2016) and people's growing 
discomfort with the widespread application and impact of data analytics in numerous areas 
of life (see Pew, 2015), such strategies of appeasement seem both futile and utterly 
misplaced. Instead, controversies should be embraced as sites of social learning where 
citizens can share and discuss their experiences with specific services and applications (see 
Rip, 1986). Moreover, measures should be taken that the outcomes and findings of 
deliberative engagements can actually affect the regulation of new and emerging 
technologies, which means that even stopping certain developments – for example, through 
temporary or permanent moratoria – must be considered a real option. Otherwise, public 
consultation and stakeholder involvement risks becoming a farce and may rightly be accused 
as a means to silence critical voices and fabricate consent. 
 
4.3. Performative Temporalities and Contestable Futures  
 
As outlined in Section 3, TA and Big Data practices share a common interest in the future. 
While Big Data is mainly discussed as a forecasting technology that may soon "predict our 
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every move" (Hassani and Silva, 2015), TA is rooted in the broader and less determinant but 
equally forward looking tradition of foresight (see Harper, 2013), focusing on different 
stakeholder's visions, expectations, and fears rather than statistical patterns. From a TA 
perspective, the future cannot be discovered, but has to be created and constructed – for 
instance through scenario building – resulting in a plurality of possible futures and paths that 
are open to public scrutiny and deliberation. In addition, TA emphasizes the 
interconnectedness between past, present, and future, acknowledging that we can only think 
about futures according to our present-day's knowledge and that the ways how futures are 
constructed are decisive for their content (see Grunwald, 2010). Such a reflexive stance may 
prove valuable when assessing the performativity and politics of Big Data forecasts, which are 
marked by a shift from prediction to prescription, no longer limited to the confines of 
prognosis, but actively telling people "what they should be doing next" (Eric Schmidt, quoted 
in Jenkins, 2010). Ultimately, Big Data's predictive power may enable a "new philosophy of 
preemption" (Kerr and Earle, 2013), which forestalls (human) action based on algorithmic 
estimates. If we allow such systems of digital regulation to proliferate, we need to be very 
sure about their epistemological premises as well as their potential ethical, social, and 
political implications.    
 
4.4. Actionable, Situated, and Inclusive Knowledge  
 
Given the prevalent "trust in numbers" (Porter, 1995) within political and administrative 
circles, on the one hand, and Big Data proponents' claims of predictive superiority and 
analytical neutrality (see Anderson 2008), on the other, TA may soon face a new competitor 
in providing guidance and support for public policy. But policy makers should be aware that 
the very kind of knowledge they receive may differ considerably between the two 
approaches: While TA focuses on collective problem solving, discussions and critical 
deliberation (see Abelson et al., 2003), Big Data methods tend to look at networks and 
opinions from a distance (see Moretti, 2013). Two-way interactions, mutual learning, and 
external subject-matter expertise are key elements of TA, but much less so in data mining and 
computational analytics.    
However, rather than substituting one for the other, we believe that both fields can learn and 
benefit from one another. For instance, whereas Big Data methods could expand the breadth 
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of traditional scoping exercises (see Gandomi and Haider, 2015), facilitate the tracking of 
trends (Nguyen et al., 2016) and public sentiment (see Cambria et al., 2014), and help map 
the dynamics of controversies over time (see Lansdall-Welfare, 2014), TA could use its 
methodological know-how, its reflexive capacities, and its experience in policy advice to make 
Big Data RRI-ready.21 In the end, diligently supervised mixed-methods approaches could 
contribute to the theoretical and methodological development of both fields as well as to the 
general advancement of responsible data-based research and innovation.  
 
In this concluding section, we have argued that Big Data practices may clearly benefit from 
the insights and experience of TA and have pointed towards certain issues and concerns that 
may prove crucial when seeking to align Big Data research with central RRI tenets. While our 
analysis had a critical edge and sought to debunk certain exaggerated hopes and claims 
mainly voiced by industry stakeholders, we do wish to acknowledge the great social, 
economic, and academic opportunities that Big Data and related methods provide. There is 
no doubt that Big Data tools can be used for the common good, but there are pitfalls along 
the way that must be thoroughly understood and addressed. Thus, while opportunities should 
be exploited, this needs to be done in a responsible, socially sustainable manner.  
Throughout the paper, we have also argued that Big Data poses a considerable challenge to 
TA, rivaling the field in several core functions, including the assessment of public views and 
visions, means and methods for exploring possible future trajectories, and the provision of 
actionable knowledge and advice for political decision making. We believe that in order to 
stay in the game, TA will have to engage with the new methods and techniques offered by Big 
Data technologies. Such an engagement should include, but not be limited to, critical 
reflection. Instead, TA should consider forming coalitions of mutual learning, for instance by 
including data scientists into future project designs, thereby expanding its multidisciplinary 
expertise by yet another approach. What we propose is a third way between industry hype 
and Big Data doom and gloom, one that acknowledges the value of data science as a powerful 
epistemic practice, that is open to the opportunities granted by the proliferation of digital 
                                                        
21 In this respect, TA could also learn from the digital methods community, which has employed Web-
based tools to map controversies around, for example, global warming (see Weltevrede and Borra, 
2016), biofuels (see Eklöf and Mager, 2013), or GM food (see Marres and Rogers, 2000), embracing 
the epistemic opportunities of online data mining while remaining attentive to potential limitations 
and the perils of competitive marketization (see Rieder and Sire, 2014).  
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(social) data, and that takes a proactive stance in developing tools and methods that function 
as best practice examples. If done right, modern data analytics could become an ally rather 
than a competitor to the field of technology assessment, potentially extending the scope, 
speed, and quality of discourse, dispute, and trend analysis. If disregarded and left to the 
proprietary discretion of commercial products, however, Big Data may not only grow to 
challenge the TA community, but could also pose a considerable threat to the core principles 






































Abelson, J., Forest, P.-G., Eyles, J., Smith, P., Martin, E. and Gauvin, F.-P. (2003). 
Deliberations about Deliberative Methods: Issues in the Design and Evaluation of 
Public Participation Processes. Social Science & Medicine, 57(2), pp. 239–251. 
Adam, B. (2005). Futures in the Making: Contemporary Practices and Sociological 
Challenges. Paper presented at the ASA conference. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/socsi/futures/conf_ba_asa230905.pdf [Accessed 20 June 
2018]. 
Adams, V., Murphy, M. and Clarke, A. E. (2009). Anticipation: Technoscience, Life, Affect, 
Temporality. Subjectivity, 28(1), pp. 246-265. 
Anderson, C. (2008). The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method 
Obsolete. Wired. [online] Available at: https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory/ 
[Accessed 20 June 2018].  
Aradau, C. and Blanke, T. (2016). Politics of Prediction: Security and the Time/Space of 
Governmentality in the Age of Big Data. European Journal of Social Theory, 20(3), pp. 
373-391. 
Assefa, G. and Frostell, B. M. (2007). Social Sustainability and Social Acceptance in 
Technology Assessment: A Case Study of Energy Technologies. Technology in Society, 
29(1), pp 63-78. 
Barben, D., Fisher, E., Selin, C. and Guston, D. H. (2008). Anticipatory Governance and 
Nanotechnology: Foresight, Engagement, and Integration. In: E. J. Hackett, O. 
Amsterdamska, M. Lynch and J. Wajcman, eds., The Handbook of Science and 
Technology Studies. Third Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 979-1000. 
Barocas, S. and Selbst, A. D. (2016 [2014]). Big Data's Disparate Impact. California Law 
Review, 104, pp. 671-732. 
Bauer, M. W. (2008). Survey Research and the Public Understanding of Science. In: M. 
Bucchi and B. Trench, eds., Handbook of Public Communication of Science and 
Technology. London: Routledge, pp. 111-130. 
Bennett, I. and Sarewitz, D. (2006) Too Little, Too Late? Research Policies on the Societal 
Implications of Nanotechnology in the United States. Science as Culture, 15(4), pp. 
309-325. 
Bimber, B. (1996). The Politics of Expertise in Congress. The Rise and Fall of the Office of 
Technology Assessment. New York: State University of New York Press. 
boyd, danah (2016). Untangling Research and Practice: What Facebook's "Emotional 
Contagion" Study Teaches Us. Research Ethics, 12(1), pp. 4-13. 
boyd, d. and Crawford, K. (2012). Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, 
Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon. Information, Communication & Society, 
15(5), pp. 662-679. 
 150 
Braun, K., Moore, A., Herrmann, S. L., Könninger, S. (2010). Science Governance and the 
Politics of Proper Talk: Governmental Bioethics as a New Technology of Reflexive 
Government. Economy and Society, 39(4), pp. 510-533. 
Brown, N. and Michael, M. (2003). A Sociology of Expectations: Retrospecting Prospects and 
Prospecting Retrospects. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 15(1), pp. 3-
18. 
Burrell, J. (2016). How the Machine 'Thinks': Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning 
Algorithms. Big Data & Society, 3(1), pp. 1-12. 
Cambria, E., Rajagopal, D., Olsher, D. and Das, D. (2014). Big Social Data Analysis. In: R. 
Akerkar, ed., Big Data Computing. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, pp. 401-414. 
Chilvers, J. and Kearnes, M. (2016). Participation in the Making. Rethinking Public 
Engagement in Co-Productionist Terms. In: J. Chilvers and M. Kearnes, eds., Remaking 
Participation. Science, Environment and Emergent Publics. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 
31-63. 
Christin, A., Rosenblat, A. and boyd, d. (2015). Courts and Predictive Algorithms. Workshop 
Primer. [pdf] Available at: http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2015-
1027/Courts_and_Predictive_Algorithms.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018].  
Citron, D. K. and Pasquale, F. (2014). The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions. Washington Law Review, 89(1), pp. 1-33. 
Collingridge, D. (1980). The Social Control of Technology. London: Frances Pinter. 
Cotton, M. (2014). Ethics and Technology Assessment: A Participatory Approach. Heidelberg; 
New York: Springer. 
Crawford, K. (2013). The Hidden Biases in Big Data. Harvard Business Review. [online] 
Available at: https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data [Accessed 20 June 
2018]. 
Daston, L. and Galison, P. (2010 [2007]). Objectivity. New York: Zone Books. 
Davenport, T. H. (2015). The Rise of Automated Analytics. The Wall Street Journal. [online] 
Available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/01/14/the-rise-of-automated-analytics/ 
[Accessed 20 June 2018].  
Davenport, T. H. (2013). Analytics That Tell You What to Do. The Wall Street Journal. [online] 
Available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/04/03/analytics-that-tell-you-what-to-do/ 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Decker, M. (2001). Preface. In: M. Decker, ed., Interdisciplinarity in Technology Assessment. 
Implementation and its Chances and Limits. Wissenschaftsethik und 
Technikfolgenbeurteilung Band 11. Berlin: Springer, IX-X. 
Decker, M. (2004). The Role of Ethics in Interdisciplinary Technology Assessment. Poiesis & 
Praxis, 2, pp. 139-156. 
Decker, M. and Grunwald, A. (2001). Rational Technology Assessment as Interdisciplinary 
Research. In: M. Decker, ed., Interdisciplinarity in Technology Assessment. 
Implementation and its Chances and Limits. Wissenschaftsethik und 
Technikfolgenbeurteilung Band 11. Berlin: Springer, pp. 33-60. 
 151 
Ekbia, H., Mattioli, M., Kouper, I., Arave, G., Ghazinejad, A., Bowman, T., Suri, V. R., Tsou, A., 
Weingart, S. and Sugimoto, C. R. (2015). Big Data, Bigger Dilemmas: A Critical Review. 
Journal of the Association for Information and Technology, 66(8), pp. 1523-1545. 
Eklöf, J. and Mager, A. (2013). Technoscientific Promotion and Biofuel Policy: How the Press 
and Search Engines Stage the Biofuel Controversy. Media, Culture & Society, 35(4), pp. 
454-471.  
Esposito, E. (2007). Die Fiktion der Wahrscheinlichen Realität. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
van Est, R. and Brom, F. (2012). Technology Assessment as an Analytic and Democratic 
Practice. In: R. Chadwick, D. Callahan, P. Singer, eds., Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. 
2nd Edition. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 306-320. 
European Commission (n.d. a). Public Engagement in Responsible Research and Innovation. 
[online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/node/766 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
European Commission (n.d. b). Responsible Research & Innovation. [online] Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/responsible-
research-innovation [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
European Commission (2016a). European Cloud Initiative to Give Europe a Global Lead in the 
Data-Driven Economy. Press Release. [online] Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1408_en.htm [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
European Commission (2016b). Big Data Analytics for Policy Making. Report. [online] 
Available at: 
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dg_digit_study_big_data_analytics_for
_policy_making.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
European Commission (2016c). Data for Policy: An Increasingly Global Affair. Conference 
Announcement. [online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/data-policy-increasingly-global-affair [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
European Commission (2015a). Data for Policy: When the Haystack is Made of Needles. Call 
for Contributions. [online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/news/data-policy-when-haystack-made-needles-call-contributions [Accessed 
20 June 2018]. 
European Commission (2015b). ICT-Enabled Public Sector Innovation in Horizon 2020. 
[online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/ict-enabled-
public-sector-innovation-horizon-2020 [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
European Commission (2015c). Special Eurobarometer 431 – Data Protection. Report. [pdf] 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_431_en.pdf 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
European Commission (2014). The Use of Big Data in Public Health Policy and Research. 
[pdf] Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ehealth/docs/ev_20141118_co07b_en.pdf [Accessed 20 
June 2018]. 
 152 
European Parliament and Council (2013). Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing Horizon 2020 – the 
Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) and repealing 
Decision No 1982/2006/EC Text with EEA relevance. [online] Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1291&from=EN 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Felt, U., Schumann, S., Schwarz, C. and Strassnig, M. (2014). Technology of Imagination: A 
Card-Based Public Engagement Method for Debating Emerging Technologies. 
Qualitative Research, 14(2), pp. 233-251.  
Forster, E. M. (1909). The Machine Stops. [online] Available at: 
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Machine_Stops [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Funtowicz, S. O. and Ravetz, J. R. (1993). Science for the Post-Normal Age. Futures, 25(7), 
pp.739-755. 
Gandomi, A. and Haider, M. (2014). Beyond the Hype: Big Data Concepts, Methods, and 
Analytics. International Journal of Information Management, 35(2), pp. 137-144. 
Gartner (2015). Gartner Survey Shows More Than 75 Percent of Companies Are Investing or 
Planning to Invest in Big Data in the Next Two Years. [online] Available at: 
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3130817 [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Grubmüller, V., Götsch, K. and Krieger, B. (2013). Social Media Analytics for Future Oriented 
Policy Making. European Journal of Futures Research, 1(20), pp. 1-9. 
Grunwald, A. (2014). Technology Assessment for Responsible Innovation. In: J. van den 
Hoven, N. Doorn, T. Swierstra, B.-J. Koops, H. Romijin, eds., Responsible Innovation 1: 
Innovation Solutions for Global Issues. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 15-32. 
Grunwald, A. (2012). Technikzukünfte als Medium von Zukunftsdebatten und 
Technikgestaltung. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing.  
Grunwald, A. (2010). Future. In: D. H. Guston, ed., Encyclopedia of Nanoscience and Society. 
Volume 1. Los Angeles: SAGE, pp. 265-267. 
Grunwald, A. (2009). Technology Assessment: Concepts and Methods. In: A. Meijers, ed., 
Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences. Handbook of the Philosophy of 
Science. Volume 9. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1103-1146. 
Guston, D. H. (2014). Understanding 'Anticipatory Governance'. Social Studies of Science, 
44(2), pp. 218-242. 
Guston, D. H. (2008). Preface. In: E. Fisher, C. Selin and J. Wetmore, eds., The Yearbook of 
Nanotechnology in Society. Volume 1: Presenting Futures. New York: Springer, pp. V-
VIII. 
Hardy, Q. (2013). Why Big Data is not Truth. [online] The New York Times. Available at: 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/why-big-data-is-not-truth/ [Accessed 20 
June 2018]. 
Hartzog, W., Conti, G., Nelson, J. and Shay, L. A. (2015). Inefficiently Automated Law 
Enforcement. Michigan State Law Review, 2015(5), pp. 1763-1796. 
 153 
Harper, J. C. (2013). Impact of Technology Foresight. Nesta Working Paper 13/16. [pdf] 
Available at: 
https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/1316_impact_of_technology_foresight_final_
version.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Hassani, H. and Silva, E. S. (2015). Forecasting with Big Data: A Review. Annals of Data 
Science, 2(1), pp. 5-19. 
Hey, T., Tansley, S. and Tolle, K., eds., (2009). The Fourth Paradigm. Data-Intensive Scientific 
Discovery. Redmond: Microsoft Research. 
Hocke, P. and Renn, O. (2009). Concerned Public and the Paralysis of Decision-Making: 
Nuclear Waste Management Policy in Germany. Journal of Risk Research, 12(7-8), pp. 
921-940. 
International Data Research (IDC) (2014). The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data 
and the Increasing Value of the Internet of Things. [online] Available at: 
www.emc.com/leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/executive-summary.htm 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Involve (2005). People & Participation. How to Put Citizens at the Heart of Decision-Making. 
[pdf] Available at: http://www.involve.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/People-
and-Participation.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018].  
Jenkins, H. W. (2010). Google and the Search for the Future. The Wall Street Journal. [online] 
Available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704901104575423294099527212 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Joss, S. and Bellucci, S. (2002). Participatory Technology Assessment: European Perspectives. 
Centre for the Study of Democracy. Gateshead: Athenaeum Press. 
Jurgenson, N. (2014). View from Nowhere. The New Inquiry. [online] Available at: 
https://thenewinquiry.com/essays/view-from-nowhere/ [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Kerr, I. and Earle, J. (2013). Prediction, Preemption, Presumption. How Big Data Threatens 
Big Picture Privacy. Stanford Law Review Online, 66, pp. 65-72. 
Kitchin, R. (2014). Big Data, New Epistemologies and Paradigm Shifts. Big Data & Society, 
1(1), pp. 1-12. 
Klüver, L., Nielsen, R. Ø. and Jørgensen, M. L. (2015). Policy-Oriented Technology Assessment 
Across Europe. Expanding Capacities. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lafont, C. (2015). Deliberation, Participation, and Democratic Legitimacy: Should 
Deliberative Mini-Publics Shape Public Policy? The Journal of Political Philosophy, 
23(1), pp. 40-63. 
Laney, D. (2012). Deja VVVu: Others Claiming Gartner's Construct for Big Data. Gartner Blog 
Network. [online] http://blogs.gartner.com/doug-laney/deja-vvvue-others-claiming-
gartners-volume-velocity-variety-construct-for-big-data/ [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Laney, D. (2001). 3D Data Management: Controlling Data Volume, Velocity, and Variety. 
META Group. Application Delivery Strategies. [pdf] Available at: 
 154 
https://blogs.gartner.com/doug-laney/files/2012/01/ad949-3D-Data-Management-
Controlling-Data-Volume-Velocity-and-Variety.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Lansdall-Welfare, T., Sudhahar, S., Veltri, G. A. and Christianini, N. (2014). On the Coverage 
of Science in the Media: A Big Data Study on the Impact of the Fukushima Disaster. 
Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Big Data, pp. 60-66. 
Law, J. (2009). Seeing Like a Survey. Cultural Sociology, 3(2), pp. 239-256. 
Leonelli, S. (2014). What Difference Does Quantity Make? On the Epistemology of Big Data 
in Biology. Big Data & Society, 1(1), pp. 1-11. 
Liebert, W. and Schmidt, J. C. (2010). Collingridge's Dilemma and Technoscience. An 
Attempt to Provide a Clarification from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Science. 
Poiesis & Praxis, 7, pp. 55-71. 
Lohr, S. (2012). The Age of Big Data. The New York Times. [online] Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-
world.html?_r=0 [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Lyon, D. (2014). Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique. 
Big Data and Society, 1(2), pp. 1-13. 
Macnaghten, P., Davies, S. and Kearnes, M. (2010). Narrative and Public Engagement: Some 
Findings from the DEEPEN Project. In: R. von Schomberg and S. Davies, eds., 
Understanding Public Debate on Nanotechnologies. Options for Framing Public Policy. 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, pp. 13-29. 
Marres, N. and Rogers, R. (2000). Depluralising the Web and Repluralising Public Debate: 
The Case of the GM Food Debate on the Web. In: R. Rogers, ed., Preferred Placement: 
Knowledge Politics on the Web. Maastricht: Jan van Eyck Editions, pp. 113-135. 
Mayer-Schönberger, V. and Cukier, K. (2013). Big Data. A Revolution That Will Transform 
How We Live, Work, And Think. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.  
Meyer, M. (2011). The Rise of the Knowledge Broker. Science Communication, 32(1), pp. 
118-127. 
Michalek, T., Hebáková, L., Hennen, L., Scherz, C., Nierling, L. and Hahn, J. (2014). 
Technology Assessment and Policy Areas of Great Transitions. Proceedings from the 
PACITA 2013 Conference in Prague. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.pacitaproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Conference-Book.pdf 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Moretti, F. (2013). Distant Reading. London: Verso.  
Morozov, E. (2013a). The Real Privacy Problem. MIT Technology Review. [online] Available 
at: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/520426/the-real-privacy-problem/ 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Morozov, E. (2013b). To Save Everything, Click Here. The Folly of Technological Solutionism. 
New York: Public Affairs. 
Mustafaraj, E., Finn, S., Whitlock, C. and Metaxas, P. T. (2011). Vocal Minority Versus Silent 
Majority: Discovering the Opinions of the Long Tail. Paper presented at the 2011 IEEE 
 155 
International Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk, and Trust, and IEEE International 
Conference on Social Computing, pp. 103-110. 
Nentwich, M. (2016). Parliamentary Technology Assessment Institutions and Practices. A 
Systematic Comparison of 15 Members of the EPTA Network. ITA manu:script, 16-02. 
[pdf] Available at: http://epub.oeaw.ac.at/ita/ita-manuscript/ita_16_02.pdf [Accessed 
20 June 2018]. 
Newell, W. H. (2010). Undergraduate General Education. In: R. Frodeman, J. Thompson 
Klein, C. Mitchman, B. Holbrook and J. Britt, eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
Interdisciplinarity. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 360-371. 
Newman, N. (2015). Data Justice: Taking on Big Data as an Economic Justice Issue. Data 
Justice Report. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.datajustice.org/sites/default/files/Data%20Justice-
%20Taking%20on%20Big%20Data%20as%20an%20Economic%20Justice%20Issue.pdf 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Nguyen, K.-L., Byung-Joo, S. and Yoo, S. J. (2016). Hot Topic Detection and Technology Trend 
Tracking for Patents Utilizing Term Frequency and Proportional Document Frequency 
and Semantic Information. Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Big 
Data and Smart Computing (BigComp), pp. 223-230. 
Nowotny, H., Scott, P. and Gibbon, M. (2001). Re-Thinking Science: Knowledge and the 
Public in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
O'Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of Math Destruction. How Big Data Increases Inequality and 
Threatens Democracy. New York: Crown. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2015). Data-Driven Innovation: 
Big Data for Growth and Well-Being. Paris: OECD Publishing.  
PACITA (2015). The Next Horizon of Technology Assessment. 2nd European TA Conference. 
Book of Abstracts. [pdf] Available at: http://berlinconference.pacitaproject.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Book-of-Abstracts-UPDATED3.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
 
PACITA (2013). Technology Assessment and Policy Areas of Great Transitions. 1st PACITA 
Project Conference. Book of Abstracts. Available at: http://www.pacitaproject.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Book-of-abstracts-Prague.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Pan, L., Boucherie, S. and Hanafi, S. (2015). Interdisciplinary Research: How Do 9 Nations 
Compare? Elsevier Connect. [online] Available at: 
https://www.elsevier.com/connect/interdisciplinary-research-how-do-9-nations-
compare [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (2001). Open Channels: Public Dialogue in 
Science and Technology. Report No. 153. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/pr153.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Pentland, A. (2014). Social Physics. How Good Ideas Spread – The Lessons from a New 
Science. New York: Penguin Press. 
 156 
Pentland, A. (2012). Society's Nervous System: Building Effective Government, Energy, and 
Public Health Systems. IEEE Computer, 45(1), pp. 31-38. 
Pew Research Center (2015). Americans' Attitudes about Privacy, Security and Surveillance. 
[pdf] Available at: http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/05/Privacy-and-Security-
Attitudes-5.19.15_FINAL.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Pew Research Center (2014). Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden 
Era. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pd
f [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Porter, A. L. (2010). Technology Foresight: Types and Methods. International Journal of 
Foresight and Innovation Policy, 6(1), pp. 36-45. 
Porter, T. M. (1995). Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2014). Big Data and Privacy: A 
Technological Perspective. [pdf] Available at: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pca
st_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Press, G. (2014). 12 Big Data Definitions: What's Yours? Forbes. [online] Available at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2014/09/03/12-big-data-definitions-whats-
yours/#3bec4cba13ae [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Presser, L., Hruskova, M., Rowbottom, H. and Kancir, J. (2015). Care.data and Access to UK 
Health Records: Patient Privacy and Public Trust. Technology Science. [online] 
Available at: http://techscience.org/a/2015081103/ [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Rieder, B. and Sire, G. (2014) Conflicts of Interest and Incentives to Bias: A Microeconomic 
Critique of Google's Tangled Position on the Web. New Media & Society, 16(2), pp. 
195-211. 
Rieder, G. and Simon, J. (2017). Big Data: A New Empiricism and its Epistemic and Socio-
Political Consequences. In: W. Pietsch, J. Wernecke and M. Ott, eds., Berechenbarkeit 
der Welt? Philosophie und Wissenschaft im Zeitalter von Big Data. Wiesbaden: 
Springer VS, pp. 85-105. 
Rieder, G. and Simon, J. (2016). Datatrust: Or, the Political Quest for Numerical Evidence 
and the Epistemologies of Big Data. Big Data & Society, 3(1), pp. 1-6. 
Rip, A. (2012). Futures of Technology Assessment. In: M. Decker, A. Grunwald, Armin and M. 
Knapp, eds., Der Systemblick auf Innovation. Technikfolgenabschätzung in der 
Technikgestaltung. Berlin: edition sigma, pp. 29-39. 
Rip, A. (1986). Controversies as Informal Technology Assessment. Science Communication, 
8(2), pp. 349-371. 
Rittel, H. W. J. and Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. Policy 
Sciences, 4, pp. 155-169. 
Rommetveit, K., Gunnarsdóttir, K., Jepsen, K. S., Bertilsson, T. M., Verrax, F. and Strand, R. 
(2013). The Technolife Project: An Experimental Approach to New Ethical Frameworks 
 157 
for Emerging Science and Technology. International Journal of Sustainable 
Development, 16(1/2), pp. 23-45. 
Rose, N. (1999). Power of Freedom. Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Rubinstein, I. (2013). Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning? International Data 
Privacy Law, 3(2), pp. 74-87. 
Sadowski, J. (2015). Office of Technology Assessment: History, Implementation, and 
Participatory Critique. Technology in Society, 42, pp. 9-20. 
Schmidt, J. C. (2008). Towards a Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity. An Attempt to Provide a 
Classification and Clarification. Poiesis & Praxis, 5(1), pp. 53-69. 
Selin, C. (2011). Negotiating Plausibility: Intervening in the Future of Nanotechnology. 
Science and Engineering Ethics, 17, pp. 723-737. 
Silver, N. (2012). The Signal and the Noise. Why So Many Prediction Fail – But Some Don't. 
New York: Penguin Press. 
Simon, J. (2017). Value-Sensitive Design and Responsible Innovation. In: S. O. Hansson, ed., 
Methods for the Ethics of Technology. London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 
pp. 219-236.  
Simon, J. (2015). Distributed Epistemic Responsibility in a Hyperconnected Era. In: L. Floridi, 
ed., The Onlife Manifesto: Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era. Charm: Springer, pp. 
145-159. 
Singh, V. K., Banshal, S. K., Singhal, K. and Uddin, A. (2015). Scientometric Mapping of 
Research on 'Big Data'. Scientometrics, 105(2), pp. 727-741.  
Statista (2016). Forecast of Big Data Market Size, Based on Revenue, from 2011 to 2026 (in 
Billion U.S. Dollars). [online] Available at: 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/254266/global-big-data-market-forecast/ 
[Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Stirling, A. (2014). Disciplinary Dilemma: Working Across Research Silos Is Harder than It 
Looks. The Guardian. [online] Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2014/jun/11/science-policy-
research-silos-interdisciplinarity [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Teknologirådet (2015). Predictive Policing: Can Data Analysis Help the Police to Be in the 
Right Place at the Right Time? [pdf] Available at: https://teknologiradet.no/wp-
content/uploads/sites/19/2013/08/Predicitve-policing.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Thompson Klein, J. (2001). The Discourse of Transdisciplinarity: An Expanding Global Field. 
In: J. Thompson Klein, W. Grossenbacher-Mansuy, R. Häberli, B. Alain, R. W. Scholz 
and M. Welti, eds., Transdisciplinarity: Joint Problem Solving among Science, 
Technology, and Society, pp. 35-44. Basel: Spring Basel AG. 
Turow, J., Hennessy, M. and Draper, N. (2015). The Tradeoff Fallacy. How Marketers Are 
Misrepresenting American Consumers and Opening Them Up to Exploitation. A Report 
from the Annenberg School for Communication. [pdf] Available at: 
 158 
https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf [Accessed 20 
June 2018]. 
Upturn (2014). Civil Rights, Big Data, and Our Algorithmic Future. A September 2014 Report 
on Social Justice and Technology. [pdf] Available at: https://bigdata.fairness.io/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/2015-04-20-Civil-Rights-Big-Data-and-Our-Algorithmic-
Future-v1.2.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Vance, A. (2010). EMC Takes a Big-Data Swipe at Oracle, H.P. and I.B.M. The New York 
Times. [online] Available at: http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/emc-takes-a-
big-data-swipe-at-oracle-h-p-and-i-b-m/ [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Voß, J.-P., Truffer, B. and Konrad, K. (2006). Sustainability Foresight: Reflexive Governance in 
the Transformation of Utility Systems. In: J.-P. Voß, D. Bauknecht, R. Kemp, eds., 
Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 
162-188. 
Weltevrede, E. and Borra, E. (2016). Platform Affordances and Data Practices: The Value of 
Dispute on Wikipedia. Big Data & Society, 3(1), pp. 1-16.  
Wesselink, A., Paavola, J., Fritsch, O. and Renn, O. (2011). Rationales for Public Participation 
in Environmental Policy and Governance: Practitioners' Perspectives. Environment and 
Planning A: Economy and Space, 43(11), pp. 2688-2704. 
White House (2016). Big Data: A Report on Algorithmic Systems, Opportunity, and Civil 
Rights. [pdf] Available at: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2016_050
4_data_discrimination.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
White House (2014). Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values. Available at: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_rep
ort_may_1_2014.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Wilsdon, J., Doubleday, R. and Hynard, J. (2015). Future Directions for Scientific Advice in 
Europe. In: J. Wilsdon and R. Doubleday, eds., Future Directions for Scientific Advice. 
Cambridge: Centre for Science and Policy. [pdf] Available at: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/54004/4/future-directions-for-scientific-advice-in-europe-
v10.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2018]. 
Wood, F. B. (1982). The Status of Technology Assessment. A View from the Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 22, 
pp. 211-222. 
Youtie, J., Porter, A. L. and Huan, Y. (2017). Early Social Science Research about Big Data. 




























































































 Paper V 
 
Datafictions: Or, How Measurements and Predictive Analytics        
Rule Imagined Future Worlds  
 





Presented Version:  
 
Unpublished manuscript  










































Datafictions: Or How Measurements and Predictive Analytics 
Rule Imagined Future Worlds 
 




As the digital revolution continues and our lives become increasingly governed by smart 
technologies, there is a rising need for reflection and critical debate about where we are, 
where we are headed, and where we want to be. Against this background, the paper suggests 
that one way to foster such discussion is by engaging with the world of fiction, with 
imaginative stories that explore the spaces, places, and politics of alternative realities. Hence, 
after a concise discussion of the concept of speculative fiction, we introduce the notion of 
datafictions as an umbrella term for speculative stories that deal with the datafication of 
society in both imaginative and imaginable ways. We then outline and briefly discuss fifteen 
datafictions subdivided into five main categories: surveillance; social sorting; prediction; 
advertising and corporate power; hubris, breakdown, and the end of Big Data. In a concluding 
section, we argue for the increased use of speculative fiction in education, but also as a tool 
to examine how specific technologies are culturally imagined and what kind of futures are 
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Our world is changing rapidly and profoundly. In ever more contexts, computers, sensors, and 
software are taking command. What can be observed is the gradual replacement of human 
decision making with algorithmic systems that guide and govern everyday life. What people 
buy, read, or watch, how doctors diagnose, the police operate, or judges judge, whether 
someone qualifies for a job, a loan, or an education – to an increasing degree, modern society 
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is permeated by 'smart' digital technologies that shape and control our collective and 
individual futures. 
The changes society is undergoing are not easy to grasp. Throughout the past years, 
the computerization of everything has progressed at breakneck speed, effectively outpacing 
our ability to carefully reflect, debate, and legislate. More recently, and in part as a reaction 
to the excitement around Big Data (see Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013), one can, 
however, observe the development of a critical discourse, with a growing body of literature 
– both academic and otherwise – examining the pitfalls of a "scored society" (Citron and 
Pasquale, 2014) in which automated systems rank and rate individuals without pause or limit. 
Primary concerns range from issues around privacy and surveillance (see Lyon, 2014) over the 
potential negative effects of algorithmic bias and discrimination (see O'Neil, 2016) to 
questions around transparency and accountability (see Pasquale, 2015), all with a strong 
focus on the here and now, the problems and challenges of our early 21st-century digital 
situation. What tends to receive less attention, however, are possible longer-term 
developments and related cultural shifts – thoughtful inquiries into the what if rather than 
the what is. In a time marked by a constant state of anticipation, of "thinking and living toward 
the future" (Adams et al., 2009: 246), we concern ourselves remarkably little with the 
prospect of becoming an increasingly datafied, software-regulated society, dominated by the 
dictates of algorithmic gods. 
One reason for the lack of critical engagement with all but the most immediate 
consequences of widespread computerization is that the contours of our digital future are 
still blurry and unclear. As indicated, the pace of ICT-led innovation is high, with new products 
and services launching every day (see Jaruzelski et al., 2016), multi-sided business models 
challenging established customer-vendor relationships (see Goodman, 2015), and legislation 
not only lagging behind, but also quite different in different parts of the world (see DLA Piper, 
2017). Factors such as these add volatility and increase uncertainty, making future 
developments both hard to predict and difficult to discuss.1 Nevertheless, as scholars of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) have emphasized, the ability to engage in forward-
looking deliberation is vital for a healthy democratic system that assumes responsibility and 
prepares for the potential long-term implications of wider socio-technical change (e.g., see 
                                                        
1 For two classic versions of this argument, see Toffler (1970) and Collingridge (1980). 
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Michelson, 2016). Rather than seeking accurate predictions, however, such anticipatory 
modes of governance are said to require a broad societal capacity to "collectively imagine, 
critique, and thereby shape issues presented by emerging technologies before they become 
reified in particular ways" (Barben et al., 2008: 992-93). Consequently, a more proactive 
approach to engaging with our algorithmic future would necessitate the cultivation of a 
critical imaginative gaze that a) contextualizes new technologies within plausible future 
scenarios, b) illustrates the different ways in which these technologies could evolve, c) opens 
up technological trajectories to considerations of social desirability, and d) develops robust 
capacities to deal with – and thus govern – unforeseen consequences and events (see Karinen 
and Guston, 2010). 
 In an effort to contribute to a greater future consciousness, this article examines a 
particular kind of literature – speculative fiction – asking whether, or in what ways, the stories 
and narratives presented may encourage reflective engagement with, and a better 
understanding of, the possible detrimental effects of expanding algorithmic regulation.2  
While our review of works of fiction does not follow a strict analytical framework, our focus 
lies on power relations and their technology-provoked renegotiation. What functions do 
these technologies fulfil? What laws do they follow? What status do they acquire? What 
hierarchies do they impose? The paper is intended as a discussion starter rather than a 
definitive study or guide, arguing for the value of fiction as a tool for critical reflection and 
providing ideas for "what to read and watch before the robots take over" (Bergstein, 2017).  
The article is structured as follows. First, Section 2 defines and discusses the notion of 
speculative fiction, providing some conceptual clarifications while comparing it to its sister 
term science fiction. Section 3 then introduces the notion of datafictions as an umbrella term 
for speculative stories that deal with the datafication of society in imaginative ways. In Section 
4, we outline and briefly discuss fifteen datafictions, subdivided into five main categories: 
surveillance; social sorting; prediction; advertising and corporate power; hubris, breakdown, 
                                                        
2 Of course, the application of advanced data analytics entails not only risks but also opportunities. 
This article neither denies this nor argues for a return to an analog age. Yet, given the rate and scale 
of digital transformation, it advocates for raised awareness that certain gains and benefits may come 
at a cost. To work towards a better understanding of the nature of these costs should not be 
interpreted as a sign of innovation-blocking technophobia, but as a way of preparing for and 
navigating an already highly technologized world – and, presumably, future (see Felt, 2015; Callon et 
al., 2009 [2001]).    
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and the end of Big Data. In a concluding segment, we argue for the use of speculative fiction 
in education, but also as a tool to uncover and examine collective socio-technical imaginations 
inscribed into the spaces and places of various brave new worlds.  
 
2. On Speculative Fiction 
 
The term "speculative fiction" has a long and contested history. Its origins are usually traced 
back to an 1889 issue of Lippincott's Monthly Magazine, where two then-recent publications 
– Edward Bellamy's novel Looking Backward 2000-1887 and George Parsons Lathrop's short 
story The New Poverty – were described as "speculative fiction put in the future tense" (Egan, 
1889: 597). The notion was further popularized by the American author Robert A. Heinlein, 
who stated that he would "prefer the term to science fiction", stressing its ability to better 
capture the field's concern with "sociology, psychology, [and] esoteric aspects of biology" 
(Heinlein, 1949: 49). Heinlein was careful, however, to differentiate speculative fiction from 
fantasy, arguing that the former would "rul[e] out the use of anything as material which 
violates established scientific fact, laws of nature […], i.e., it must be possible to the universe 
as we know it" (ibid.). In a similar vein, Margaret Atwood, acclaimed author of several 
dystopian novels, has shown reluctance to classify her work as science fiction, where "things 
happen that are not possible today", instead favoring speculative fiction as a label for prose 
where "nothing inconceivable takes place, and the projected trends […] are already in 
motion" (Atwood, 2005b: 92). As Atwood explains, "We've done it, or we're doing it, or we 
could start doing it tomorrow" (ibid.). 
 While Atwood's attempt to position speculative fiction as a genre separate from and 
opposite to science fiction has not gone unchallenged (see Le Guin, 2009), the distinction 
draws attention to the issue that much of what is commonly considered science fiction 
involves dubious plots and technologies that have no or very little connection to the world 
we live in. The problem is not so much a lack of realism, but a missing cognitive link between 
the imagined and the actual, a sense that in one way or another, what could happen there 
could also happen here (see Atwood, 2011). Such a link can be rather abstract or 'on the nose', 
but it is only through jolts of recognition – e.g., engendered by historical, cultural, or technical 
references and associations – that fictional tales acquire a deeper meaning and purpose, 
effectively generating "other worlds as a comment upon our own" (Miner, 1991: 150). As 
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Atwood (2005b: 158-159) emphasizes, "The fictional world so lovingly delineated by the 
writer may bear a more obvious or a less obvious relation to the world we actually live in, but 
bearing no relation to it at all is not an option." Ultimately, it is by drawing such connections 
that speculative fiction "take[s] part in the discourses of the contemporariness" (Kuźnicki, 
2017: 18), raising questions "not only about what might happen, but also about what is 
happening" (Miner, 1991: 150).  
 Given this focus on plausible stories grounded, at least to some extent, in human 
history and experience, it should come as no surprise that the genre often addresses issues 
quite similar to those of real-life society: the unequal distribution of power, wealth, and 
privilege; the violation of civil rights and liberties under systems of oppression; racism, sexism, 
and other forms of social discrimination; environmental change and human interference with 
nature; the potential risks and harms of techno-scientific innovation, to name but a few. Yet, 
rather than directly dealing with the here and now, speculative fiction explores these issues 
in alternative realities, pushing them to extremes in "strange but imaginable" future contexts 
(see Onyett, 2016: 62). Such visions can then serve as "dire warnings […], dark shadows cast 
by the present into the future" (Atwood, 2005b: 94). They are, figuratively speaking, "what 
will happen if we don't pull up our socks" (ibid.). By showing what it might be like to live in 
such a universe, speculative novels may stimulate reflection and promote critical thinking, 
providing "rich and complex avenues for reading and rereading the world" (Thomas, 2013: 4). 
What is important here is the interaction between the narrated story and the reader. As de 
Smedt and de Cruz (2015) argue, speculative fiction's epistemic value lies in its ability to 
present fictional worlds in great detail, immersing the reader in an altered reality and allowing 
her to become emotionally invested in a concrete situation or event. Furthermore, by 
showing new technologies fully operational and graphically depicting what changes in social 
organization could mean for those affected, the genre can contribute to a better appraisal of 
the actual consequences such hypothetical situations may have, should they ever occur. It is 
for these qualities that speculative text has been lauded as a valuable resource for critical 
pedagogy (see Patch, 2014), public deliberation (see Milkoreit, 2017), but also technology 
assessment (see Miller, 2015), providing opportunities for developing a sense of "informed 
skepticism" while exploring the "social, political, and ethical implications of science [and 
technology] that are so powerfully revealed through story" (Svec & Winiski, 2013: 37). 
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 The notion of speculative fiction as outlined above has guided our literature review in 
several important ways. On the one hand, it has prompted us to discard any fictional stories 
that bear no or hardly any resemblance to the world and universe as we currently know it. 
Thereby, the cut-off point was not whether the story features space travel and aliens or not 
– a distinction Atwood makes when differentiating between sci-fi proper and speculative 
fiction (see Atwood, 2011: 115) – but rather the degree to which the topics and issues 
addressed connect to our own history and culture. For instance, despite its space-age setting, 
it is the thematization of mathematical prediction and science as a religion that makes Isaac 
Asimov's (2010) Foundation trilogy such a striking illustration of today's Big Data-invigorated 
social physics movement (see Pentland, 2014; Strogatz, 2003). Thus, while lacking in 
sociological realism, the series offers a quintessential portrayal of an enduring positivist 
dream3 – i.e., to uncover the invariant, 'natural' laws of collective human behavior (see Ball, 
2001) – providing an imaginative take on a field and vision that has gained considerable 
traction in recent years. On the other hand, the flexibility of the genre has also allowed us to 
include fictions that are so close to home they can hardly be considered sci-fi. Examples for 
this are Wilson's (2015) novel The Affinities, Egger's (2013) tech thriller The Circle, or Liu's 
(2012) short story The Perfect Match. None of these titles include technologies that either 
have not already been realized or else could not conceivably be realized at any given moment. 
Instead, they ponder what it means to be human in ever more tech-regulated environments, 
creating unsettlingly familiar sceneries and then "pushing the envelope as far as it will go" 
(Atwood, 2005a). What can be observed in such cases is a progressing conflation of fiction 
and reality, sometimes to the point where the fiction – even if recent – appears to fall behind 
the actual pace of techno-cultural change. This does not, however, imply that fictional tales 
are becoming irrelevant as tools for critical assessment and reflection, but rather, as Atwood 
(ibid.) argues, that exploring the imagination must no longer be considered a pastime, but a 
necessity, because "increasingly, if we can imagine it, we'll be able to do it."  
 Subsequently, this paper provides insight into what can broadly be subsumed under 
the label of "datafictions". After some conceptual clarifications (Section 3), we present a 
selective overview of works of fiction that may contribute to a deeper engagement with the 
logics and politics of spreading algorithmic regulation (Section 4). While by no means 
                                                        
3 Others have referred to it as the "Cartesian dream" (see Pereira and Funtowicz, 2015). 
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comprehensive or conclusive, this review hopes to serve as a starting point and guide for 
researchers, educators, and readers who wish to delve further into the subject matter.      
 
3. Datafictions: Conceptual and Methodological Considerations 
 
Whereas speculative fiction functions as a basic framing for the kind of literature we are 
interested in, the notion of "datafictions" further specifies our thematic interest. In short, we 
propose datafictions as an umbrella term for speculative stories that deal with the 
datafication of society in both imaginative and imaginable ways. While this definition is fairly 
broad, so is the range of topics and issues commonly addressed: questions of surveillance and 
control, the use of predictive analytics, the emergence of new reputation economies, the 
intricate politics of computer-curated information, the development of sophisticated AI 
systems, or society's growing dependence on technology and machines are but some of the 
subgenre's most prevalent themes. Many of these stories are bleak and dystopian, depicting 
the oppressing force of all-knowing totalitarian regimes, while others are more satirical and 
playful, commenting, for instance, on people's tendency to overshare personal information 
or to rank and rate anything that can possibly be rated and ranked. At their core, however, 
most stories are quite serious interrogations of techno-cultural dynamics and trends, inviting 
the reader not only to consider but to experience possible future scenarios through a 
protagonist's eyes and actions. Thereby, questions of power, autonomy, and identity may 
become much more tangible and 'real', effectively replacing abstract concepts with 
something that can feel uncomfortably close and personal. Narrative fiction may thus prove 
fertile ground for a more critical appreciation of data as a source of social order and control, 
their collection and analysis a key instrument of modern population management. What 
datafictions can then ultimately provide are vivid accounts of data power in action – the 
concrete practices, the laws and ethics, the immediate but also the long-term societal 
repercussions. Although imagined, these accounts may serve as a basis for further reflection, 
essentially acting as a diffracted window to our own culture and time.  
 Our search for relevant works of fiction included a reassessment of well-known genre 
classics; regular perusal of the culture and literature sections of The New York Times, The 
Guardian, ArsTechnica, and The Verge; reading through related discussions on various blogs 
and online forums; and personal conversations with scholars familiar with the subject matter. 
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Apart from fitting into the framework of speculative fiction outlined above, the main selection 
criterion was whether the problems and issues addressed in the story are pertinent to current 
debates about Big Data and algorithmic decision making. In particular, we sought to focus on 
literary and audio-visual texts – i.e., novels, short stories, films, and television shows – that 
examine the impact of technology on people's lives, the formative power these technologies 
can have, but also potential forms of resistance, if only to show their utter futility.4 All in all, 
we present and briefly discuss fifteen datafictions, most of them of a decidedly dystopian, 
techno-nightmarish nature. As indicated, this overview is neither exhaustive nor definitive, 
but rather seeks to provide some initial orientation and impetus for further exploration.  
 There are two notable omissions in our selection. First, though extremely popular, we 
are excluding stories about artificial intelligence (AI) if AI is discussed in terms of machine 
consciousness and linked to ethical debates about robot rights and human-like emotions. 
Why so? On the one hand, while existing computational models have successfully captured a 
number of cognitive and behavioral correlates of conscious information processing, to date, 
"no existing approach to artificial consciousness has presented a compelling demonstration 
of phenomenal machine consciousness, or even clear evidence that phenomenal 
consciousness will eventually be possible" (Reggia, 2013: 112). Given this, many fictional 
treatments of AI – think of the HBO series Westworld (2016), the sci-fi thriller Ex Machina 
(2014), or the robot drama A.I. Artificial Intelligence (2001) – reside in the realm of fantasy 
rather than plausible speculation. On the other hand, we would argue that the focus on 
consciousness – regardless of whether rationally conceivable or not – diverts attention from 
other AI-related issues that are already evident, and arguably much more pressing. As one 
news headline poignantly put it, "Intelligent robots don't need consciousness to turn against 
us" (Del Prado, 2015). A second, related omission concerns fictions of an oncoming singularity 
depicted as a runaway, self-improving superintelligence that far exceeds the human mind and 
intellect. More often than not, these rogue systems then strive to either enslave – as seen in, 
for example, I, Robot (2004), The Matrix (1999), Colossus: The Forbin Project (1970) – or 
eradicate – e.g. , Robopocalypse (Wilson, 2014), Computer One (Collins, 1993), The Terminator 
(1984) – humanity, no longer following the will of their increasingly obsolescent creators. 
                                                        
4 In fact, many stories – after allowing for initial bursts of hope and optimism – eventually lead to the 
pessimistic conclusion that the reigning regime cannot be weakened or overthrown and that 
resistance, under Big Brother's watchful gaze, is indeed futile. 
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While such visions might make for an entertaining plot, AI experts have argued that they rest 
on a "profound misunderstanding of both the nature of intelligence and the behavior of 
recursively self-augmenting systems" (Chollet, 2017), stressing that the development of 
artificial general intelligence (AGI) remains a far-off pipe dream. A more realistic scenario, one 
depicted in many of the datafictions mentioned below, is the continued proliferation of 
comparatively narrow, specialized AI into virtually all corners of society. Importantly, 
however, these imagined AI systems are seldom rogue or beyond human control, but serve 
specific purposes driven by certain government or corporate interests and objectives. Neither 
conscious nor ultrasmart, the technologies showcased in the selected fictions are often 
surprisingly mundane, concurring with Atwood's aforementioned warning: "We've done it, or 
we're doing it, or we could start doing it tomorrow" (2005b: 92). 
 




The rise of Big Data has been accompanied by renewed interest in a classic of dystopian fiction 
– George Orwell's (1987 [1949]) novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. In a world where Big Brother 
watches one's every move, private life has effectively come to an end. Through always-on 
telescreens and hidden microphones, the one-party government has turned society into an 
electronic panopticon: "[a]sleep or awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the 
bath or in bed – no escape" (ibid.: 29). While Orwell's vision also connects to recent debates 
around fake news and alternative facts (see Andrews, 2017), in the main, it provides a chilling 
depiction of life under constant surveillance, showcasing possible consequences such as the 
loss of individuality in a culture marked by distrust, emotional solitude, self-censorship and 
enforced conformity. What is more, the book offers a haunting illustration of the use of 
technological progress for the diminution of human liberty, sensitizing the reader to the 
interrelationship between (ICT) technology, surveillance, and social control. Consider the 
following excerpt indicating how intimate and fine-grained such tech-enabled surveillance in 
Orwell's post-World War II fiction has already become: "He […] pushed back his chair, so as 
to get as far away from the telescreen as possible. To keep your face expressionless was not 
difficult, and even your breathing could be controlled, with an effort: but you could not 
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control the beating of your heart, and the telescreen was quite delicate enough to pick it up" 
(Orwell, 1987: 82).  
 Moving from state to corporate surveillance, Dave Eggers' (2013) novel The Circle 
chronicles the rise of a data-hungry tech company and its rapid growth in influence and 
power. As a Google-Facebook-Twitter hybrid that has already devoured most of its 
competitors, the eponymous Circle seeks "full access to all data about every person" (ibid.: 
483), employing a growing variety of sensors and services to create a society where "secrets 
are crimes" (ibid.), "privacy is theft" (ibid.: 303), and "all that happens must be known" (ibid.: 
67). While the novel delves into the social and psychological consequences of extreme 
metrification and social media pressure, it also considers the effects of privately-controlled 
transparency on democracy, showcasing how the quest for improved political accountability 
can lead to an utter totalitarian nightmare. In general, it is this emphasis on the recurring gap 
between good intentions and bad solutions that makes The Circle an intriguing, provocative 
read: Child abduction is a horrible crime, but does this warrant the implantation of miniature 
tracking chips into each and every kid? More data may allow for better healthcare, but does 
this sanction a mandatory, round-the-clock monitoring of one's personal life? Back-room 
deals can undermine people's trust in public officials, but does this mean that officeholders 
should be forced to 'go clear', live streaming all of their meetings and conversations to an 
unrestricted public audience? What the Circle's followers dream of is a "new glorious 
openness, a world of perpetual light" (ibid.: 491); what they help create, however, is "the 
world's first tyrannical monopoly", a "private company [controlling] the flow of all 
information" (ibid.: 401). 
 Another dark vision of pervasive corporate surveillance is outlined in Ken Liu's (2012) 
short story The Perfect Match. In a world not too far from our own, people largely rely on 
personal AI assistants to manage their lives – what to eat, where to shop, how to relax, whom 
to date, Centillion's proprietary algorithms "always know best" (ibid.). The reason the 
software can provide such spot-on recommendations is its unrestricted access to personal 
information, including users' social media profiles, their complete search and purchase 
histories, any reviews they may give or receive, location data, audio and video streams, 
etcetera. All of these data are then used to compile user profiles, train personalized learning 
algorithms, and nudge people into commercial transactions, with the aim of boosting 
advertising revenue. What Liu's story highlights, however, is that most people give up their 
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data voluntarily, either unaware of the end user agreement terms and conditions, or else 
willingly accepting a loss of privacy and autonomy in exchange for better products and 
services. The life Liu describes is one filtered through the eyes of the machine, turning people 
into "docile", "obedient puppets" who have forgotten how to think and judge for themselves: 
"Look at you. You've agreed to have cameras observe your every move, to have every 
thought, word, interaction recorded in some distant data center so that algorithms could be 
run over them, mining them for data that marketers pay for. Now you've got nothing left 
that's private, nothing that's yours and yours alone. Centillion owns all of you. […] You buy 
what Centillion wants you to buy; you read what Centillion suggests you read; you date who 
Centillion thinks you should date. But are you really happy?" (ibid.).  
 
4.2. Social Sorting 
 
While processes of social sorting already play a role in the surveillance dystopias mentioned 
above, they figure more prominently in other fictions, a first example being Aldous Huxley's 
(2006 [1932]) canonical novel Brave New World. Whereas Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four 
envisions a violent totalitarian dictatorship, Huxley depicts a subtler, more mechanical system 
of social oppression. In a distant future, attempts to create an utmost efficient and stable 
society have led to an eradication of individuality and free will. People are bred into one of 
five castes, each chemically engineered and psychologically conditioned for specific, 
predefined tasks and duties: intellectually challenging jobs for smart-by-design Alphas, "semi-
moron work" for artificially backward Epsilons – "the principle of mass production at last 
applied to biology" (ibid.: 7). Rather than forcefully suppressed, however, caste members are 
nudged into a life of self-indulgence and complacency, nurtured by a nonstop stream of moral 
propaganda and consumption-driving advertisement. In Huxley's vision, social order thus 
follows industry interests, the happy, goods-consuming citizen an effective solution to the 
need that the "machine turns, turns and must keep on turning" (ibid.: 42). Under-
consumption, in turn, is seen as a "crime against society" (ibid.: 52), a failure to commit and 
conform to "what civilized people ought to do" (ibid.: 122). Sprinkled with a good dose of 
irony, what makes Brave New World a particularly commendable read is the attention 
devoted to the protagonists' emotional states as well as intense debates arguing the pros and 
cons of the imposed system, signifying a veritable culture clash. As the Savage, born and 
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raised in an Indian reservation, responds when reminded of the comfort the highly regulated 
life affords: "But I don't want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want 
freedom, I want goodness. I want sin. […] I'm claiming the right to be unhappy." (ibid.: 240)      
The vision of a society ruled by measurements and metrics is also played out in the 
Black Mirror TV episode "Nosedive" (Wright, 2016). Using a centralized reputation system, 
the people in this fiction constantly rank and rate each other's behavior and social media 
feeds, the aggregated score becoming a public statement of one's status and standing within 
the community. A high score means not only social prestige, but also access to better jobs 
and exclusive discounts. A low score, on the other hand, can endanger one's very existence, 
threatening career prospects as well as acceptance in society. The episode pictures people's 
constant struggle to maintain their scores, the apparent need to create and hide behind a 
fake, always-smiling persona, and the relative ease with which carefully built reputations can 
be destroyed by a few unfortunate events. While the software technically enables this culture 
of vigorous grading, it is the people themselves who fuel the system's cruelty: Though friendly 
on the surface, they have turned into hypersensitive critics of their peers, obsessed with 
"play[ing] the numbers game" because "that's how the fucking world works" (ibid.). What is 
thus most interesting about "Nosedive" is not so much the details of the technology, but the 
story's inquiry into human nature, exposing our need to judge and compare, thereby always 
looking for approval and self-validation in the form of likes, upvotes, and 5-star ratings. And 
while the episode's cinematography paints the world and its people in bright pastel colors, it 
soon becomes clear that there is something very rotten about the state of this imagined 
civilization. 
The theme of computerized social sorting is also explored in Robert C. Wilson's (2015) 
novel The Affinities. When the data-mining company InterAlia offers Affinity testing as a new 
service, the world starts to change. Based on a series of psychological assessments, people 
who qualify are placed in one of twenty-two Affinity groups where someone is "statistically 
more likely to trust others, to be trusted, to make friends, to find partners, in general to have 
successful social engagements" (ibid.: 15). While such groups can be physically, ethnically, 
and socially diverse, the members of an Affinity share certain character traits that facilitate 
interpersonal bonding, fellowship, and cooperation. Within but a few years, Affinity circles 
start to revolutionize societal dynamics: people distance themselves from their families and 
friends, preferring the company of their "tranchemates" instead; commercial networks 
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become increasingly tribal, with Affinity groups managing their own trusts and investments 
portfolios; political decision making, too, gets shaped by Affinity interests, a growing number 
of elected officials firmly in the pocket of powerful clan lobbies. What Wilson outlines is a 
post-national system of loyalty that shakes the very foundations of a society and culture. 
While also tackling questions of privatization and intellectual property, the book's central 
theme is that of algorithmic discrimination and social exclusion. Whereas acceptance to an 
Affinity group comes with a wide range of tangible benefits, those who do not qualify are left 
behind, locked out of the exclusive enclaves of their former peers: "You could put a hundred 
people together and they could live better, fuller, freer, happier, more collaborative lives – 
but only the right hundred people, not a hundred random people off the street. […] Not 
disputing it's nice inside, for anyone who can get inside. But think about what that means for 




The collection and statistical analysis of data is often driven by the goal to forecast trends and 
events. How likely is it that a particular recommendation will suit the recipient's tastes and 
preferences (The Perfect Match)? What are the probabilities that a person will fit into a 
specific group of likeminded people (The Affinities)? While predictive capacities play a role in 
many datafictions, there are some that treat the theme as a central subject matter. In Isaac 
Asimov's (2010 [1951, 1952, 1953]) Foundation trilogy, for instance, a scientist named Hari 
Seldon develops a branch of mathematics that allows him to accurately predict the future 
course of history. Having foretold the slow demise of the Galactic Empire, Seldon and his 
followers are cast into exile on a far-off planet where they attempt to preserve humanity's 
knowledge and rebuild the interstellar civilization. What is interesting is that only the first few 
chapters follow the actions of Seldon himself, the bulk of the books depicting crises and 
challenges of later generations, all perfectly predicted by the doctor's initial calculations. After 
a while, however, an unforeseen anomaly causes Seldon's predictions to fail, casting doubt 
on what was considered a proven destiny. The space saga then engages in a critical 
examination of a probabilistic science that assumes that "the laws of history are as absolute 
as the laws of physics" (ibid.: 283), pondering issues of blind trust, free will, and the limits of 
mathematical (pre)calculation. Importantly, however, Asimov's series is not a cautioning 
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dystopia, but a complex fictional treatment of the longstanding human aspiration to know 
ahead and plan in advance. And it is arguably this absence of overt moralizing that makes the 
series a particularly productive, albeit controversial (Krugman, 2012), discussion piece.   
 The theme of prediction and foresight also plays a central role in Philip K. Dick's (1991 
[1956]) short story The Minority Report. In a fictional New York City, police forces make use 
of the Precrime system to detect and detain citizens who are prophesied to commit a crime 
in the near future, thereby "successfully abolish[ing] the postcrime punitive system of jails 
and fines" (ibid.: 72). As a result, felonies have been cut down by almost one hundred percent, 
creating an all but crimeless society in which acts of violence and aggression are largely 
unknown. But the practice of pre-emptive crime prevention raises some difficult questions: 
What are the rights of those incarcerated as the police is effectively "taking in individuals who 
have broken no law" (ibid.)? How accurate are the predictions, how secure is the system, and 
is there a danger of corruption? As a society, what do we value more – personal integrity or 
statistical safety? What Dick's thriller-like story furthermore outlines is the immense 
controlling power of the analytical machineries and those in charge of them. The situation is 
worsened as there seem to be hardly any accountability structures in place, the police and 
the military being the only organizations with access to the system's forecasts. Citizens are 
thus subjugated to a black-boxed security regime with no means to appeal or get information 
about the presumed future offense. Given the recent rise of predictive policing all over the 
world (Ferguson, 2017), Dick's Minority Report no longer seems like a distant fiction, but 
should rather be regarded as a very timely and relevant read.   
Another example for society-wide pre-crime analysis can be found in the anime TV 
series Psycho-Pass (2012). In a dystopian 22nd-century Japan, people are constantly 
monitored by the Sibyl system, a super computer architecture that analyzes people's 
psychological profiles to determine their crime coefficient. If the estimated score is above a 
certain threshold, the person registers as a latent criminal with all rights being immediately 
revoked. The system then commands "enforcement action", essentially ordering authorities 
to eliminate the subject even if no crime has yet been committed. While visualizing the violent 
cruelty of the system in genre-typical extremes, the series offers thoughtful reflections on 
issues of responsibility in complex human-machine entanglements. As an officer concedes 
after nearly having shot a panicked hostage the Sibyl system deemed to be a dangerous 
threat: "I've been an enforcer for a long time now. [...] Following orders and taking down 
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preys engrained in me. My hands only know how to do what they are told, I've always obeyed 
[…]. I've taken down many latent criminals. I did what was best for society, blindly accepting 
that idea. And one day I just stopped thinking about what I was doing. It all become 
perfunctory to me. As natural an act as breathing." (ibid., episode 2) Alongside more general 
questions of justice and due diligence, the series also focuses on the importance of public 
trust, stressing that the system's acceptance crucially depends on people's belief in its 
flawless working and perfect objectivity: "They promised a society managed by fair and 
impartial machine intelligence, a law free of petty human ego. People only accepted Sibyl 
because that's what they thought they were getting." (ibid., episode 17) Following the show's 
dark plot, it soon becomes clear that this is actually not quite what people were getting.     
 
4.4. Advertising and Corporate Power 
 
Another central topic is that of targeted advertising and hyper-commercialization, Egger's 
(2013) The Circle, Liu's (2012) The Perfect Match, Huxley's (2006 [1932]) Brave New Word, 
and Black Mirror's "Nosedive" episode (Wright, 2016) being but a few examples already 
mentioned above. A particularly well-known depiction of targeted commercial content is 
shown in Steven Spielberg's film Minority Report (2012) – a loose adaptation of Dick's same-
named short story – where the main protagonist is personally addressed by surrounding 
billboards that seem to be able to detect his emotional state (extreme stress) and suggest 
various forms of relief (having a drink, going on vacation). The idea of highly personalized 
advertising is also explored in Thomas Sweterlitsch's (2014) novel Tomorrow and Tomorrow, 
a gory crime story taking place ten years after a nuclear terrorist attack has completely 
obliterated the city of Pittsburgh. People in this fiction have started to wear brain-wired 
augmented reality interfaces that project overlays onto supplementary retinal lenses. While 
these interfaces are used to watch video streams and revisit memories of the past, the system 
constantly tracks people's location and field of view, serving up ads that fit the current 
situation: "Waverly dips a biscuit into his cappuccino. Illy pitches espresso in the Adware – I 
consent and soon our waiter brings a fresh cup and biscotti [...]." (ibid.: 55) But the world of 
Tomorrow and Tomorrow is one defined by voyeuristic sensationalism and moral decline, the 
ads often linking to pornographic content matched to one's personal preferences: "I watch 
her a heartbeat too long after she returns to her game, her jersey dress rising with every 
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punch, and my Adware fills with pop-ups and redirect streams to escort services and live 
companions, to cam girls in lingerie who coo they want to meet me. […] 'I don't want any, I 
don't want them,' but the ads are better at knowing what I want than I am and ranks of girls 
march for my approval, all slight variations of Twiggy […]" (ibid.: 22).  
 While fictions such as Tomorrow and Tomorrow focus on people's individual 
experience of personalized adverts, Pohl and Kornbluth's (2003 [1953]) classic novel The 
Space Merchants features a critical portrayal of the advertising industry as such, and the 
substantial influence and power this sector can wield. The story is as follows: On an 
overpopulated planet Earth, ad agencies who have become the de facto rulers of modern 
society are looking to expand their customer base, following the credo "more people, more 
sales" (ibid.: 94f). But space on Earth is running out, with even the wealthy living in small, box-
like apartments and both water and natural proteins being scarce, expensive resources. 
Marketing experts, though, have come up with a solution: To colonize Venus and turn the 
planet's inhabitable atmosphere into the home of a thriving, and thus exploitable, new 
civilization – an entire world to loot, gut, and plunder. To achieve this, however, people must 
be nudged into wanting to go to Venus, persuading prospective colonists but also society at 
large that "the grass is greener far away" (ibid.: 16). Against this background, the book's twist-
rich plot deals with a range of issues: the ad industry's constant hunger to grow and expand; 
a professional ethos and ethics guided only by the proverbial "god of Sales" (ibid.: 8); the 
conflicting interests of producers and consumers in an economy geared toward profit 
maximization; a culture of lobbying where public officials are but puppets dancing to the 
strings of their corporate masters. The Space Merchants is not a recent publication, but in a 
world where the revenues of digital marketing companies dwarf the GDP of many nations 
(see Khanna, 2016), and where ad-selling social media platforms aim to connect ever more 
people to their version of the Internet (Shearlaw, 2016), the book seems more topical than 
ever. 
 The political influence of powerful tech corporations is also explored in Daniel F. 
Galouye's (1999 [1964]) novel Simulacron-3. In a society completely overrun by human 
pollsters, a company called Reactions, Inc. develops a computer simulation in which 
electronic avatars can be surveyed for their thoughts and opinions on advertised products. 
Since the simulated environment closely mimics that of its creators, the sampled reactions 
are indicative of a product's real-world performance: "Before we market a product, we want 
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to know who's going to buy it, how often, what they'll be willing to pay" (ibid.: 8). What soon 
becomes clear, however, is that the company's ambitions reach far beyond mere market 
research. First, by reprogramming the simulation from a market-focused to a politically-
oriented environment, the company aims to support political leaders in their campaigns, 
telling them "which cards to play – in every national and local election and on every issue" 
(ibid.: 38). Second, using the simulator for political advice, the company's CEO eventually 
plans to assume leadership himself, replacing current office holders with an industry-friendly 
cabinet: "Hall, I think you're observant enough to know I'm a man of no small ambitions. […] 
What we want is the most capable national leadership available! Can you think of a bigger 
financial empire than the one I've created? Is there anyone more logically qualified to sit in 
the White House?" (ibid.: 56) Although published decades ago during the early years of the 
computer age, Galouye's book remains incredibly timely: Though the White House is not yet 
controlled by the CEO of a major tech company, media reports have documented the crucial 
role that consultancy firms have played in recent elections (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 
2018), employing technology that is not too far from what is envisioned in Galouye's fiction. 
Given that Simulacron-3 also addresses the issue of automation-caused mass unemployment, 
the book certainly should not be missing from any datafictions reading list.   
   
4.5. Hubris, Breakdown, and The End of Big Data  
 
Continuing with another classic of speculative fiction history, Edward M. Forster's short story 
The Machine Stops (2013 [1909]) envisions an extreme case of unmitigated technology 
dependence. In Forster's fiction, mankind has largely retreated to a subterranean habitat, 
with each individual residing in its own fully automated room, serviced by a giant machine 
structure. Direct personal interaction has become rare, with people mostly communicating 
through sound and image transmitting devices, unwilling to leave the comfort of their homes, 
where the machine provides them with any amenities needed – from food and clothing to 
medicine and hot baths to music and literature. In turn, though religion is generally frowned 
upon, people have started to worship the benevolent machine, gradually forgetting that it 
was man, not God, who once created it. Thus, while people have grown increasingly reliant 
on using and interacting with the machine, they no longer understand the apparatus as a 
whole, gradually losing the ability to control it: "We created the Machine, to do our will, but 
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we cannot make it do our will now. It has robbed us of the sense of space and of the sense of 
touch, it has blurred every human relation and narrowed down love to a carnal act, it has 
paralyzed our bodies and our wills, and now it compels us to worship it" (ibid.: 30). Ultimately, 
Forster's vision is a gloomy mediation on what is lost and left behind in the name of progress 
if thought of only in terms of technical advancement and the progress of the machine. It is a 
story about a decadent, complacent society that is swallowed by its own inventions: "Man, 
the flower of all flesh, the noblest of all creatures visible, man who had once made god in his 
image, and had mirrored his strength on the constellations, beautiful naked man was dying, 
strangled in the garments that he had woven" (ibid.: 39). 
 The theme of scientific hubris and out-of-control technology is also explored in Mary 
Shelley's (2012 [1818]) horror novel Frankenstein. After being forsaken by its creator and 
shunned by humanity, an unnamed artificial creature, kind-hearted and affectionate at first, 
turns into a murderous monstrosity, driven by feelings of hatred and revenge. While some 
chapters are told from the monster's perspective, the story mainly progresses through the 
eyes of its tormented creator, Victor Frankenstein, whose neglect and failure to assume 
responsibility greatly contribute to the creature's misery and wickedness. By pondering this 
father-child relationship, the tale raises questions that remain of crucial relevance in today's 
science and engineering culture: Are there any limits to what science and technology ought 
or ought not to do? What are the moral and ethical duties of a creator towards her invention 
and the possible effects this invention may have on society? Also, as for the most part it is 
only Frankenstein who is aware of the creature's evil deeds: What are the ill-effects of secrecy 
and non-disclosure? What structures of accountability could counteract such tendencies 
towards systematic concealment and opaque operations? Shelley's novel can thus be read as 
a call for prudence and caution, but also as a reminder that technologies, once unleashed 
upon society, must continually be watched and cared5 for should we not wish to experience 
their broken-hearted wrath: "'Remember, that I am thy creature; I ought to be thy Adam, but 
I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed. […] I was benevolent 
and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous.'" (ibid.: 85). 
                                                        
5 For a more detailed discussion of Frankenstein and the significance of care, see Halpern et al. 
(2016). For an analysis of collective imaginations and practices of responsibility in collaborative 
knowledge production, see Völker (2018, forthcoming). 
 181 
 A final recommendation would be Bridle's (2016) short story The End of Big Data. In 
his text, Bridle sketches a world in which the collection and exchange of personal data has 
been banned by law. A sophisticated satellite system monitors earth, scanning infrastructure 
and transmissions to ensure that "all the mainframes that used to track and store every detail 
of [people's] lives are turned off, and stay off" (ibid.). This is necessary because a new black 
economy aims to profit from whatever data are left to scrape, trading user profiles to sustain 
the remnants of the once thriving advertising industry. The ban of personal data was caused 
by a complete breakdown of the Web's networks, followed by large-scale data breaches: 
social security numbers, passwords, emails, text messages, browsing histories, credit card 
transactions, contracts, medical records – all public and for everyone to see. Everyone 
became vulnerable and legislature decided to act: "Nothing identifying. No dossiers, no 
manila files, no cookies or patterns of life or digital signatures, nothing that could link anyone 
to anything." (ibid.) Bridle's story is a thought experiment envisioning the end of the digital 
world as we currently know it, paying particular attention to the sites and physical objects left 
behind: decommissioned data centers, disassembled routers and cooling vents, drums of 
redundant Ethernet cable, recycling crews that scrap computer parts for metals, minerals, 
and magnets. If a personal data repository is discovered, it will be destroyed, for the people 
in Bridle's tale have experienced and rebelled against its power: "Data is power. It's something 
to take from and hold over somebody else; quantified dominion. The more you have on 
someone, the more you have over them. The more personal it is, the more power, until you've 
eaten right through the skin of social relationships and into the flesh itself. The [personal data 
repository] is an ark of unqualified dominion." (ibid.)   
 
5. Final Considerations  
 
As indicated, the above overview of speculative datafictions is neither comprehensive nor 
conclusive. Rather, it is meant as an initial guide and orientation, an invitation to dig deeper 
and explore a growing body of literary and audio-visual texts relevant to the subject matter. 
What also needs to be noted is that the proposed sub-categories (surveillance, social sorting, 
prediction, etc.) should be treated as only a suggestion, as but one attempt to cluster works 
of fiction that are so varied and rich that they could be interpreted, linked, and grouped in 
many different ways. Thus, while in a sense we engage in the precarious process of "sorting 
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things out" (Bowker and Star, 1999), we seek to do so in an open and preliminary manner, 
providing a basis for further discussion rather than a definitive scheme or structure. 
 Questions of categorization aside, the overview should have conveyed a sense of the 
thematic breadth and scope covered by datafictions, but also of the ways these visions 
connect to issues around Big Data and algorithmic decision making. Going forward, we see 
two main application areas for this kind of sci-fi engagement: Frist, as often argued in the 
academic literature (e.g., see Berne and Schumer, 2005), narrative fiction can prove fertile 
ground for exploring social, ethical, and political issues around new and emerging 
technologies, thereby supporting educational efforts and the cultivation of reflexive 
capacities in students, scholars, and practitioners. As Burton and co-authors (2015: 35) 
explain, by "reframing recognizable human situations and problems in terms of unfamiliar 
settings and technology, science fiction […] can be an ideal medium for raising and exploring 
ethical concerns", making "visible the alarming and problematic aspects of a given situation 
that have become invisible in the mundane world because they have come to be regarded as 
ordinary or inevitable." From this perspective, works of fictions are primarily conceived as a 
tool for critical thinking, a way to draw people in and overcome the intellectual resistances 
some might feel towards the subject of ethics (see Pease, 2009). We concur with this 
perspective and would add that there is further need for shared collections and repositories 
that could facilitate the preparation of e.g. workshops and courses. The present article can be 
seen as an attempt to contribute to this effort. There is, however, a second area of application 
that tends to receive far less attention. Educational efforts aside, speculative fictions can also 
be used to examine how techno-scientific innovations are perceived at a given point in time 
as well as what is ultimately regarded as a desirable or undesirable future. Watching episodes 
of the British TV series Black Mirror, for instance, may give an impression of how specific 
technologies are culturally imagined and what kind of futures are considered plausible given 
current implementations and trajectories. In this regard, we recognize speculative fictions as 
valuable objects of research, conceptually no less legitimate and credible than other forms of 
future-oriented technology assessment such as mapping exercises, scenario development, or 
Delphi surveys. On the contrary, as a relatively unrestricted form of creative visioning, such 
narratives can expand the spectrum of what can reasonably be imagined, enabling 
comparative analysis between dominant and counter discourses (see Hajer, 2006), and 
possibly even serve as a necessary corrective to political and industry hyperbole (e.g., see 
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Rieder, 2018). In that sense, speculative fictions do not just imagine futures, but envision 
alternative paths and realities that can challenge the agenda-driven storylines of public-
private stakeholders. We thus believe that a responsible research and innovation process 
should take into consideration the visions and worries put forth in speculative fictions, 
acknowledging the genre as a fruitful site for investigating broader cultural narratives and 
imaginations. 
As mentioned, we hope that this paper marks only the beginning of more consistent 
academic interest in what we propose to call datafictions. The time seems right as processes 
of computerization and datafication continue to pose considerable social, ethical, and 
political challenges – from security to privacy to algorithmic bias and discrimination. There is 
no lack of relevant material: besides a proliferation of genre-specific publications, the fictional 
treatment of speculative data cultures has entered the mainstream. Jonathan Franzen's 
(2015) novel Purity, for example, can easily be regarded a datafiction from a 'serious', critically 
acclaimed author whose work would usually not be placed in, or even near, the science fiction 
genre. If one also takes into consideration that recent movies from the Marvel superhero 
universe feature visually striking examples of data-driven decision making – think of Project 
Insight in Captain America: The Winter Solider (2014) or Peter Parker's AI suite in Spider-Man: 
Homecoming (2017) – it becomes clear that datafictions no longer linger at the periphery of 
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